Spooner v. City of Phx.
Decision Date | 27 November 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CV 17-0500,1 CA-CV 17-0500 |
Citation | 435 P.3d 462,246 Ariz. 119 |
Parties | Evelyn Lee SPOONER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CITY OF PHOENIX, et al., Defendants/Appellees. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Debus Kazan & Westerhausen, Ltd., Phoenix, By Tracey Westerhausen, Larry L. Debus, Gregory M. Zamora, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
Burch & Cracchiolo, Phoenix, By Melissa Iyer Julian, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
¶ 1 Evelyn Spooner appeals from a judgment entered in favor of the City of Phoenix and Toni Brown (collectively, the City) on her civil claims arising from a purported wrongful arrest. Spooner argues the trial court erred by precluding her from using Brown’s grand jury testimony to impeach Brown’s credibility at trial and directing a verdict on her simple negligence claim. We affirm the preclusion of Brown’s grand jury testimony and hold that a law enforcement officer is not subject to civil liability for simple negligence arising from an investigation into criminal activity. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
¶ 2 In 2009, Brown, a detective with the Phoenix Police Department, began investigating Spooner’s financial relationship with ninety-five-year-old Mary B. At a 2011 grand jury proceeding, Brown testified about her investigation, and the grand jury indicted Spooner for three counts of theft from a vulnerable adult and one count of unlawful use of a power of attorney. The State later dismissed the criminal charges, and Spooner then filed suit against the City asserting purported constitutional violations, simple negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious arrest. Spooner supported these claims with allegations that Brown lied to the grand jury, withheld exculpatory evidence, and failed to properly investigate Spooner’s relationship with Mary.1
¶ 3 After the close of evidence in an eight-day civil jury trial, the trial court entered judgment as a matter of law in the City’s favor on Spooner’s claims for simple negligence, malicious arrest, and constitutional violations. The jury then found for the City on the claims for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Spooner timely appealed the final judgment, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1)2 and -2101(A)(1).
¶ 4 At oral argument on appeal, Spooner conceded that grand jury witnesses enjoy absolute immunity for claims arising from their testimony. See Green Acres Tr. v. London , 141 Ariz. 609, 613, 688 P.2d 617, 621 (1984) ; see also Rehberg v. Paulk , 566 U.S. 356, 369, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012). She argues, however, that the trial court deprived her of due process when it precluded her use of Brown’s grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes at trial. The court precluded the testimony after finding both: (1) that "allowing introduction of the grand jury testimony ... would effectively operate to circumvent the absolute immunity of [a grand jury] witness," and (2) that the probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues—namely, "the appropriate scope of the use of the grand jury testimony relative to the remaining liability claims."
¶ 5 Spooner argues that evidence of Brown’s purported false testimony to the grand jury is relevant to Brown’s credibility, relying upon Marshall v. Randall , 719 F.3d 113, 116-18 (2d Cir.2013) ( ). We do not reach the general issue of admissibility, however, because we find no error in the exclusion of the evidence under Rule 403. Even relevant evidence is subject to exclusion "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury." Ariz. R. Evid. 403. "Because ‘probative value’ and ‘the danger of unfair prejudice’ are not easily quantifiable factors, we accord substantial discretion to the trial court in the Rule 403 weighing process." Hudgins v. Sw. Airlines, Co. , 221 Ariz. 472, 481, ¶ 13, 212 P.3d 810, 819 (App. 2009) (citing State v. Gibson , 202 Ariz. 321, 324, ¶ 17, 44 P.3d 1001, 1004 (2002) ). The decision to preclude impeachment evidence is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Gasiorowski v. Hose , 182 Ariz. 376, 382, 897 P.2d 678, 684 (App. 1994) (citing Selby v. Savard , 134 Ariz. 222, 227, 655 P.2d 342, 347 (1982) ).
