Spivey v. State of Ohio
| Citation | 999 F.Supp. 987 |
| Decision Date | 06 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:97CV2308.,No. 1:97CV2309.,1:97CV2308.,1:97CV2309. |
| Parties | Linda SPIVEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF OHIO, Defendant, Tanya MIXON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF OHIO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Joyce Goldstein, Bryan P. O'Connor, James A. Ciocia, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiffs in 197CV2308.
Roger F. Carroll, James G. Tassie, Christopher M. Culley, Office of the Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for Defendants in 197CV2308.
Scott H. Schooler, George L. Forges, Mark A. McClain, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiffs in 197CV2309.
Roger F. Carroll, James G. Tassie, Christopher M. Culley, Office of the Attorney General, Columbus, OH, Frederick R. Nance, Brenda M. Johnson, Stegen A. Friedman, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants in 197CV2309.
These two consolidated actions arise under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. and the Constitution of the State of Ohio. The Plaintiffs are taxpayers, registered voters who either have children attending the Cleveland Public Schools or are employed by the Cleveland School District and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Cleveland Branch. They are seeking declaratory relief to prevent implementation of Substitute House Bill No. 269 (H.B.269) passed by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio for the purpose of creating the classification of "municipal school district," changing the number of members and organization of the Cleveland School District Board of Education, placing the Mayor of the City of Cleveland in charge of the Cleveland School District and eliminating all licensing, experimental and educational requirements for appointees employed in positions with responsibilities similar to those of superintendent, treasurer and business manager in all other school districts in the State of Ohio. This matter is before the Court upon cross motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed in both cases.
With regard to the standard to be applied, Rule 12(c) provides:
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
In determining whether H.B. 269 violates the United States and Ohio Constitutions, the Court will have to consider whether a rational basis exists for its enactment. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). The Plaintiffs argue that consideration of justification for enactment of H.B. 269 involves matters outside the pleadings requiring the 12(c) motion to be treated as a motion for summary judgment.
In Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10 (6th Cir.1987), the defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings but requested relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Sixth Circuit ruled that where a 12(b)(6) defense is raised in a 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the standard for deciding a 12(b)(6) motion is used. Id. at 11. A complaint may be dismissed if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The facts pleaded by the plaintiff must be accepted as true and the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences may not be accepted as true. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d at 12.
Rule 12(b) also provides that, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), if matters outside the pleadings are considered, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment. However, a court may go outside the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in determining whether a statute bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Mahone v. Addicks Utility District of Harris County, 836 F.2d 921, 936 (5th Cir.1988). The Court in Mahone explained that going outside the complaint to hypothesize reasons for enacting a statute will not conflict with the requirement that the pleaded facts be accepted as true. Id. Truth is not the issue in such case and using discovery procedures to develop facts showing the state's true reasons for its actions could be inefficient and unnecessary. Id.
The Seventh Circuit allows an equal protection action requiring a rational basis review to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In order "to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality that applies to governmental classifications." Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 460 (7th Cir.1992). A conclusory assertion that the state's enactment of the statute is without rational bases is insufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality when justification is readily apparent. Id. See, Shanks v. Forsyth County Park Authority, 869 F.Supp. 1231, 1236 (M.D.N.C.1994).
The justification for H.B. 269 is readily apparent. There is no dispute that the Cleveland City School District has been financially and operationally troubled. In 1996, the "Cleveland Summit on Education" was convened to find a solution to this problem. The Summit created the Cleveland City Schools Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee) to examine government systems for urban school districts throughout the country and to recommend a better system for the Cleveland City School District. The Advisory Committee found that elected boards of education had very high turnover ratios and often did not consist of qualified individuals. Because of success in implementing appointed boards of education in Boston, Baltimore and Chicago, the Advisory Committee recommended that the Cleveland City School District be governed by an appointed board instead of an elected board of education. The Ohio General Assembly accepted the Advisory Committee's recommendation, and on July 22, 1997, passed H.B. 269 thereby enacting Ohio Revised Code §§ 3311.71-.77, and amending O.R.C. §§ 102.02, 3313.02, 3313.04, 3313.11, 3313.70, 3315.15 and 3329.08.
H.B. 269 created a new classification of school district known as a "municipal school district." A municipal school district is defined as "a school district that is or has ever been under a federal court order requiring supervision and operational, fiscal and personnel management of the district by the state superintendent of public instruction." O.R.C. § 3311.71(A)(1).
Upon the release of a municipal school district from a federal court supervision order, the management and control of the municipal school district is immediately assumed by a new nine-member board of education whose members are appointed by the mayor of the municipal corporation having the greatest portion of territory in the municipal school district. The Cleveland City School District is composed of the Villages of Bratenahl, Linndale and Newburgh Heights, a portion of Garfield Heights and the City of Cleveland. Because the City of Cleveland has the greatest portion of territory in the Cleveland City School District, the Mayor of Cleveland would appoint the new board members if the Court finds that H.B. 269 is constitutional. The nine board members are selected from a slate of at least 18 candidates nominated by a "municipal school district nominating panel." O.R.C. § 3311.71(B)(C). The panel consists of three parents or guardians of children attending the schools in the municipal school district, appointed by the district's parent-teacher organization or similar organization selected by the state superintendent; three persons appointed by the mayor; one person appointed by the president of the legislative body of the municipal corporation containing the greatest portion of territory in the municipal school district; a school teacher, appointed by the collective bargaining representative of the school district's teachers; a school principal, selected by a vote of the school district's principals; a representative of the business community, appointed by an organized collective business entity selected by the mayor; and a president of a public or private institution of higher education located within the municipal school district, appointed by the state superintendent. O.R.C. § 3311.71(C). The nominees must reside within the municipal school district and at least one member must reside in the municipal school district but not in the municipal corporation containing the greatest portion of the district's territory. O.R.C. § 3311.71(D). Four of the nine members shall have displayed, prior to appointment, significant expertise in either education, finance or business management. Id. In addition to the nine members appointed by the mayor, the president of a state university or community college located within the municipal school district shall serve as a nonvoting ex officio member. O.R.C. § 3311.71(G).
For the first thirty months after appointment of the board, the mayor also appoints the chief executive officer and fills any vacancies in that position. O.R.C. § 3311.72(B)(1). Subsequent action with respect to the chief executive officer requires the concurrence of the board. O.R.C. § 3311.72(B)(2).
The members of the board serve until a mandatory referendum is held to determine whether the mayor shall continue...
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