St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson

• Decision Date: 08 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-1871.,73-1871.
• Citation: 496 F.2d 973
• Parties: Joyce ST. HILAIRE MOYE, Appellee, v. Emmett HENDERSON and Doris Collins, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

496 F.2d 973 (1974)

Joyce ST. HILAIRE MOYE, Appellee, v. Emmett HENDERSON and Doris Collins, Appellants.

No. 73-1871.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 14, 1974.

Decided May 8, 1974.

George Pike, Jr., Little Rock, Ark., for appellants.

Henry Woods, Little Rock, Ark., for appellee.

Before VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge, and LAY and ROSS, Circuit Judges.

VAN OOSTERHOUT, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is an action in admiralty brought by Joyce St. Hilaire Moye against Emmett Henderson, Basil Henderson, Doris Collins, and Bill Hobson seeking damages arising out of a boating accident which took place on the Arkansas River, a navigable stream, on June 6, 1971. The plaintiff suffered serious and permanent injuries, for which she seeks compensation and punitive damages. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). A pre-trial motion to dismiss based on lack of admiralty jurisdiction was overruled. After trial to the court, Judge Henley presiding, and pursuant to a Memorandum Opinion reported at 364 F.Supp. 1286 (E.D.Ark.1973), the plaintiff was awarded a judgment of $84,000 against Emmett Henderson and Doris Collins. Those defendants appeal from that judgment.

FACTS

Shortly before the accident here involved, Basil Henderson purchased an eighteen-foot motorboat powered by a 225 horsepower inboard engine. On June 6, 1971, he loaned the boat to his son, Emmett Henderson, for a pleasure outing on the Arkansas River. In the early afternoon the boating party met at a launching ramp near North Little Rock. Included were Emmett Henderson, Pat Henderson, Bill Hobson, Doris Collins, Carolyn McRae, and the plaintiff. The party cruised on the river for some time, with some intoxicants being consumed. Henderson allowed Hobson to operate the craft for a period, during which Doris Collins asked Hobson to be allowed to drive. She falsely represented to Hobson her experience in operating boats of this size and type. Mrs. Collins was feeling the effects of the intoxicants, and Carolyn McRae objected to allowing her to take the controls of the boat. Nevertheless, Hobson allowed her to drive after first securing the consent of Henderson, the master of the boat.

In the meantime, the plaintiff and Pat Henderson had assumed a perch atop the rear deck of the boat, with their feet on the rear seat. The plaintiff was holding a glass of wine. While the boat was traveling about 25 miles per hour, Pat Henderson shouted to Mrs. Collins three times, the last rather forcefully, to stop the boat so that someone could water ski. Mrs. Collins then pulled the combination gearshift-throttle lever backward through the neutral position into reverse gear. The boat stopped suddenly and tilted violently, throwing Henderson and the plaintiff into the water. The plaintiff was struck in the leg by the propeller, receiving serious and permanent injuries.¹

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Suit was filed in federal court under its admiralty jurisdiction, the Arkansas River being a navigable stream. Named as defendants were Emmett Henderson, Basil Henderson, Bill Hobson, and Doris Collins. All of the defendants joined in a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction because admiralty did not extend to accidents involving small pleasure craft engaged in non-commercial navigation. The motion was overruled, Judge Henley holding in an unreported opinion that the case was clearly within the court's admiralty jurisdiction because the accident happened on navigable waters and "directly resulted from the operation of a boat which is certainly a traditional maritime activity." Judge Henley felt that admiralty applied regardless of the size of craft or the type of activity in which the boat was being operated.

After trial, Judge Henley found that Basil Henderson and Bill Hobson were free of negligence and absolved them of liability. 364 F.Supp. at 1291-1292. Such determination is not challenged on this appeal. However, he found that Doris Collins and Emmett Henderson were each guilty of negligence proximately causing the plaintiff's injuries. Id. The court determined that $112,000 would be fair and reasonable compensation for the plaintiff's injuries, but reduced this amount by 25% because of her own negligence in sitting on the rear deck instead of the seat. Id. at 1292, 1296. Judgment was thus entered against Emmett Henderson and Doris Collins for $84,000.

