Spring v. Bd. of Trustees of Me. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys.
| Decision Date | 14 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | CV-10-63 |
| Parties | SARAH H. SPRING, Plaintiff v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF Maine Public Employees Retirement System, Defendant |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
In an order dated February 10, 2011, this court dismissed the Plaintiff's 80C appeal by agreement of the parties and deferred judgment on the defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint which alleged equitable estoppel, pending submissions from the parties regarding the applicability of promissory estoppel to the Plaintiff's complaint. The plaintiff responded by pleading the appositeness of promissory estoppel to her case and noting the court's flexibility in fashioning an appropriate remedy under that doctrine. The defendant argues that dismissal is appropriate on the Plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim as upon the equitable estoppel claim. For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as to promissory estoppel and GRANTED as to equitable estoppel.
A "motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint, not the sufficiency of the evidence the Plaintiff's are able to present." Barnes v. McGough, 623 A.2d 144, 145 (Me. 1993) (citation omitted). The court is required to "consider the material allegations of the complaint as admitted and review the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff's to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Bussell v. City of Portland, 1999 ME 103, ¶ 1, 731 A.2d 862. "A dismissal is appropriate onlywhen it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support of his claim." Dexter v. Town of Norway, 1998 ME 195, ¶ 7, 715 A.2d 169, 171 (quotations omitted).
The complaint alleges the following. The plaintiff is a member of the MPERS and has contributed funds to be held by it in trust. Members who had accumulated at least ten years of service prior to July 1, 1993, are eligible to participate in a favorable "age 60" retirement plan. As of July 1, 1993, the plaintiff had nine years of creditable service with MPERS. On multiple occasions, and particularly on or about December 5, 2007, the defendant informed the plaintiff that she could purchase one year of out-of-state credits for service performed in another school system, which would count towards the years that she had acquired before July 1, 1993. On May 2, 2008, she was informed of the cost of purchasing the past year of service and that the result of purchasing it would be to make her eligible for retirement at age 60.
In reliance upon this information, she withdrew $17,279 from savings to purchase the year of service, and incurred costs in doing so. She also told her employer that she would retire in July of 2009 and committed resources to building a business for her second career. On or about October 31, 2008, she was informed that the year of service could not be credited toward the "age 60" plan and hence she would not be eligible for normal retirement at that age. She canceled her notice of retirement. Following an administrative hearing, on March 16, 2010, MPERS adopted the position that the Plaintiff's purchased year of service was not creditable.
On or about April 7, 2010, the petitioner timely filed a civil complaint, alleging that equitable estoppel required enforcement of MPERS's original promise of the Plaintiff's retirement category, or other relief that would make her whole. The complaint also included an 80C appeal to assure this court's jurisdiction. MPERS moved to dismiss. By order of February10, 2011, this court granted the motion to dismiss as to the 80C appeal by agreement of the parties. Prior to issuing an order on MPERS's motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's equitable estoppel claim, however, the court invited the parties to brief the issue of promissory estoppel, including its availability against state entities and the range of remedies available thereunder. The plaintiff argues that promissory estoppel is applicable to her case against MPERS; MPERS moves to dismiss the claim of promissory estoppel as well as the claim of equitable estoppel. The court will address the applicability of both forms of estoppel.
The defendant argues that no viable claim for equitable estoppel exists because equitable estoppel can be used only as a defense, not as an affirmative cause of action.
Id. (quoting Martin v. Me. Central R.R. Co., 83 Me. 100, 104, 21 A. 740 (1890)); see also Guay v. Kennedy, 2011 Me. Super. LEXIS 22, at *12 () However, in an earlier case, the Court did not disallow a Plaintiff's estoppel claim, but upheld a jury instruction, given over the Plaintiff's objection, which required the plaintiff to prove that the Plaintiff's reliance caused actual detriment or prejudice, as opposed to the Plaintiff's proposed instruction that allowed estoppel if prejudice would occur unless the estoppel was given effect. Martin v. Prudential Insurance Company, 389 A.2d at 30-31.
In more recent cases involving claims against municipalities, the Law Court has expressly stated that equitable estoppel may be asserted defensively, rather than affirmatively. Tarason v. Town of S. Berwick, 2005 ME 30, ¶ 16, 868 A.2d 230, 234 (); Buker v. Town of Sweden, 644 A.2d 1042, 1044 (Me. 1994) () (quoting Waterville Homes v. Dept. of Transp., 589 A.2d 455, 457 (Me. 1991)).
The plaintiff relies upon a series of cases in which claims for equitable estoppel were brought affirmatively in response to agency action. See Berry v. Bd. of Trustees, Maine State Retirement Sys., 663 A.2d 14 (Me. 1995); Hall v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 498 A.2d 260 (Me. 1985); Crummett v. Bd. of Trustees, Maine State Retirement Sys., 424 A.2d 1102 (Me. 1981); Maine Sch, Admin. Dist. #14 v. Raynolds, 413 A.2d 523 (Me. 1980). However, these cases do not expressly contradict the principle articulated in Waterville Homes, as none of these cases contains any indication that the argument regarding the doctrine's use as "sword" versus a "shield" was made or considered. In Reynolds, the Law Court first held that "under the law of Maine the application of equitable estoppel is not absolutely precluded solely because it is invoked against activity by a governmental official or agency in the discharge of a governmental function," but rather that the applicability of equitable estoppel would depend "on the totality of the particular circumstances involved, which will include the nature of the particular governmental official or agency acting and of the particular governmental function being discharged as precipitating particular considerations of public policy," and remanded for the trial court to determine the pertinent facts and public policy arguments in the first instance. Reynolds, 413 A.2d at 533. The Crummett court likewise remanded the case to the Board for expansion of the record, after the Superior Court erroneously concluded estoppel could not lie against a governmental agency, see Crummett, 424 A.2d at 1104, because the Justice did not have the benefit of the Raynolds holding permitting such an action under certain circumstances. In Hall, the Law Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiff's equitable estoppel claim, noting, "Although equitable estoppel may be invoked against a governmental entity in appropriate circumstances, there must be a valid reason to believe that the person making the relied upon representation had authority to represent the agency's position," and finding thatsuch reason did not exist in that case. Hall, 498 A.2d at 267. And in Berry, the Law Court remanded a Rule 80C petition which had been joined with an independent equitable estoppel claim because the Superior Court had confined itself to the...
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