Spoone v. Newsome Chevrolet Buick

• Decision Date: 04 June 1991
• Docket Number: No. 1713,1713
• Citation: 412 S.E.2d 434,306 S.C. 438
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: James L. SPOONE, Appellant, v. NEWSOME CHEVROLET BUICK and the Randolph W. Hope Company, Inc., Respondents. . Heard

Page 434

412 S.E.2d 434

306 S.C. 438

James L. SPOONE, Appellant, v. NEWSOME CHEVROLET BUICK and the Randolph W. Hope Company Inc., Respondents.

No. 1713.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard June 4, 1991.

Decided Oct. 28, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 24, 1992.

Certiorari Granted May 6, 1992.

D. Michael Kelly, of Suggs & Kelly, Columbia, for appellant.

Douglas J. Robinson and Robert J. Sheheen, both of Savage, Royall & Sheheen, Camden, for respondents.

BELL, Judge:

This is a statutory proceeding for worker's compensation. James L. Spoone filed a claim for benefits against his employer, Newsome Chevrolet Buick, Inc. The single commissioner awarded compensation and the full commission affirmed. Newsome appealed to the circuit court. The court reversed the award on the ground that the claim was barred by Section 42-9-60, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, which prohibits compensation if the injury was occasioned by the intoxication of the employee. Spoone appeals. We affirm.

The facts of the case are stipulated. Newsome employed Spoone as a car salesman in Columbia, South Carolina. During December, 1985, Newsome's management promoted a month long sales contest between two teams of employees. The winning team would receive a steak dinner party. This party was one of a series of social events which were regularly held by Newsome to promote sales. Spoone's team won the contest.

The party was held on January 8, 1986. In addition to the dinner, Newsome provided a serve yourself "open bar" with liquor and beer. Spoone left the party highly intoxicated to drive home in a "demonstrator" car Newsome furnished for his personal use. He sustained serious injuries when he "flipped" the car on the highway. At the time of the accident he was legally intoxicated. The parties agree that the accident was caused by his intoxication. For purposes of this appeal, Newsome has abandoned any argument that Spoone was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

The single commissioner concluded Spoone suffered compensable injuries. He reasoned that since the employer provided an "open bar" to its employees with the knowledge they would be drinking and driving, it should be equitably estopped from raising Section 42-9-60 as a defense. The circuit court held that equitable estoppel could not be invoked to nullify the prohibition of a mandatory statute.

The narrow issue presented for our decision is whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be used to overcome the bar of Section 42-9-60. This is a question of first impression in South Carolina.

As a general rule, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may not be invoked to nullify a mandatory statutory restriction. Freeman v. Fisher, 288 S.C. 192, 341 S.E.2d 136 (1986). The rule rests on the principle that equity will not prevail over a positive enactment of the legislature. Town of Zebulon v. Dawson, 216 N.C. 520, 5 S.E.2d 535 (1939). There is a sound reason for this principle. An important function of legislation is to consider and to balance the competing interests and equities arising from the conduct of human affairs. Worker's compensation laws are a classic example of this legislative balancing of the equities. See Cook v. Mack's Transfer & Storage, 291 S.C. 84, 352 S.E.2d 296 (Ct.App.1986), cert. denied, 292 S.C. 230, 355 S.E.2d 861 (1987) (statute embodies legislative balancing of advantages between employer and employee to afford widest practical coverage for work related injuries). When the legislature has struck a balance by enacting a statutory rule, the courts have no prerogative to annul the legislative choice by applying "chancellor's foot" notions of equity in its place. Stated differently, "[I]t is not the province of this Court to perform legislative functions." Henderson v. Evans, 268 S.C. 127, 130, 232 S.E.2d 331, 333 (1977). The function of equity is to supplement the law, not to displace it. See Town of Zebulon v. Dawson, supra.

In this case, the language of the statute is plain and unqualified. It lists no exceptions. We cannot, under the guise of doing equity, allow what the General Assembly has expressly prohibited.

AFFIRMED.

SHAW, J., concurs.

GARDNER, J., dissents with separate opinion.

