Spratt v. Duke Power Co.

• Decision Date: 20 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. 8210IC1000,8210IC1000
• Citation: 65 N.C.App. 457,310 S.E.2d 38
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Gregory E. SPRATT v. DUKE POWER COMPANY.

Page 38

310 S.E.2d 38

65 N.C.App. 457

Gregory E. SPRATT v. DUKE POWER COMPANY.

No. 8210IC1000.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Dec. 20, 1983.

W. Edward Poe, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel, Duke Power Co., Charlotte, for defendant-appellant.

Davis & Corriher by James A. Corriher, Salisburg, for plaintiff-appellee.

JOHNSON, Judge.

The question presented for review is whether the Industrial Commission correctly found and concluded that Gregory Spratt's injury by accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. For the reasons set forth below, we answer the question in the affirmative.

The only injury which is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act is an injury "by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." G.S. 97-2(6). The determination of whether an accident arises out of and in the course of employment is a mixed question of law and fact, and the appellate court may review the record to determine if the findings and conclusions of the Industrial Commission are supported by sufficient evidence. G.S. 97-86; Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 233 S.E.2d 529 (1977).

The uncontradicted evidence tended to show that the 25 year old plaintiff, Gregory Spratt, had been employed for approximately four years as a set (or utility) operator by and at defendant Duke Power Company's Buck Steam (power) Station. Plaintiff worked during the third shift, from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. On 18 April 1981 plaintiff reported to work at about 11:00 p.m. When he arrived, the other employees were in the process of shutting the unit down. Plaintiff performed various duties until 1:30 a.m., including changing a chart on the precipitator panel in the control room, locking up the precipitators, dumping ashes out of the boilers and cooling the boilers down. Plaintiff's trip to the control room in the main area of the plant took him across the same area where he later fell. The floor was a terrazzo material, but at the precipitator panel the floor changed to a grating. The grating extends back toward the rear of the station where the canteen is located.

At about 1:30 a.m. on 19 April 1981, plaintiff met some coworkers and went to the canteen, also referred to as the "bellywasher," for dinner. After finishing dinner, plaintiff returned to work and went first to the control room, then to get a drink from the lobby water fountain, and then he decided to go back to the canteen to purchase some chewing gum. He went through the double doors separating the lobby area from the main area of the plant, and started running across the terrazzo floor toward the canteen on a path that took him by the precipitator panel. As he ran, plaintiff slipped on coal dust that had accumulated, probably resulting from a coal leak, on the floor. He started falling and struck and injured his left knee and left hand on the floor grating.

Plaintiff knew that station rules prohibited running inside the plant. He offered no reason to explain why he was running on this occasion. Plaintiff admitted on cross-examination that he used to run track in high school, and that he ran on this particular occasion out of "force of habit." Plaintiff's shift supervisor, O.R. Edwards testified that although he was not present at the time of plaintiff's accident, he had previously warned all the employees, including plaintiff, not to run on numerous occasions and that he had in the past seen plaintiff running and stopped him.

On these facts, Deputy Commissioner Shuping issued an opinion and award dated 9 March 1982, in which he ruled that Mr. Spratt's accident did not arise out of and in the course of his employment because his running was in violation of his employer's safety rule. The Deputy Commissioner made a Finding of Fact [No. 1] reflecting the foregoing evidence and in addition, the following pertinent Finding of Fact:

2. Despite the defendant-employer having previously adopted a safety rule (and/or regulation) which specifically forbade running, under any circumstances, within the business premises and of which he was not only aware but for prior violation(s) of which he, as well as other co-employees, had been reprimanded by the defendant-employer; claimant for reasons personal to himself and which borne [sic] no reasonable relationship, either directly or indirectly, to the furtherance of his master's business, elected to run to the canteen on this occasion, despite the fact that he was likewise aware, as a result of having walked through this same area earlier during the shift, of the presence of accumulated coal dust on the terrazzo flooring thereof. Therefore, in light of the foregoing, the method, and more particularly, the running fashion, by which he attempted to satisfy his personal comfort needs on this occasion, was unreasonable.

