Springdale Educ. Ass'n v. Springdale School Dist.

• Decision Date: 09 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2284,97-2284
• Citation: 133 F.3d 649
• Parties: 157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2181, 123 Ed. Law Rep. 42 SPRINGDALE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Wendell Ridenour, President; Wendell Ridenour; Susan Rowe, Appellants, v. SPRINGDALE SCHOOL DISTRICT; Jim D. Rollins, Individually and as Superintendent of the Springdale School District, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 649

133 F.3d 649

157 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2181, 123 Ed. Law Rep. 42

SPRINGDALE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Wendell Ridenour President; Wendell Ridenour; Susan Rowe, Appellants, v. SPRINGDALE SCHOOL DISTRICT; Jim D. Rollins, Individually and as Superintendent of the Springdale School District, Appellees.

No. 97-2284.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 11, 1997.

Decided Jan. 9, 1998.

Richard Wilson Roachell, Little Rock, AR, argued, for appellant.

Charles L. Harwell, Springdale, AR, argued (Marcus W. Van Pelt, on the brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, FLOYD R. GIBSON and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

The Springdale Education Association and its president, Wendell Ridenour, and Ridenour and Susan Rowe, individually (hereinafter, collectively, "the union"), brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Springdale School District and its superintendent, Jim Rollins, in both his individual and official capacities. The union appeals from the district court's dismissal of each claim with prejudice, and from the denial of its motion to reconsider the dismissals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I.

This appeal arises from an apparent conflict between Rollins and those individuals in the district's employ who have associated themselves with the Springdale Education Association, a local union. In its initial complaint, the union charged that certain actions and statements by Rollins (and other unnamed district employees) evincing an anti-union sentiment were violative of the First Amendment. The union sought to assign liability for its alleged constitutional injuries both to the district and Rollins under section 1983. After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the district court granted the union leave to amend its complaint.

The union's amended complaint alleged that on May 29, 1996, Rollins directed the Springdale school board attorney to research the legal question whether the district could legally terminate the employment of teachers for involvement in union activities. In addition, Rollins stated at a public meeting that as long as he was superintendent "classified or non-certified district personnel were not going to be members of the Springdale Education Association" and that "he would 'not stand for it.' " Moreover, "Rollins or those under his direction or control" encouraged or coerced employees of the district not to join the union, subjected district employees to "ridicule and contempt in public and private meetings," and placed Rowe, a non-certified district employee, on probation "in direct retaliation for her lawful activities" on behalf of the union. Further, "[s]upervisors under the direction of and with the knowledge of Rollins" had expressed to members of the union the hope that they could "be saved from this 'satanic organization,' referring to the Springdale Education Association, AEA, and/or NEA." See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 2-3.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted this motion with respect to both the district and Rollins, dismissing each action with prejudice, and denied the union's motion to reconsider.

II.

We conduct a de novo review of a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1148 (8th Cir.1993). A complaint should not be so dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would demonstrate an entitlement to relief. See id. When analyzing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), we accept the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id. We do not apply a standard of heightened specificity, more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of the civil rules, in cases alleging municipal liability under section 1983. See Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir.1995) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993)). At a minimum, however, a complaint must contain facts sufficient to state a claim as a matter of law and must not be merely conclusory in its allegations. See Frey, 44 F.3d at 671.

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that allege an action performed under color of state law that resulted in a constitutional injury. See Haberthur v. City of Raymore, Mo., 119 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir.1997). A local government, however, cannot be held liable under section 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents on a theory of respondeat superior. See Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). Rather, a plaintiff seeking to impose such liability is required to identify either an official municipal policy or a widespread custom or practice that caused the plaintiff's injury. See Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, --- U.S. ----, ----, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 467 (8th Cir.1996); McGautha v. Jackson County, Mo., Collections Dep't, 36 F.3d 53, 55-56 (8th Cir.1994).

The identification of an official policy as a basis upon which to impose liability ensures that a municipality is held liable only for constitutional deprivations "resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality." Brown, --- U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 1388; see also McGautha, 36 F.3d at 55-56. Similarly, actions performed pursuant to a municipal "custom" not formally approved by an authorized decisionmaker "may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law." Brown, --- U.S. at ----, 117 S. Ct. at 1388; see also McGautha, 36 F.3d at 56-57.

As the district court noted, neither the union's complaint nor amended complaint, read liberally, alleges that any constitutional injury was the result of an official policy or widespread custom of the school district. Instead, every alleged action is attributed specifically to Rollins, or to unnamed persons "under his direction or control." The district itself is mentioned but once within the alleged facts, by way of a summary accusation that it violated the plaintiffs' rights. See Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 4. The amended complaint is thus insufficient, on its face, to state a claim against the district. See, e.g., Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 735-36 (7th Cir.1994) (dismissal of county school corporation proper when complaint failed to adequately allege policies or customs on part of corporation).

Nevertheless, the union attempts in its brief to attribute the actions of Rollins to the district by asserting that Rollins is an authorized district policymaker. Any action taken by Rollins, it contends, must therefore have constituted official district policy. We have summarized the applicable law regarding this theory as follows:

Although municipal liability for violating constitutional rights may arise from a single act of a policy maker, that act must come from one in an authoritative policy making position and represent the official policy of the municipality. [internal citations omitted]. Therefore, "[w]hen an official's discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that official's making, those policies, rather than the subordinate's departures from them, are the act of the municipality."

McGautha, 36 F.3d at 56 (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 925, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion)). Whether a person is an authorized policymaker for purposes of assigning municipal liability is a question of state law. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2723, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989); Jane Doe "A" v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir.1990).

The district court determined that Rollins was not an authorized policymaker for the school district under Arkansas law, precluding any claim against the district for his actions under the "official policy" theory of municipal liability. We agree with this conclusion. With regard to all school district policies, a school superintendent is empowered only to "recommend" changes, which may or may not become "proposals." See Ark.Code Ann. § 6-17-205(c)(2) (Michie 1993). The union argues, however, that Rollins was, in fact, the district's final policymaker with respect to Rowe's being placed on probation in retaliation for union activities. Arkansas law does not establish procedures for placing school district employees on some sort of explicit probation. ¹ A superintendent does have authority to place a teacher or a noncertified district employee on suspension. See Ark.Code Ann. §§ 6-17-1508(a), -1704. However, those suspended are entitled to a hearing within ten days, and only the school board may terminate employment or continue a suspension for any definite period of time. See Ark.Code Ann. §§ 6-17-1508(e), -1509, -1705. An employee cannot lose compensation without action by the board. See Ark.Code Ann. §§ 6-17-1508(f) & (g), -1705(e).

Arkansas law is clear, then, that a school board, and not a superintendent, has ultimate responsibility for all district policies, including policies involving unfavorable employment action. See Ark.Code Ann. § 6-17-205; § 6-17-1501 et seq. (Teacher Fair Dismissal Act); Western Grove Sch. Dist. v. Terry, 318 Ark. 316, 885 S.W.2d 300, 301-03 (1994). Nowhere in the union's amended complaint is it...