Spruance v. Commission On Judicial Qualifications

• Decision Date: 25 March 1975
• Docket Number: S.F. 23153
• Citation: 532 P.2d 1209,13 Cal.3d 778,119 Cal.Rptr. 841
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 532 P.2d 1209 William D. SPRUANCE, a Judge of the Municipal Court, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS, Respondent. In Bank

Page 841

119 Cal.Rptr. 841

13 Cal.3d 778, 532 P.2d 1209

William D. SPRUANCE, a Judge of the Municipal Court, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS, Respondent.

S.F. 23153.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

March 25, 1975.

Mintz, Giller, Himmelman & Mintz, Herman W. Mintz, Oakland, and Leland J. Bruzzone, San Leandro, for petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., William D. Stein and Linda Ludlow, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

BY THE COURT.

The Commission on Judicial Qualifications (hereinafter the Commission) has recommended the removal from office of Judge William D. Spruance of the Municipal Court for the San Leandro-Hayward Judicial District of Alameda County. ¹ Pursuant to rule 920 of the California Rules of Court, ² Judge Spruance has petitioned this court to modify or reject the Commission's recommendation. In discharging our solemn constitutional duties in this matter we have independently reviewed the entire record and have adopted with some modifications the findings of the Commission, as set forth seriatim hereinafter. We conclude that petitioner has engaged in inexcusable and reprehensible conduct constituting in some instances 'wilful misconduct in office' (hereinafter wilful misconduct) and in other instances 'conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute' (hereinafter prejudicial conduct). We accordingly adopt and hereby effectuate the Commission's recommendation of removal.

After practicing law for almost 20 years, petitioner campaigned for and was elected to the municipal court, taking office on January 4, 1971. On January 11, 1973, he was notified that the Commission had, on its own motion pursuant to rule 904, ordered a preliminary investigation of his judicial conduct. On July 13, 1973, petitioner was served with a five-count Notice of Formal Proceedings (rule 905) encompassing nineteen specifications of wilful misconduct and prejudicial conduct. Following petitioner's filing of a verified answer, this court on January 4, 1974, at the Commission's behest, appointed three special masters to hold evidentiary hearings. (Rule 907.) ³

The 19 days of hearings before the masters commenced on February 19, 1974, and concluded on March 19, 1974. During the course of the proceedings, the examiners designated by the Commission to prosecute the charges against petitioner (rule 921(f)) received permission to strike three of the specifications in count I of the Notice of Formal Proceedings (counts I--C, I--D, and I--H). The masters filed their report on April 25, 1974, finding five specifications not proven (counts I--G, I--I, II--D, II--G, and IV). Of the remaining eleven specifications, six were found to constitute both wilful misconduct and prejudicial conduct (counts II--A, II--B, II--C, II--F, III, and V) three were found to constitute wilful misconduct (counts I--E, I--F, and II--E), and the final two specifications were found to constitute prejudicial conduct (counts I--A and I--B). The masters, who also made findings concerning factors in mitigation, unanimously recommended that petitioner be censured.

After considering the masters' report [rule 912], written objections thereto (rule 913), which were filed only by the examiners, and oral arguments (rule 914), the Commission, on July 16, 1974, issued its own findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendation. (Rules 918 and 919.) By unanimous vote (save for a seven-to-two vote as to count I--A) the Commission adopted the masters' findings of fact concerning the eleven specifications found proven by the masters. The Commission unanimously concluded that these proven specifications constituted wilful misconduct. The Commission dismissed the five charges the masters found not proven, ⁴ as well as the three charges which had been stricken. The Commission made no findings concerning mitigation. By a five-to-four vote the Commission recommended to this court that petitioner be removed from office. (Rule 917.) Petitioner was thereby disqualified from acting as a judge for as long as the Commissions's recommendation of removal remained pending before this court. (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (a).)