GARDNER, Judge (dissenting):

I respectfully dissent. My dissent is based upon my conviction that the trial judge by the appealed order and my brothers of the majority opinion err in several respects. First, it is my conviction that S.C.Code Ann. Section 42-9-60 (1976) is a mandatorily restrictive statute but is not a statute which applies to the facts of this case. And second, I would hold that in view of the law of this state pertaining to the possession of alcoholic beverages on business premises, other than retail liquor stores and businesses with mini-bottle licenses, that Newsome Chevrolet Buick's (NCB) conduct was so inconsistent with the defense of intoxication as to amount to an intentional waiver which worked an estoppel as to that defense.

My research reveals that S.C.Code Ann. Section 61-13-260 (1976), much to my approval, provides "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to store or have in possession any alcoholic liquors in his place of business other than a licensed liquor store...." S.C.Code Ann. Section 61-5-20 (1976) sets forth the places where alcoholic liquor may be lawfully possessed and lawfully consumed. Section 61-5-20(2)(a) and (b) provides:

(2) Any person may possess or consume alcoholic liquors:

(a) In a private residence, hotel room or motel room;

(b) Or on any other property not engaged in any business or commercial activity,....

[Emphasis ours.]

Section 61-5-20(4) provides that it is legal to sell and consume under certain circumstances alcoholic liquors and beverages sold in sealed containers of two ounces or less. Our Supreme Court has construed this statute's predecessor, the brown bagging law, to be in pari materia with Section 61-13-260 and held, in effect, that Section 61-13-260 is inapplicable in those places and times when it is legal to sell and consume mini-bottles. Lewis v. Gaddy, 254 S.C. 66, 173 S.E.2d 376 (1970).

S.C.Code Ann. Section 61-5-110 (1976) provides that a violation of Section 61-5-20 shall constitute a misdemeanor.

With the above-noted exceptions of retail liquor stores and businesses licensed to sell mini-bottles, Sections 61-13-260, 61-5-20(2)(a) and (b) and 61-5-110 read together make it unlawful for a person engaged in business or a commercial activity to possess or serve for consumption alcoholic beverages in his place of business.

The result of the majority opinion, in my opinion, rewards the violation of these statutes and works an unjust and illegal forfeiture of workers' compensation. I cannot concur in this contradiction of the announced public policy of our state.

As noted in the majority opinion, Section 42-9-60 provides that an injury will not be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act if it is caused by intoxication. I would hold that the Legislature did not intend this section to be applicable in those situations where an employer, who has neither a retail liquor store license nor a mini-bottle license, in violation of Sections 61-13-260 and 61-5-20(2)(a) and (b) possesses liquor in the work place, supplies the liquor, encourages his employees to drink liquor on the job, and then allows the employee to drive a company provided automobile.

I would hasten to add that the facts of this case are very different from those of Christmas parties or other gatherings to which spouses are invited and attendance is neither implicitly nor explicitly required.

I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Background Considerations

The fundamental premise of this dissent is that the room rented by NCB was a place of business because the purposes for renting the room were sales motivation and sales promotion. Management paid for the rooms, the liquor, the set-ups, and the dinner. And, ostensibly, management considered this money well spent as a legitimate and tax deductible business expense. The room was, therefore, a place of business rented for business purposes. It was, I would hold, an extension of NCB's main place of business.

I question my brothers' characterization of the meeting as a party or a social event. It was social only insofar as the word has a connotation of being about the interaction of human beings. It was a party room only insofar as management furnished liquor with the subtle coercion of a boss suggesting that the worker have a drink with him. It was a situation in which an invitation was equivalent to a command. Spouses were not invited. Management personnel made speeches. The purpose was purely to motivate the salesmen to make more sales. This was the purpose and the meeting would not have been held without the hope of management that this purpose be accomplished.

Analysis

In analyzing this case, I fear it is so easy and comfortable to get hung up on the idea that Spoone voluntarily drank the liquor and became intoxicated and the fault was therefore all his own. This I think is patently erroneous reasoning lacking a clear view of the frailties of man, the realities of the real facts of life, the announced public policy of this state, and the announced law of this state. These considerations require, except in cases where it becomes a matter of law, that the fact finder in certain relationships be given the leeway of determining whether the supplying of the liquor, as opposed to the drinking thereof, is the cause of the accident. This Court in an analogous situation in the case of Christiansen v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 328 S.E.2d 351 (1985) adopted the "Dramshop" rule in South Carolina. There this Court held, in effect, non-demurrable an allegation that a shopkeeper in violation of a statute sold alcohol to an intoxicated plaintiff and the providing of the alcohol, as opposed to the drinking thereof, might be the proximate...