Squires v. Inhabitants of Town of Amherst

• Decision Date: 21 October 1887
• Citation: 145 Mass. 192,13 N.E. 609
• Parties: SQUIRES v. INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF AMHERST.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

145 Mass. 192

13 N.E. 609

SQUIRES

v.INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF AMHERST.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampshire.

October 21, 1887.

Exceptions from superior court, Hampshire county; KNOWLTON, Judge.

Tort under Pub.St. c. 52, to recover for personal injuries sustained on a highway. At the trial in the superior court, the plaintiff testified to receiving personal injuries and damage to a wagon, horse, and harness on the evening of December 31, 1885, by running off the end of a culvert, by reason of the lack of a railing on a way in the defendant town, which it was bound to keep in repair. On cross-examination, defendant's counsel introduced a paper on which was written the following: “AMHERST, January 1, 1886.

“Received of F.L. Stone, for the town of Amherst, ten dollars, in full of all demands for damage sustained on the highway near the house of Alden Cooley, on the evening of December 31, 1885.

[Signed] “EMORY A. SQUIRES.”

This paper the plaintiff admitted he signed, but contended that he did so upon the understanding that Stone, who was one of the selectmen of the defendant town, would pay him more if it proved the plaintiff was injured in his person, the amount actually paid being intended to cover the damage to the plaintiff's team. The plaintiff offered to show by the above and other evidence of the same kind that he did not understand that he was settling for personal injuries, that the writing was procured by mistake, and claimed the right to go to the jury on that question, and on the whole case; but the court ruled that the writing could not be thus controlled, directed a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.

Wm. G. Bassett, for plaintiff.

The ruling of the court was an interpretation of the written instrument. The contention of plaintiff was that the paper was procured under such circumstances of mistake as to render it ineffectual as evidence of accord and satisfaction to bar plaintiff's right of action for personal injuries. There was evidence for the jury on this question. It was error not to submit it to them, with instructions similar to those approved in Curley v. Harris, 11 Allen, 112. The cases relied on, of Goss v. Ellison, 136 Mass. 503;Leddy v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394, 2 N.E.Rep. 107; Osborn v. Railroad Co., 140 Mass. 549, 5 N.E.Rep. 486; Weston v. Chamberlin, 7 Cush. 404;Stone v. Dickinson, 5 Allen, 29;Brown v. Cambridge, 3 Allen, 474, where the question was not as to the validity of the release, but its effect, have no application to the facts presented in this case. The paper was procured by an agreement that more should be paid if plaintiff was injured in person. In that event, the payment it evidenced was not to be in full. Lee v. Railway Co., 6 Ch.App. 527; 19 Wkly.Rep. 729, 25 Law T. (N.S.) 77; Roberts v. Railway Co., 1 Fost. & F. 460; Rideal v. Railway Co., Id. 706. The legal effect of the instrument was not to prevent a recovery for personal injuries. The words “in full of all demands for damage sustained” have not a broad enough meaning for that. The statute places “bodily injury” in antithesis to “damage in his property.” The instrument only deals with the latter. Pub.St. c. 52, § 18. At least a case of latent ambiguity was presented, to explain which parol testimony was admissible, and the testimony showed clearly that personal injuries were not settled for. Sargent v. Adams, 3 Gray, 72;Swett v. Shumway, 102 Mass. 365;Keller v. Webb, 125 Mass. 88, 2 Add.Cont. 782; Smith v. Jeffryes, 15 Mees. & W. 561, 562.

D.W. Bond, for defendant.

The ruling of the court that the writing signed by the plaintiff could not be controlled as the plaintiff proposed, and directing a verdict for the defendant, was correct. It was not claimed that the plaintiff was induced to sign the writing by any fraud practiced upon him. The plaintiff claimed there was a mistake about the writing; that the minds of the parties did not meet upon the settlement as stated in the writing. The plaintiff offered to show that he did not understand he was settling for personal injuries. The writing is “in full of all demands for damages sustained on the highway” on the evening of December 31, 1885. Such a writing has been held by our court to constitute a contract and an accord and satisfaction, and not to be controlled by parol evidence. Brown v. Cambridge, 3 Allen, 474;Stone v. Dickinson, 5 Allen, 29, 33;Stone v. Dickinson, 7 Allen, 26;Curley v. Harris, 11 Allen, 112;Simmons v. Almy, 103 Mass. 33;Goss v. Ellison, 136 Mass. 503;Leddy v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394, 2 N.E.Rep. 107; Osborn v. Railroad Co., 140 Mass. 549, 5...