Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 April 1963
• Docket Number: No. 14023-14029.,14023-14029.
• Citation: 316 F.2d 758
• Parties: Dorothy WEINSTEIN, Executrix of the Estate of Ralph Weinstein, Deceased, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Thelma P. FREEMAN and Provident Tradesmens Bank and Trust Company, Co-Executors of the Estate of Addison B. Freeman, Jr., Deceased, Appellants, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Mary B. GRICE, Executrix of the Estate of David S. Grice, Deceased, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Diane BRAFF, Administratrix ad Prosequendum and as General Administratrix of the Estate of Bernard Jay Braff, Deceased, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Edna E. LONG and Laura Manney, Administratrices of the Estate of Shirley E. Reitz, Deceased, Appellants, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Attilio E. ABATE, Administrator of the Estate of Frederick N. Abate, Deceased, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Joseph THOMPSON, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Letha Mae Thompson, Deceased, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft, Corporation.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

316 F.2d 758 (1963)

Dorothy WEINSTEIN, Executrix of the Estate of Ralph Weinstein, Deceased, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Thelma P. FREEMAN and Provident Tradesmens Bank and Trust Company, Co-Executors of the Estate of Addison B. Freeman, Jr., Deceased, Appellants, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Mary B. GRICE, Executrix of the Estate of David S. Grice, Deceased, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Diane BRAFF, Administratrix ad Prosequendum and as General Administratrix of the Estate of Bernard Jay Braff, Deceased, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Edna E. LONG and Laura Manney, Administratrices of the Estate of Shirley E. Reitz, Deceased, Appellants, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Attilio E. ABATE, Administrator of the Estate of Frederick N. Abate, Deceased, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Joseph THOMPSON, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Letha Mae Thompson, Deceased, Appellant, v. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC., General Motors Corporation, and Lockheed Aircraft, Corporation.

Nos. 14023-14029.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued December 6, 1962.

Decided April 26, 1963.

Milton M. Borowsky, Philadelphia, Pa., for libellants-appellants (Abraham E. Freedman, Marvin I. Barish, Morton Rosen, Freedman, Landy & Lorry, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief).

Thomas F. Mount, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees (J. Grant McCabe, III, Rawle & Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee Eastern Airlines, Inc., Owen B. Rhoads, Arthur E. Newbold, III, Dechert, Price & Rhoads, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee General Motors Corp., Sidney L. Wickenhaver, Hugh G. Moulton, Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee Lockheed Aircraft Corp., on the brief).

Before BIGGS, Chief Judge, STALEY, Circuit Judge, and LEAHY, District Judge.

BIGGS, Chief Judge.

This appeal raises the novel and interesting question of whether an action for wrongful death arising out of the crash of an aircraft in navigable waters within one marine league from shore lies within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.

At approximately five o'clock in the afternoon of October 4, 1960, Eastern Airlines Flight No. 375, a land-based Lockheed Electra aircraft, took off from Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts, on a scheduled flight to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Shortly after becoming airborne, the aircraft crashed into the navigable waters of Boston Harbor. The libellants' decedents, passengers on board the aircraft, were killed as a result of the crash.

Libels in personam were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in admiralty, by the personal representatives of seven deceased passengers against Eastern Airlines, Inc., the owner and operator of the aircraft, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the manufacturer of the plane, and General Motors Corporation, the manufacturer of the aircraft's power plant.¹ The libels alleged that Eastern had been negligent in maintenance, operation and navigation of the aircraft and that Lockheed and General Motors had been negligent in the design, manufacture and inspection of the aircraft and power plant respectively, and had failed to make necessary alterations and modifications or warn Eastern of the necessity to do so. Additional allegations of breach of warranty were directed against all three respondents.² Exceptions to the libels were filed by the respondents on the grounds that the claims asserted were not within the jurisdiction of a court sitting in admiralty.

The court below sustained the respondents' exceptions and dismissed the actions in an order dated March 19, 1962, the order appealed from.³ The court held⁴ that admiralty jurisdiction in cases of tort depends "in the absence of statute, upon a maritime locality plus some maritime connection * * *. Therefore, until Congress establishes such jurisdiction by statute, admiralty jurisdiction does not encompass causes of action arising from crashes of airplanes into the navigable waters of a state * *."⁵ With regard to the contract and warranty claims, the court ruled that "The traditional criterion of admiralty jurisdiction as to contracts is whether the contract is maritime, having reference to maritime service or maritime transactions."⁶ The contracts in the cases now on appeal, it held, "had no maritime aspects at all."⁷ We find for the reasons set out hereinafter that the court below was in error as to the issue of tort jurisdiction but was correct as to the allegedly maritime contracts herein involved.

