St. John's Roman Catholic Church Corp. v. Town of Darien

Decision Date27 July 1962
Citation184 A.2d 42,149 Conn. 712
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesST. JOHN'S ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH CORPORATION v. TOWN OF DARIEN et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

James J. O'Connell and Thomas J. Dolan, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Albert L. Coles, Bridgeport, for plaintiff.

Warrack Wallace, Greenwich, with whom were Daniel B. Badger, Greenwich, and, on the brief, Emile W. Jacques, Jr., Greenwich, for defendants.

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, SHEA and ALCORN, JJ.

ALCORN, Associate Justice.

The zoning regulations of the town of Darien provide for an R-2 residence zone in which the permitted uses are (1) a single, detached dwelling on its own lot for not more than one family and (2) public schools. Additional uses are permitted in that zone if a special permit therefor is issued by the planning and zoning commission. Among these additional permitted uses are 'parochial and private schools.' Darien Zoning Regs., p. 35 (1957). The property owner contemplating a use requiring a special permit must submit a plan of the proposed development, accompanied by an application for the permit, to the planning and zoning commission, which, after public notice and hearing, is authorized to issue the permit under certain conditions. The pertinent provisions of the zoning regulations are set forth in the footnote. 1

The plaintiff owns a 10.8-acre tract of land in an R-2 residence zone. Wishing to erect a parochial school on the property, it applied for a special permit. After public notice and hearing, the planning and zoning commission denied the application, and the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Common Pleas. On the same date, the plaintiff brought the present action for a declaratory judgment. The basis of the appeal from the action of the planning and zoning commission was that it had acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of the discretion vested in it. The appeal, after a hearing, was dismissed by the Court of Common Pleas. St. John's Roman Catholic Church Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Commission, Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County at Stamford, No. 2117. The court decided in substance, that the zoning regulations set forth prescribed conditions which must be satisfied in order to justify the granting of a special permit and that the record was devoid of proof that the plaintiff had established the necessary requirements. It was conceded that the plaintiff did not question the constitutionality of the zoning regulations in that action. The court was aware of the pendency of the present action in which the question of constitutionality is raised. No appeal was taken from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, and consequently the failure of the plaintiff to establish the necessary basis for the issueance of a special permit under the facts then presented has been conclusively determined.

Following that final judgment, the plaintiff proceeded with the present action, in which it seeks injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment determining whether the provisions of the zoning regulations requiring a special permit are valid and binding or are invalid, null and void. The questions reserved for our advice on a stipulation of facts are: ' Is there, on the facts * * * stated, an existing dispute or controversy sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment in this cause, and if so: Are the Special Permit Regulations of the Town of Darien, being sections 440 to 443.4, inclusive unconstitutional and void because they deprive plaintiff of its property without due process of law or deny plaintiff equal protection of the laws contrary to the provisions of Article First, Section 9, of the Constitution of the State of Connecticut and to Amendments Five and Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States of America; or because they are an infringement on the right of free exercise of religion and the right to impart and receive religious instruction and education contrary to the provisions of Article First, Sections 3 and 4 and Article Seventh of the Constitution of the State of Connecticut and to Amendment Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States of America; or because they have no reasonable relationship to the purposes of zoning and fail to set up adequate standards of administration?'

We turn first to the question whether the issue now raised is the proper subject of a declaratory judgment. An essential requirement is that there be 'an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement between the parties.' Practice Book § 277(b). The defendants claim that the issue in the present case is identical to the issue in the appeal from the denial of the special permit and has been determined by the judgment rendered in that appeal. The claim is unsound. In the appeal from the decision of the planning and zoning commission, the legality of the requirement of a special permit was assumed, and the issue was whether the plaintiff had shown itself to be entitled to the permit. In the present case, the issue is whether the plaintiff can constitutionally be required to obtain a permit. In the former case, the plaintiff, having recognized and utilized the zoning regulations by applying for the special permit thereunder, could not, in its appeal from the denial of that permit, attack the constitutionality of the provision governing the issuance of the permit. Florentine v. Darien, 142 Conn. 415, 428, 115 A.2d 328; Hutchison v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 138 Conn. 247, 252, 83 A.2d 201; Strain v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 137 Conn. 36, 38, 74 A.2d 462. It could, however, attack the constitutionality of the regulations in an independent proceeding, as it seeks to do in the present case. Florentine v. Darien, supra, 430; Hutchison v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra, 252; Strain v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 40.

To be entitled to a declaratory judgment, the plaintiff must have 'an interest, legal or equitable, by reason of danger of loss or of uncertainty as to * * * [its] rights or other jural relations.' Practice Book § 277(a). In order to attack the constitutionality of the regulations, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it is adversely affected by them. Karen v. East Haddam, 146 Conn. 720, 723, 155 A.2d 921; State v. Hurliman, 143 Conn. 502, 506, 123 A.2d 767; State v. Donahue, 141 Conn. 656, 665, 109 A.2d 364. It has been conclusively determined that the plaintiff is not entitled to a special permit under the terms of the zoning regulations. Unless the requirement of a special permit is invalid, therefore, the plaintiff is barred from the use of its property for the desired purpose until such time as it submits an application which is approved by the commission. The question of validity has not been decided, and it is in issue in this case. The plaintiff has satisfied the requirements for a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the zoning regulations.

We turn then to the question on which a declaratory judgment was sought. The case comes to us on a reservation based on stipulated facts. The reservation is not in proper form. The second question propounded embraces various and sundry grounds for the claimed unconstitutionality of the regulations. 'Questions in a reservation should be so stated that each will present a definite point of law and that the court may give to each a categorical or very definite answer.' Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 82, 198 A. 176, 115 A.L.R. 907; Practice Book § 470. Because of the importance of the public interest involved, however, we will entertain the reservation. General Motors Corporation v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 133, 55 A.2d 732; Barnes v. New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 11, 98 A.2d 523; Stanton v. Stanton, 140 Conn. 504, 509, 101 A.2d 789.

The stipulated facts, beyond those already recited, are as follows: Darien is divided into eight zone classifications, five of which are residential. The R-2 zone is the most highly restricted zone, and certain uses permitted in less highly restricted zones, are excluded from it. The proposed school would provide elementary educational facilities for children of the plaintiff's parish in a building containing sixteen classrooms with a capacity of 600 pupils. A residence now on the premises would be converted into living quarters for teachers, and other changes would be made on the property. The access road to an existing public high school is about 750 feet from the plaintiff's southern boundary, and a new public elementary school is contemplated at a location similar in size to the plaintiff's tract and nine-tenths of a mile away in the same zone. Both the existing and the proposed public schools have been approved by the planning and zoning commission under what is now General Statutes § 8-24, 2 subject to prescribed conditions relating to buffer strips, parking and playground facilities and exterior lighting. The plaintiff's proposed school would comply with state standards as to equivalent instruction and compulsory attendance. See General Statutes §§ 10-184, 10-188. The stipulated facts do not disclose that any religious instruction would be offered.

We consider first the portions of the compound question submitted to us which relate to a claim that there has been an infringement of the free exercise of religion and of the right to impart and receive religious instruction and to a claim that the zoning regulations do not set up adequate standards of administration. The answer to the first claim is that on the stipulated facts no issue of the free exercise of religion or of religious instruction is involved. Even if the assumption were to be made, however, that, since this is a parochial school, the students will receive religious instruction, nevertheless the right to impart or receive that instruction may constitutionally be subjected to reasonable regulations....

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