Trimbo v. Trimbo

• Decision Date: 25 November 1891
• Citation: 50 N.W. 350,47 Minn. 389
• Parties: TRIMBO v TRIMBO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

47 Minn. 389

50 N.W. 350

TRIMBOvTRIMBO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 25, 1891.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. In the absence of fraud or undue influence, mere weakness of intellect, resulting from old age or sickness, is no ground for setting aside an executed contract.

2. The rule as to the measure of mental capacity in such cases is simply that the contracting party must have enough to reasonably understand the nature and effect of what he is doing.

3. Where the incapacity is not continuous, and the act is in itself reasonable and proper, and hence furnishes no intrinsic evidence of mental incapacity, the burden is on the party assailing the act to show the incapacity at the time it was done.

Appeal from district court, Sibley county; SEVERANCE, Judge.

Action by George Trimbo against Michael Trimbo to set aside deeds. Judgment in part for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

W. H. Leeman, for appellant.

H. J. Peck, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

One Jacob Trimbo, the father of these parties, owned a farm of 266 acres, upon which he resided until his decease, the 80 acres upon which the dwelling-house was situated being his homestead. Having been taken quite ill in November, 1885, he made a will; but shortly afterwards, having concluded that it was better to divide his property among his children during his life-time, so as to save the cost and trouble of administration, he destroyed the will, and about December 1st executed two deeds, (his wife, Ellen, joining,) one to defendant, conveying 160 acres of the land, including the homestead 80, and the other to another son, Henry, conveying the balance of the farm. Each of these deeds was subject to the payment, by the grantee to other children of the grantors, of certain sums of money, which were made specific liens on the land. As part of the same transaction, the grantees executed a joint agreement, in consideration of these conveyances, to provide suitable support to the grantors during their natural lives. This agreement they have fully performed. Jacob Trimbo died in January, 1886, and his wife in August, 1888. There is no claim here of any fraud or undue influence. So far as appears, the execution of these deeds, which disposed of the land in the same way as the will had done, was wholly the voluntary and unsolicited act of the old man, the reason assigned by him for disposing of his farm in this way being that these two sons, especially Michael, “had stayed at home all the time;” evidently meaning that they had remained and helped him on the farm, while the others had gone out for themselves. The plaintiff, as one of the heirs at law, brought actions against this defendant and his brother Henry, to have these deeds set aside on the ground of the mental incapacity of both the grantors. The trial court found that Jacob Trimbo was of sound mind, but that Ellen, his wife, was mentally incapable of executing the deeds; and, as conclusions of law, held that the deed to defendant, so far as it attempted to convey the homestead 80, was wholly void, and as to the other 80 was void as to one undivided third part. If the finding of fact as to the mental incapacity of the wife was warranted by the evidence, the somewhat novel state of facts might present some interesting legal questions. But a perusal of the evidence satisfies us that it did not justify the finding. As has been already remarked, there is no element of frand, overreaching, or undue influence in the case. Neither is there anything tending to show that the disposition of the property made by these conveyances was not a reasonable, natural, and proper one to be made. The ground...