Spinks v. First Christian Church of Vera

• Decision Date: 24 June 1925
• Docket Number: (No. 514-4190.)
• Citation: 273 S.W. 815
• Parties: SPINKS et al. v. FIRST CHRISTIAN CHURCH OF VERA.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 815

273 S.W. 815

SPINKS et al. v. FIRST CHRISTIAN CHURCH OF VERA.

(No. 514-4190.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

June 24, 1925.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Second Supreme Judicial District.

Trespass to try title by the First Christian Church of Vera against R. C. Spinks and others. Judgment for defendants was reversed, and judgment rendered for plaintiff by the Court of Civil Appeals (260 S. W. 1073), and defendants bring error. Reversed, and judgment of district court affirmed.

D. J. Brookreson, of Benjamin, for plaintiffs in error.

Dickson & Newton, of Seymour, for defendant in error.

POWELL, P. J.

The nature and result of this case have been admirably stated by the Court of Civil Appeals, as follows:

"This was a suit in trespass to try title, instituted by the First Christian Church of Vera, Tex., against the Vera Baptist Church, to recover two acres of land situated in the town of Vera, and from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff has appealed.

"W. T. Ward was the common source of title. The plaintiff claimed title under a deed, date May 10, 1912, reciting a cash consideration paid of $10, executed by Ward, conveying the property in controversy to J. C. Gray and Van D. Alford, as elders of the plaintiff church, and their successors in office. The deed was duly filed for record in the deed records of Knox County on the same day it was executed, in the usual form of a conveyance with warranty of title, with the exception only of the following provisions:

"`It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that this conveyance is for the use and benefit of the said First Christian Church of Vera, Tex. It is further agreed and understood by and between the parties hereto that in event the said First Christian Church shall fail to erect upon said premises a church building within 24 months from date of this deed that then in that event the title to said premises shall revert to the said W. T. Ward, and this conveyance shall become null and void. And in event the said Christian Church shall erect said building within said time then in that event the title of the said First Christian Church in and to said tract of land shall become absolute.'

"The defendant claimed title under a deed dated October 24, 1921, purporting to convey the property in controversy to R. C. Spinks, J. J. Collier, and A. E. Boyd, deacons of the defendant church and their successors in office, for the use and benefit of the defendant, and reciting a cash consideration paid of the sum of $300. That deed is in the usual form of a conveyance with warranty of title, and purports to convey an absolute fee-simple title.

"It thus appears that plaintiff's deed had been executed and filed for record 9 years 5 months and 14 days before the execution of the deed in favor of the defendant.

"Plaintiff never erected a church building on the property, and by reason of its failure to do so the trial court held, in effect, that under and by virtue of the stipulations in its deed plaintiff's title ceased and terminated at the expiration of the 24-month period fixed in the deed, and for that reason decreed title in the defendant under its deed from Ward and wife.

"The defendant seeks to sustain the judgment of the trial court upon the theory that the stipulation quoted from the deed to plaintiff constituted a limitation of title, and not a condition subsequent. Obviously, that was the view taken by the trial judge.

"The appellant's contention is that the clause in its deed mentioned above did not constitute a limitation of title, but was a condition subsequent; that the breach of that condition did not, ipso facto, revest title in the grantor, and that the grantor's deed to the defendant conveyed no title because prior to its execution he had lost his right to claim a reversion of title as against plaintiff by his failure for an unreasonable length of time to assert such right of reversion."

Upon appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals sustain the contention of the Christian Church, quoted in the preceding paragraph of this opinion. The order of that court was as follows:

"For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. Judgment would be here rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the property in controversy, but, since the issue of damages for destruction of the timber has not been determined, the cause will be remanded. And, in view of our conclusions that the record shows without controversy that W. T. Ward waived his right to claim a reversion of title as against plaintiff for failure to erect a church building, it is unnecessary to determine the merits of other assignments presented in appellant's brief, to the effect that plaintiff established title by limitation."