Based upon his Findings of Fact, the Deputy Commissioner concluded, as a matter of law, as follows:

On 19 April 1981 plaintiff sustained an injury by accident; however, the same did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, in that the activity in which he was then engaged and which resulted in such injury; to wit, running within the defendant-employer's premises, had been specifically forbidden by his employer and (such activity) was not calculated, either directly or indirectly, to further his master's business, but rather was adopted by the claimant solely for the purpose of satisfying his own personal comfort or convenience and was, in consideration of the known hazards, an unreasonable manner (or method) of doing so. G.S. 97-2(6); Larson, Workers' [sic] Compensation Law, Section 21.80 et seq., Section 31.12; Teague v. Atlantic Co., 213 N.C. 546, 196 S.E. 875 (1938); Martin v. Bonclarken Assembly, 296 N.C. 540, 251 S.E.2d 403 (1979).

On 29 July 1982, the Full Commission issued an opinion and award reversing the Deputy Commissioner's decision, stating that,

The Full Commission has carefully considered the record in its entirety, particularly in light of the decision of the Supreme Court filed July 13, 1982 in the case of Hoyle v. Brick & Tile Company, 306 N.C. 248, 293 S.E.2d 196. The Full Commission is of the opinion that the decision of the Hearing Commissioner cannot be affirmed.

The Full Commission then adopted the Deputy Commissioner's Findings of Fact Nos. 1 and 2, vacated and set aside the balance of the decision, and inserted in lieu thereof the following:

FINDING OF FACT

3. At the time complained of, plaintiff was not violating a direct, immediate, and specific order by a then present superior. His accident, therefore, arose out of and in the course of his employment.

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Full Commission made the following Conclusion of Law:

The Supreme Court, in the case of Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Company, supra, held to bar recovery it must be shown that an employee is "disobeying a direct, immediate, and specific order by a then present superior." We cannot find that this is true in the case sub judice. We therefore hold that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment.

The defendant contends that the Full Commission erred in reversing the Deputy Commissioner on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 293 S.E.2d 196 (1982). Although we agree with defendant that Hoyle presents a slightly different factual situation than that presented by plaintiff Spratt's claim, we are, nevertheless, of the opinion that the Full Commission reached the correct conclusion in awarding plaintiff benefits for his accidental injury.

In Hoyle the deceased employee was employed as a cull brick stacker. He removed imperfect bricks from a conveyor and stacked them. A forklift operator then removed the culls. The employer had a rule against unauthorized personnel operating forklifts and Hoyle was not so authorized. On two occasions prior to the accident, Hoyle was observed by supervisors using a forklift and reprimanded.

On the night of the accident, Hoyle had stacked culls until he had no more space to put them. The authorized forklift operator, who was busy helping another employee, told Hoyle that he could use the forklift to move the culls. After loading the stack of cull bricks, Hoyle moved away from his work station in the forklift. He was later found pinned under the overturned forklift. The Deputy Commissioner's denial of benefits was upheld by the Full Commission.

On appeal, this Court in a 2-1 decision ¹ held that Hoyle's operation of the forklift, after prior warnings and in the face of rules against the practice, constituted a departure from the job for which he had been employed, and affirmed the award denying benefits. Judge (now Justice) Harry C. Martin dissented on the grounds that at the time of the accident, Hoyle was attempting to get his own work done, although in a forbidden fashion, and therefore his actions did not break the causal connection between his employment and his death.

The Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision followed Judge Martin's reasoning and reversed this Court's decision. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Branch first stated the general rules governing compensable injuries resulting from accidents "arising out of and in the course of the employment."

The term "arising out of" refers to the origin or cause of the accident, and the term "in the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident ...

306 N.C. at 251, 293 N.C. at 198.

In reaching its ultimate conclusion that Hoyle's disobedience of his employer's rule was not such a departure from his employment as to destroy the causal connection between the accident and the employment, the Supreme Court analyzed a number of its prior opinions in similar cases of employee disobedience. The court distinguished Teague v. Atlantic Co., 213 N.C. 546, 196 S.E. 875 (1938) (benefits denied where deceased had disobeyed his orders and exceeded the scope of his...