Those defendants appeal from that judgment, urging as grounds for reversal that the trial court erred in the following respects:

1. In holding that admiralty jurisdiction was established.

2. In determining that federal law controlled and refusing to apply and enforce the law of Arkansas.

3. In failing to hold that the plaintiff\'s negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injuries.

We reject such contentions and affirm the judgment for the reasons hereinafter stated.

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION

The judicial power of the United States extends "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; . . ." U.S. Constitution, Art. III, § 2. Congress has conferred original jurisdiction on the district courts of "any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, . . ." through 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Whether the district court had jurisdiction over this case depends on whether the law of admiralty extends to the operation of small pleasure craft engaged in non-commercial navigation on navigable waters. The defendants contend on appeal that the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts does not extend this far. Thus, they reason, Judge Henley erred in holding that admiralty jurisdiction was present in this case, and the federal court was without jurisdiction, there being no diversity of citizenship among the parties.

The federal courts for many years exercised admiralty jurisdiction over torts governed only by the standard that the tort must have occurred on navigable waters. This standard was set down in The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36, 18 L.Ed. 125 (1865): "The jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend upon the fact that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the locality — the high seas, or navigable waters where it occurred. Every species of tort, however occurring and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." This "locality test" was often reiterated by the federal courts. See, e. g., Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U. S. 202, 205, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971) (note list of cases in n. 2); Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 476, 42 S.Ct. 157, 66 L.Ed. 321 (1922); Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 1963). See also 7A J. Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ .3253 (1972).

However, over the years a number of courts questioned whether the maritime locality of a tort is alone sufficient to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. Several lower courts had by 1972 held that a tort, in addition to having a maritime locality, must involve a significant relationship to maritime navigation and commerce in order to invoke admiralty jurisdiction. See Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972); Chapman v. City of Grosse Point Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F.Supp. 111, 114-115 (S.D.Tex.1968); McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F.Supp. 866, 868 (S.D.N.Y.1961). Finally, in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972), the Supreme Court was squarely faced with this question. In that case the plaintiff's airplane lost its power while taking off from the defendant's airport after ingesting seagulls into its engines, and crashed into Lake Erie, a navigable body of water. After discussing the history of the locality test, Justice Stewart summarized as follows:

There has existed over the years a judicial, legislative, and scholarly recognition that, in determining whether there is admiralty jurisdiction over a particular tort or class of torts, reliance on the relationship of the wrong to traditional maritime activity is often more sensible and more consonant with the purposes of maritime law than is a purely mechanical application of the locality test. Id. at 261.

Finding that a crash of land-based aircraft while operating between two points of land had little to do with the focus or purpose of the law of admiralty, the Court held that maritime locality alone is no longer sufficient to sustain admiralty jurisdiction in aviation accidents. Rather, the wrong must "bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id. at 268. Such a maritime nexus is not present in the crash into navigable waters of a land-based aircraft operating between two points in the continental United States. Id. at 274.

The strict locality test for admiralty has thus been extensively altered. An accident must now involve a traditional maritime activity to sustain admiralty jurisdiction. Thus, the question of whether admiralty jurisdiction existed in the instant case depends on whether the accident arose out of "traditional maritime activity."

The defendants rely on Executive Jet to support their contention that this case does not fall within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, even though the accident occurred on navigable waters. They contend that the operation of small pleasure craft engaged in non-commercial navigation does not constitute a "traditional maritime activity." Rather, they would limit that term to commercial endeavors. In addition, they rely on policy grounds for leaving disputes of this type to state courts, which are competent to handle these essentially local cases, thus freeing the federal courts from the burden of trying such cases.

Several cases have interpreted Executive Jet and its effect on the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. In Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d...