In order to secure a final judgment, the Christians waived their claim for the timber the Baptists had cut in clearing the 2 acres. Therefore, in its opinion on rehearing, the Court of Civil Appeals held:

"Since the rendition of our judgment on original hearing appellant has filed an offer to remit any claim for the value of timber destroyed by appellee on the land in controversy. As indicated in our original opinion, the case was remanded for another trial solely by reason of that claim. With that claim now eliminated, it follows from our former conclusions that judgment must be and the same is here rendered in favor of appellant for the land in controversy, the judgment of the trial court having been already reversed; and appellees' motion for rehearing is overruled."

See 260 S. W. 1073.

A deed must be construed by reading all of its provisions. They must be made to harmonize in all their provisions, wherever possible. Each clause must be given effect, unless inconsistent the one with the other. Now this deed to the elders of the Christian Church was in the form of a general warranty deed, except for its provisions already quoted by the Court of Civil Appeals. These provisions followed the granting clause and preceded the habendum and warranty clauses in the deed. Those conditional clauses constituted the very essence of the deed. They gave expression to the all-controlling purpose of the grantor. Giving effect to this deed, as a whole, the condition was precedent rather than subsequent. In the case of Wiederanders v. State, 64 Tex. 133, Judge Stayton quoted with approval the following definitions by Kent:

"`A precedent condition is one which must take place before the estate can vest or be enlarged.' 4 Kent, 125; 2 Black, 154.

"Conditions subsequent `are those which operate upon estates already created and vested, and render them liable to be defeated.'" 4 Kent, 126; 2 Black, 154.

Still further Judge Stayton quotes with approval the following from Kent:

"`Words of limitation mark the period which is to determine the estate; but words of condition render the estate liable to be defeated in the intermediate time, if the event expressed in the condition arises before the determination of the estate, or completion of the period described by the limitation. The one specifies the utmost time of continuance, and the other marks some event which, if it takes place in the course of that time, will defeat the estate. The material distinction between a condition and a limitation consists in this: that a condition does not defeat the estate, although it be broken, until entry by the grantor or his heirs. But it is in the nature of a limitation to determine the estate when the period of limitation arises without entry or claim.' 4 Kent, 127."

These definitions have always been recognized in Texas. The difficulty arises in construing the deed in each case. In the case of Stevens v. Railway Co., 212 S. W. 639, this section of the Commission of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge McClendon, reviews the authorities. In that case, the court said:

"While the legal attributes of the two estates under consideration are well defined and clearly distinguished, difficulty often arises when construing particular instruments in determining whether they fall within one or the other class. In this question of construction the chief difficulty lies. Certain general principles have from time to time been laid down, but it is not always easy to apply these principles to the particular case."

As just stated, the difficulty arises in construing the deed in suit. As already declared by us, however, we think this deed is in no sense upon a condition subsequent. Rather, it is upon a condition precedent, with a limitation as to when that condition may be performed. Under the evidence in this case, and as shown by the deed, Ward wanted a Christian Church in his neighborhood. He was willing to give the church the 2 acres of land for that purpose. The one condition was that a church be constructed within 24 months. He made no requirements as to the value of the church building, nor its style of architecture nor whether it be built on credit or for cash. Nor did he provide that the deed would remain valid and binding only so long as the church building was used for worship. Requirements of this kind are generally present in school, church, gin, compress, and railway depot lots. He simply provided that, if one thing be done within a given time, the deed should become effective; otherwise it would be "null and void." In other words, the deed was lying dormant until it should be vitalized and given life by the performance of this condition precedent. The deed merely gave to this church this right to acquire title to this lot by doing a certain thing beforehand. It required affirmative action to bring the deed into being. It was not a question of defeating a deed already in force, as must be true in a condition subsequent. We have been unable to find a deed just like the one at bar. The intention of the grantor here is made quite clear. He shows beyond a doubt that the deed merely conveys a right to these people to acquire title....