Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger

• Decision Date: 11 December 1920
• Docket Number: 16150,16164.
• Citation: 194 P. 595,113 Wash. 359
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: SPOKANE HOTEL CO. v. YOUNGER et al. HOTEL CO. OF TACOMA v. SAME.

194 P. 595

113 Wash. 359

SPOKANE HOTEL CO. v. YOUNGER et al.

HOTEL CO. OF TACOMA v. SAME.

Nos. 16150, 16164.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

December 11, 1920

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John M. Wilson, Judge.

Action by the Spokane Hotel Company against C. H. Younger and others, constituting the Industrial Welfare Commission together with an action by the Hotel Company of Tacoma against the same defendants. From an order dismissing the actions, which sought to restrain the enforcement of an order of the Commission, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Thos D. Rockwell, of Seattle, and Hayden, Langhorne & Metzger, of Tacoma, for appellants.

Lindsay L. Thompson, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

MOUNT J.

This appeal is from an order of the lower court dismissing an action brought by the appellants to restrain the industrial welfare commission from enforcing the following order:

'To Whom It May Concern:

'Take Notice: That pursuant to the authority in it vested by chapter 174 of the Session Laws of the state of Washington, for 1913, and pursuant to the recommendations of the public housekeeping conference of representatives of employers and employés in the different occupations in the public housekeeping industry throughout the state, together with the representatives of the public, duly held after investigation of such industry, which said recommendations were duly approved by said industrial welfare commission.

'The term 'public housekeeping' shall include the work of: Cooks, housekeepers, linen room girls, chambermaids cleaners, kitchen girls, dishwashers, pantry girls, pantry servers, waitresses, counter girls, bus girls, bell hops checkers, cashiers, elevator operators, janitresses, laundry workers (where a laundry is not maintained in the establishment), and any other occupation which would properly be classified under public housekeeping. The establishments shall include: Hotels, rooming houses, boarding houses, restaurants, cafés, cafeterias, lunchrooms, tearooms, apartment houses, cookhouses in camps, hospitals (not nurses), philanthropic institutions, and any other which may be properly classified under this industry.

'The industrial welfare commission for the state of Washington does hereby order:

'(1) That no person, firm, association, or corporation shall employ any female over the age of eighteen years in any occupation in the public housekeeping industry throughout the state, at a weekly wage rate of less than eighteen dollars ($18.00) or $3.00 per day of 37 1/2c per hour, such wage being the estimate of said conference of the minimum wage adequate to supply the neceesary cost of living and to maintain them in health and comfort.

'(2) That no person, firm, association or corporation shall employ any female over the age of eighteen years in any occupation in the public housekeeping industry throughout the state more than six days in any one week.

'(3) That no person, firm, association or corporation shall employ any female over the age of eighteen years in any occupation in the public housekeeping industry throughout the state more than five hours without a rest period of at least one-half hour; that a schedule of hours be posted in all cases.

'(4) That where a uniform be required it must be furnished and laundered by the employer.

'(5) That when meals are furnished to employés the time used in eating may be deducted in arranging the schedule; that if the room be furnished same must be properly heated and sanitary.

'(6) That there must be separate toilets for women and a suitable room provided for change of clothing and for eating lunches.

'(7) That women shall not be employed as 'bell hops' nor serve as elevator operators after 12:00 at night.

'(8) That when board is furnished $1.00 per day may be deducted; and for room furnished $2.00 per week may be deducted; that 25c may be deducted for breakfast, 35c for lunch and 40c for dinner; that in every case there shall be a definite agreement as to whether board and room shall or shall not be furnished; that otherwise the straight wage schedule shall prevail.

'(9) This order shall become effective sixty (60) days from the date hereof, or June 2, 1920, and supersedes all other orders heretofore issued covering this industry.'

The complaint alleges in substance that the plaintiffs were operating large hotels and employing a number of women therein as chambermaids, linen room workers, laundry workers and cleaners, none of whom were paid less than $13.20 per week, the minimum wage prior to June 20, 1920; that the order above quoted, made on June 20, 1920, was made without authority; that no public hearings were had, and plaintiffs had no notice or opportunity to be heard in regard thereto; that the minimum wage of $18 per week of six days is arbitrary, unreasonable, and confiscatory to plaintiffs' property. The prayer is for an order enjoining the industrial welfare commission from enforcing the order.

On issues joined the case was tried to the court and resulted in a dismissal. This appeal followed.

The appellants argue that the statute under which the industrial welfare commission acted is unconstitutional: (1) Because it violates section 3, article 1, of the Constitution of this state, and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; (2) because public hearings were not held by the commission; (3) because the commission was without authority to fix a weekly wage of six days or to fix a rate for room and board. We shall consider these points in the order stated.

1. The appellants argue that this statute is void because it violates the constitutional provision that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.' In Larsen v. Rice, 100 Wash. 642, 171 P. 1037, the constitutionality of this act was attacked. The provisions of the act are there summarized, and need not be repeated here. It was there held that the act was a valid act. That decision was based upon Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Or. 519, 139 P. 743, L. R. A. 1917C, 944, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 217, and Simpson v. O'Hara, 70 Or. 261, 141 P. 158, Id., 243 U.S. 629, 37 S.Ct. 475, 61 L.Ed. 937. The appellants here apparently concede that the subject of the act is within the police power of the Legislature as a measure to insure the public health, welfare, and safety, and do not attack the act upon that ground, but insist that the act makes no provision for notice to persons affected by the act and for that reason is void. It is insisted that this question was neither presented nor considered in the case of Larsen v. Rice, supra; that the Oregon statute makes provision for notice and a hearing while our statute makes no provision for notice to persons affected by the order. Counsel for appellants cite a large number of cases from the Supreme Court of the United States and other courts to the effect that where individual rights or property is taken there must be notice and an opportunity to be heard. Most of these cases, if not all of them, are cases affecting the rates to be charged by common carriers and are judicial in their nature. These cases are readily distinguishable from the case before us, because the duties of the industrial welfare commission as fixed by the act under consideration are administrative and not judicial. In the case of G. O. Miller Telephone Co. v. Minimum Wage Commission (Minn.) 177 N.W. 341, which is a case very similar to the one before us, the Supreme Court of Minnesota said:

'The minimum wage commission is an administrative body. It does not determine hours of labor or prescribe conditions of employment or work out the rights of the employer and employé except in so far as its fixing of a minimum wage under conditions prescribed by the statute has such effect. Legislative power is not delegated to it nor judicial power conferred upon it. It has the administrative authority which is conferred by the statute. In performing the duties with which it is charged it must be permitted to proceed in a practical way so as to accomplish the lawful results intended. It must be permitted to exercise judgment and discretion in working out the details of administration and establish some sort of administrative regulations. This does not mean that it has either delegated legislative or judicial power. The Legislature determines the policy of the statute. The review by a court of the orders of the commission is limited to

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