Springer v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming
| Decision Date | 23 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-129,96-129 |
| Citation | 944 P.2d 1173 |
| Parties | 13 IER Cases 619 William SPRINGER, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF WYOMING, a Wyoming corporation, Appellee (Defendant). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Donald J. Sullivan (argued) and Bert T. Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellant.
John B. "Jack" Speight, Brent R. Kunz (argued) and Dominique D.Y. Cone, Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, Cheyenne, for appellee.
Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.
William Springer (Springer) filed this wrongful termination action against his former employer, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming (Blue Cross), claiming breach of employment contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. After a bench trial, the district court found in favor of Blue Cross on all claims and entered an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. In this appeal, Springer challenges the district court findings regarding breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
We affirm.
Appellant Springer presents the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the Employment Handbook, either alone or in combination with the Disciplinary Rules, did not constitute an enforceable contract of employment.
2. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the employer's failure to follow its own internal Disciplinary Rules did not constitute a breach of the employment contract.
3. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the manipulation of the employee's duties for the purpose of creating an excuse to fire him did not violate the inherent contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
4. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the employer's claim of a subjective "loss of confidence" constituted good cause for termination of the employment.
Appellee, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, states the issues as:
A. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming had cause to terminate William Springer's employment.
B. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming's progressive disciplinary provisions were not mandatory and did not apply to Mr. Springer.
C. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming did not have a special relationship with Mr. Springer so that the tort of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would be actionable.
Blue Cross hired Springer as a staff attorney on September 15, 1986. As staff attorney, his primary responsibilities included coordination of benefits, subrogation and refunds oversight. In December 1990, Springer was placed on active duty in the Air Force because of Desert Storm. Upon his return to work on April 29, 1991, he was placed in the position of Director of Claims and Staff Assistant to the Senior Director of Benefits Administration. On August 1, 1993, Springer was reassigned to the position of staff attorney. Blue Cross terminated Springer's employment on January 3, 1994, giving him three months salary plus pay for his accrued vacation to that date.
In July 1995, Springer filed a complaint against Blue Cross seeking compensatory and punitive damages. He claimed that a contractual relationship existed between him and Blue Cross by virtue of representations made in the employee handbook and company policies and that Blue Cross breached the contract. Springer also claimed breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The district court held a three-day bench trial in late 1995. During the trial, the court heard testimony from Springer, as well as several members of the Blue Cross senior management team, including Charles Chapman, president, and Karen Dobson, vice president. Springer reported directly to either Chapman or Dobson during his entire tenure at Blue Cross. The court received into evidence numerous exhibits from both parties. The documentary evidence included several memos from Chapman and Dobson to Springer during the course of his employment indicating management concerns with Springer's performance and the need for improvement. The exhibits reveal that management had spoken with Springer on more than one occasion about his absenteeism and had discussed with him revisions to his work by outside counsel.
The district court entered a Decision Letter and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in favor of Blue Cross. The court did not decide the question, but assumed for purposes of its decision that an implied-in-fact contract existed between the parties by virtue of the handbook. The court determined that Blue Cross had good cause to terminate Springer and that the progressive discipline procedure outlined in the employee handbook was not mandatory. As a result, the court concluded that Blue Cross did not breach the employment contract. The court also found that Springer did not show the existence of a special relationship necessary to give rise to an action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Springer's claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress failed as he did not establish the elements of those torts. Because he did not prevail on the tort claims, the court found Springer had no claim for punitive damages. As indicated in the statement of issues, Springer seeks our review only of the district court's findings relating to the breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims.
The trial court made express findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict. Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo.1993). While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Id. Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail weighing disputed evidence. Id. Findings of fact will not be set aside unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. We review a district court's conclusions of law de novo on appeal. Id.
Ordinarily when an employee claims breach of an implied-in-fact contract based on provisions in an employee handbook, we begin our analysis by determining whether those provisions altered the presumption of at-will employment. However, in this case the district court, without deciding the matter, started by assuming an employment contract was in place between Springer and Blue Cross by virtue of the handbook. The court then determined that, even assuming an implied-in-fact contract existed, Blue Cross did not commit a breach.
Several versions of the Blue Cross employee handbook were introduced into evidence. In its decision letter, the district court pointed out several unresolved factual issues regarding later versions of the handbook--for example, the effect of disclaimers and Springer's signed acknowledgments of receipt, as well as whether there was consideration for changes to the handbook and whether consideration was in fact necessary. Because these questions were left unanswered, we must assume the district court based its decision on its interpretation of the July 1982 handbook given to Springer when he was hired.
We start, then, from the premise that the terms of the 1982 employee handbook constituted an implied-in-fact contract. Deciding whether a breach of contract has occurred involves interpreting the contract. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, as is interpretation of an unambiguous contract. Garcia v. Uniwyo Federal Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo.1996). When the meaning of a contract is ambiguous or not apparent, it may be necessary to determine the intention of the parties from evidence other than the contract itself, and interpretation becomes a mixed question of law and fact. Sanchez v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 855 P.2d 1256, 1257 (Wyo.1993). Springer claims that Blue Cross breached the contract in two respects: 1) Blue Cross did not have good cause to terminate his employment, and 2) Blue Cross did not follow its disciplinary procedures prior to terminating his employment. We address each of those arguments in turn.
The district court concluded Blue...
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