Spring v. Spring
| Citation | 229 N.W. 147,210 Iowa 1124 |
| Decision Date | 11 February 1930 |
| Docket Number | 39904 |
| Parties | AMY SPRING, Appellant, v. FRANK X. SPRING, Executor, et al., Appellees |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED SEPTEMBER 26, 1930.
Appeal fro Lee District Court.--JOHN M. RANKIN, Judge.
Suit in equity, to establish a resulting trust, on the ground that the purchase money of the property involved was furnished by plaintiff to one Edward J. Spring, who paid the same upon the purchase price and took title in his own name. He afterwards became the husband of the plaintiff. The property was occupied as their homestead by the plaintiff and her husband until 1924, and by the plaintiff herself up to the time of the bringing of this suit. The principal defendant is the executor of Edward J. Spring, who died in February, 1926. The other defendants are creditor-claimants against the estate of Edward J. Spring. After trial upon the merits, the district court dismissed the petition, and the plaintiff has appealed.
Reversed.
B. A Dolan, for appellant.
Ralph B. Smith, for executor, appellee.
Burrows & Burrows, for the other appellees.
I.
The plaintiff's action is predicated on that form of resulting trust involved and defined in Cotton v. Wood, 25 Iowa 43, and which was briefly stated therein as follows:
"Where, upon the purchase of property, the consideration is paid by one, and the legal title conveyed to another, a resulting trust is thereby raised, and the person named in the deed will hold the property as trustee of the party paying the consideration."
The foregoing pronouncement has been followed and elaborated in a long line of our cases, a few of which are the following: Freeborn v. Servis, 182 Iowa 1350, 165 N.W. 178; In re Estate of Mahin, 161 Iowa 459, 143 N.W. 420; Culp v. Price, 107 Iowa 133, 77 N.W. 848; Dunn v. Zwilling Bros., 94 Iowa 233, 62 N.W. 746.
The property involved was purchased on September 22, 1906. The negotiations for the purchase were had jointly with plaintiff and Edward J. Spring, but the final execution of instruments appears to have been had with Edward J. Spring alone. These two parties were at that time contemplating marriage. The plaintiff insisted that a home be first acquired. Edward had no money for that purpose. The plaintiff had a savings account of $ 480 in the bank, and offered to devote the same to the purchase. The purchase price of the property in question was $ 1,250. $ 500 was paid as a down payment. A mortgage was given for the balance, of $ 750. Edward J. Spring was named in the deed of conveyance as sole grantee. He was likewise the sole maker of the mortgage. At a later time, a new mortgage was signed by both parties. The mortgage debt was drawn payable in monthly installments. It is the claim of the plaintiff that she herself undertook to, and did, pay all the monthly installments, and that the mortgage was fully paid and discharged by her in March, 1919. The burden is upon the plaintiff to establish by clear and satisfactory evidence the essential facts upon which she relies in support of her beneficial ownership. The first of these is her claim that, of the first $ 500 payment, she paid $ 450, and that Edward paid only the sum of $ 50. This claim is satisfactorily proved. No question of admissibility of evidence is presented. The plaintiff's own testimony is well corroborated, both by circumstances and by direct evidence. The more important circumstance is disclosed by the records of the bank in which she had her deposit in September, 1906. These show that she did have at that time a savings account in such bank for $ 480, and that, on September 21, 1906, she drew therefrom the sum of $ 450. That Edward had no property of his own, and no visible resources at that time, is undisputed. Both parties were at that time employees of the same employer, at $ 9.00 per week each.
As to the payment of the mortgage, subsequent chronology is to be considered. The parties were married on December 10, 1906. From that time they occupied the property as their home. Except for two years, the plaintiff engaged in profitable employment throughout her married life. The rate of wages received by her exceeded that of her husband. The continuity of her employment far exceeded that of her husband. The successive employers of plaintiff were disclosed in her testimony, and the rate of wages received by her. One employment lasted for nine years. Her evidence in this regard, if not true, was susceptible of contradiction. It is, however, wholly undisputed. Likewise, her testimony as to the alleged monthly payments made by her upon the mortgage, if untrue, was susceptible to contradiction. The mortgage was held by, and the payments were made to, a building and loan association, whose records were presumptively available. This evidence was undisputed. On the other hand, the husband throughout his married life was afflicted with ill health, which greatly impaired his earning capacity while employed, and greatly interrupted the continuity of his employment. His disability gradually increased, rather than improved, until he finally had become helpless and deformed. The defendant introduced evidence showing certain of his employments. But such evidence discloses employment covering a period of not more than three or four years. Indisputably, the mortgage was paid by March, 1919. It is clear, upon this record, that the husband could not have paid it out of his earnings. This fact is clearly corroborative of the testimony of the plaintiff on the subject.
There is some evidence tending to show small payments by the husband, which might be referable to his ownership of an aliquot part of the property.
Upon the whole record, we deem it clearly proved that, in the initial transaction, plaintiff paid 9/10 of the purchase price, and the husband paid 1/10 thereof; that a resulting trust was created thereby in favor of the plaintiff to the extent of 9/10 of the property; that her subsequent monthly payments upon the mortgage fully protected her interest, and fully met her obligation as the cestui que trust in 9/10 of the property as her aliquot part. She is, therefore entitled to a decree establishing such resulting trust and...
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