The Constitution of the United States, Article III, Section 2, provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction". Statutory implementation of this constitutional grant was enacted by Congress in substantially identical terms. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333.⁸

The critical factor in determining whether a tort claim comes within the broad statutory grant of admiralty jurisdiction is the situs of the tort; i. e., the place where it happened. If the tort occurred on navigable waters,⁹ the claim is one that lies within the jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty; nothing more is required. In the landmark case of The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36, 18 L.Ed. 125 (1865), the Supreme Court stated: "The jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend upon the fact that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the locality — the high seas, or navigable waters where it occurred. Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." This "locality test" has been consistently reiterated by the courts. "In torts * * * jurisdiction depends solely upon the place where the tort was committed, which must have been upon the high seas or other navigable waters.", State Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263, 271, 42 S.Ct. 473, 66 L.Ed. 933 (1922). "It is well established that the situs of a tort determines whether or not it is maritime. In order to be maritime it must occur on navigable waters subject to admiralty jurisdiction.", Forgione v. United States, 202 F.2d 249, 252-253 (3 Cir.), certiorari denied, 345 U.S. 966, 73 S.Ct. 950, 97 L.Ed. 1384 (1953). "Admiralty jurisdiction extends to every species of tort committed upon the high seas or on navigable waters.", United States v. Matson Navigation Co., 201 F.2d 610, 613 (9 Cir. 1953). "It is clearly established that the jurisdiction of the admiralty over a maritime tort does not depend upon the wrong having been committed on board a vessel, but rather upon its having been committed upon the high seas or other navigable waters.", London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 279 U.S. 109, 123-124, 49 S.Ct. 296, 300, 73 L.Ed. 632 (1929). See Grant SmithPorter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 42 S.Ct. 157, 66 L.Ed. 321 (1922); Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 34 S.Ct. 733, 58 L.Ed. 1208 (1914); Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 20 L.Ed. 90 (1870); Dean v. Chesapeake Bay Ferry District, 158 F.Supp. 408 (E.D.Va.1958); Thomson v. Bassett, 36 F.Supp. 956 (W.D. Mich.1940); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Monterey, 6 F.2d 893 (N.D. Calif.1925).¹⁰

The respondents take the position that admiralty jurisdiction over cases of tort depends not only upon the locus of the tort but upon a finding of some maritime connection or nexus with the alleged wrong. In other words, it is their contention that the tort must have a maritime "flavor" and that an airplane crash in navigable waters lacks this necessary element. This argument, that both locality and a maritime connection are jurisdictional prerequisites, is not a new one. "It has * * * been doubted whether the civil admiralty jurisdiction, in cases of tort, does not depend upon the relation of the parties to some ship or vessel and embrace only those tortious violations of maritime right and duty which occur in relation to vessels to which the admiralty jurisdiction in cases of contract applies.", 1 Benedict, Admiralty § 127 at p. 351 (6th ed.).¹¹ The respondents cite Campbell v. H. Hackfield & Co., 125 F. 696 (9 Cir. 1903) and McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F.Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y.1961) as authority for their position.

In Campbell, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a tort claim brought by an employee-longshoreman against his stevedore-employer for personal injuries sustained while loading or unloading the hold of a vessel in navigable waters was not within the jurisdiction of admiralty. The court stated: "In the case of torts, locality remains the test, for the manifest reason that, to give an admiralty court jurisdiction, they must occur in a place where the law maritime prevails. But this is by no means saying that a tort or injury in no way connected with any vessel, or its owner, officers, or crew, although occurring in such a place or territory, is for that reason within the jurisdiction of the admiralty. On the contrary, it is * * * only of maritime contracts, maritime torts, and maritime injuries of which the United States courts are given admiralty jurisdiction." See id., supra, at p. 700.¹²

In the McGuire case, supra, a tort action was brought in admiralty to recover for personal injuries sustained when the libellant struck a submerged object while swimming at a public beach. The court held that the subject matter of the action was outside the jurisdiction of admiralty. The court stated: "That a tort may have occurred on navigable waters...