¶ 6 The record reflects that the trial court carefully considered the scope and purpose of absolute immunity in judicial proceedings, including warnings from both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court against allowing parties to "circumvent" absolute witness immunity "by using evidence of the witness’[s] testimony to support any ... claim concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution." Rehberg , 566 U.S. at 369, 132 S.Ct. 1497 ; accord Sobol v. Alarcon , 212 Ariz. 315, 318, ¶ 11, 131 P.3d 487, 490 (App. 2006) () (quotation omitted). The court also reasonably determined introduction of grand jury testimony was unfairly prejudicial and likely to confuse the jury because it would constitute direct evidence of purported misconduct for which the City was absolutely immune.3 We find no abuse of discretion or due process violation here.
¶ 7 Spooner argues the trial court erred when it entered judgment for the City upon Spooner’s claim for simple negligence. We review the entry of judgment as a matter of law de novo , "viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." SWC Baseline & Crismon Inv’rs, L.L.C. v. Augusta Ranch Ltd. P’ship , 228 Ariz. 271, 292, ¶ 93, 265 P.3d 1070, 1091 (App. 2011) (citing Shoen v. Shoen , 191 Ariz. 64, 65, 952 P.2d 302, 303 (App. 1997) ). We likewise review the existence and scope of qualified immunity de novo . See Ochser v. Funk , 228 Ariz. 365, 369, ¶ 11, 266 P.3d 1061. 1065 (2011) (citation omitted). We will affirm the judgment if it is correct for any reason. Walter v. Simmons , 169 Ariz. 229, 240 n.9, 818 P.2d 214, 225 n.9 (App. 1991).
¶ 8 As a general rule, public entities and public employees are subject to tort liability for their negligence. See Ryan v. State , 134 Ariz. 308, 309-10, 656 P.2d 597, 598–99 (1982) () (citing Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n , 93 Ariz. 384, 392, 381 P.2d 107 (1963) ), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Tucson Unified Sch. Dist. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. , 174 Ariz. 336, 339, 849 P.2d 790, 793 (1993) ; see also Hogue v. City of Phoenix , 240 Ariz. 277, 280, ¶ 9, 378 P.3d 720, 723 (App. 2016) (citing Greenwood v. State , 217 Ariz. 438, 442, ¶ 14, 175 P.3d 687, 691 (App. 2008) ). Although our supreme court recognized the abolition of general sovereign immunity in Ryan , it nonetheless "hasten[ed] to point out that certain areas of immunity must remain." 134 Ariz. at 309-10, 656 P.2d at 599. Some remaining areas of immunity are prescribed by statute within Arizona’s Governmental Tort Claims Act, see, e.g., A.R.S. § 12-820.02, but the legislature has directed that its statutory grant of immunity for certain acts "shall not be construed to affect, alter or otherwise modify any other rules of tort immunity regarding public entities and public officers as developed at common law." See A.R.S. § 12-820.05(A) ; see also Clouse ex rel. Clouse v. State , 199 Ariz. 196, 203, ¶ 27, 16 P.3d 757, 764 (2001) ( )(citations omitted).
¶ 9 Common law qualified immunity generally provides public officials, including police officers, limited protection from liability when "performing an act that inherently requires judgment or discretion."4 Chamberlain v. Mathis , 151 Ariz. 551, 555, 558, 729 P.2d 905, 909, 912 (1986) ( ); see also Portonova v. Wilkinson , 128 Ariz. 501, 503, 627 P.2d 232, 234 (1981) () (citing Patterson v. City of Phoenix , 103 Ariz. 64, 70-71, 436 P.2d 613, 619–20(1968) ); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D (1979) (); id. at cmt. h ("carr[ied] out [on] the orders of others or ... [done] with little choice as to when, where, how or under what circumstances"). no immunity attaches to a ministerial act This accommodation for discretionary acts exists because "officials should not err always on the side of caution" for fear of being sued. State v. Superior Court (Donaldson) , 185 Ariz. 47, 50, 912 P.2d 51, 54 (App. 1996) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant , 502 U.S. 224, 229...
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