Springman By Springman v. Hall
| Decision Date | 26 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 33A04-9401-CV-15,33A04-9401-CV-15 |
| Parties | Anthony C. SPRINGMAN, By his mother and next friend, Debby Jo SPRINGMAN, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Douglas E. HALL, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Appellant-plaintiff, Anthony Springman b.n.f Debby Jo Springman ("Anthony"), appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment for appellee-defendant, Douglas Hall ("Hall"), in Springman's negligence action. We reverse.
Springman presents one issue: whether there were genuine issues of material fact which precluded granting summary judgment in favor of Hall?
The facts most favorable to the non-movant indicate that the lawsuit arose out of an accident that occurred on February 15, 1990, in Muncie, Indiana. At approximately 4:50 p.m., Hall was driving at about 20-25 m.p.h., northbound near downtown Muncie on Madison Avenue, a four lane street. The speed limit on Madison Avenue is 30 m.p.h. A light mist was falling.
Anthony, then seven years old, was walking east on Gilbert Street at Madison Avenue. Anthony stopped at the intersection for two seconds and looked both ways on Madison Avenue. Anthony then began to cross the street.
As he proceeded across the intersection, Anthony almost walked into a car traveling in the southbound lanes of Madison Avenue. Anthony continued crossing the intersection, and as he stepped into the center northbound lane he was struck by Hall. Anthony sustained injuries to his leg and head.
Anthony filed suit against Hall on December 19, 1990. On September 20, 1993, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hall.
Upon review of a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same legal standard as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind.Trial Rule 56(C); Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Colonial Motel Properties, Inc (1990), Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d 778. On review, we may not search the entire record to support the judgment, but may consider only that evidence which had been specifically designated to the trial court. Keating v. Burton (1993), Ind.App., 617 N.E.2d 588, reh'g denied, trans. denied. The party appealing the trial court's grant of summary judgment has the burden to persuade this court that the trial court's decision was erroneous. Indiana Republican State Committee v. Slaymaker (1993), Ind.App., 614 N.E.2d 981.
Summary judgment is particularly inappropriate in negligence actions. Barsz v. Max Shapiro, Inc. (1992), Ind.App., 600 N.E.2d 151. The determination of whether a defendant's conduct fell below the requisite standard of care is a question for the fact-finder. Jump v. Bank of Versailles (1992), Ind.App., 586 N.E.2d 873. Any doubt as to a fact, or an inference to be drawn from a fact, is to be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Even where the trial court believes that the non-movant will not be successful at trial, summary judgment should not be granted where material facts conflict or conflicting inferences are possible. Haase v. Brousseau (1987), Ind.App., 514 N.E.2d 1291.
Anthony's action against Hall sounded in negligence. To recover on a theory of negligence, the plaintiff must establish: (1) a duty on the part of the defendant to conform his conduct to a standard of care arising from his relationship with the plaintiff, (2) a failure of the defendant to conform his conduct to the requisite standard of care required by the relationship, and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach. Webb v. Jarvis (1991), Ind., 575 N.E.2d 992.
All drivers are under a common law duty to maintain a proper outlook while traveling on the roadways. Koroniotis v. LaPorte Transit, Inc. (1979), Ind.App., 397 N.E.2d 656. In addition to this common law duty, drivers are also under a statutory duty with regard to pedestrians and children:
Notwithstanding other provisions of this article or a local ordinance, a person who drives a vehicle shall do the following:
(1) Exercise due care to avoid colliding with a pedestrian or a person propelling a human powered vehicle, giving an audible signal when necessary.
(2) Exercise proper caution upon observing a child or an obviously confused, incapacitated or intoxicated person.
IC 9-21-8-37. Here, Hall owed Anthony a duty to maintain a proper outlook and exercise that reasonable care which was necessary to avoid hitting him.
Next, Anthony must demonstrate that Hall failed to conform his conduct to the requisite standard of care. Generally, the question of whether a defendant's conduct fell below that level of care required to be exercised under the circumstances is a question of fact....
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