Following the procedure set forth in Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1973) 10 Cal.3d 270, 110 Cal.Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1, we granted a writ of review to examine the Commission's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of removal. Since the ultimate, dispositive decision to censure or remove a judge has been entrusted to this court, we felt it our responsibility 'in exercising that authority . . . (to) make our own, independent evaluation of the record evidence adduced below.' (Id., at p. 276, 110 Cal.Rptr. at p. 204, 515 P.2d at 4.) In fulfilling that responsibility, we have examined in full detail the record of proceedings below and find in accordance with the Commission that the eleven specifications of misconduct not stricken or dismissed below ⁵ have been proven by 'clear and convincing evidence' sufficient to sustain them 'to a reasonable certainty.' (See Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 275, 110 Cal.Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1.)

We turn now to a pre cis of the proven specifications of misconduct. As to each such specification, our findings of fact are set forth in the margin. Our findings are adapted, and in some instances adopted In haec verba, from those of the Commission.

Count I generally charged petitioner with having conducted his court in a bizarre and unjudicial manner. In particular, he was alleged to have treated attorneys in a cavalier, rude and improper manner. Count I--E charged that petitioner had subjected an attorney to improper cross-examination when the attorney took the stand in support of his motion to disqualify petitioner (Code Civ.Proc., § 170.6), and had improperly levied 'witness fees' against the attorney as a condition to petitioner's disqualification of himself. ⁶ In count I--F petitioner was charged with having demeaned a deputy district attorney in open court and having him placed under restraint, because the deputy had appealed petitioner's disposition of another case. ⁷ Count I also set forth proven specifications of petitioner's treatment of litigants in a cavalier, rude and improper manner. Thus, in count I--A, petitioner was alleged to have expressed his disbelief in the testimony of a defendant by having created a sound commonly referred to as a 'raspberry' ⁸ and in count I--B, petitioner was charged with having made a vulgar gesture (giving the 'finger' or Digitus impudicus) in reprimanding a defendant for coming in late in a traffic matter. ⁹

Count II generally alleged that petitioner's judicial conduct was subject to the improper influence of his business relations and social friendships. In counts II--A and II--B, petitioner was charged with having approached a deputy district attorney, as well as that deputy's superior, in an attempt to influence the disposition of a case pending against a friend. ¹⁰ In count II--C, it was charged that petitioner had attempted to coerce a deputy district attorney into accepting a negotiated plea and, upon his refusal to accept, petitioner had suppressed the evidence and had acquitted the defendant, who was the son of a friend and political supporter. ¹¹ In count II--E, petitioner was charged with having caused a defendant cited for engaging in a speed contest (Veh.Code, § 23109, subd. (a)) to appear before him rather than in the department in which the defendant had been directed to appear. When the defendant, who was the nephew of a friend and political supporter, appeared before petitioner, the charge against the defendant was reduced to illegal parking (Veh.Code, § 22502) without notice to or an appearance by the district attorney. ¹² And finally, in count II--F it was alleged that petitioner had improperly transferred to his own court the file in a felony-assault case involving the same defendant as in count II--E, whereupon petitioner had ordered the defendant released on his own recognizance so as to prevent the defendant from being booked and interrogated by the police pursuant to the execution of an outstanding warrant for his arrest. ¹³ Count III consisted of a single specification alleging that petitioner had solicited another judge to dismiss a traffic citation which he had received and that petitioner had subsequently altered the reported disposition so as to convey the false impression that the citation had been dismissed upon petitioner's having completed traffic school. ¹⁴

Finally petitioner was charged in the single specification of count V with having consistently appointed two attorneys in criminal cases in which the defendant was either not entitled to counsel at public expense or the public defender had not been requested to represent them. ¹⁵

Taken as a whole the record indicates that petitioner engaged in a pervasive course of conduct of overreaching his judicial authority by deciding cases for reasons other than the merits, by improperly influencing another judge, and by using the judicial process to gain special favors for friends and political supporters. The record also shows that petitioner has under color of judicial office repeatedly committed petty, vindictive, vulgar and otherwise unjudicial acts.

We turn now to the question whether the conduct which we have found as a fact to have occurred is conduct for which discipline may constitutionally be imposed. Other than for habitual intemperance or wilful and persistent failure to perform his duties, the Constitution provides that a judge may be censured or removed from the bench only for wilful misconduct or prejudicial conduct. (See fn. 1, supra.) We first sought to give meaning to these standards of conduct in Geiler. We...