St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. v. Bone

• Decision Date: 22 June 1889
• Citation: 11 S.W. 958,52 Ark. 26
• Parties: ST. L., I. M. & S. RY. v. BONE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

11 S.W. 958

52 Ark. 26

ST. L., I. M. & S. RY. v. BONE

Supreme Court of Arkansas

June 22, 1889

APPEAL from Independence Circuit Court, R. H. POWELL, Judge.

This was an action to recover damages for the loss of goods destroyed by the burning of a car at the depot of the defendant company.

The complaint alleged that on April 15, 1886, the defendant received and undertook, by its written bill of lading, to transport a car-load of furniture from St. Louis, Missouri and to deliver the same to the plaintiff, at Batesville Arkansas.

That a car controlled by defendant was loaded at St. Louis with plaintiff's goods on the 15th of April, 1886, and arrived at Batesville on April 19, about 12:30 o'clock p. m.

That plaintiff in anticipation of the arrival of his goods had engaged wagons and teams to carry them from the car to his storehouse.

That in a short time after the arrival of the car, he paid the freight on the goods, as he was required to do, before the car would be opened to him for the purpose of unloading.

That he had on the day previous to the arrival of the car, requested the defendant's agent in charge of the depot at Batesville, that when said car arrived it should be placed on a side track of the railroad so as to be convenient of access to wagons for receiving the goods, which said agent agreed and promised to do.

That said defendant neglected and refused to comply with its promise, and in disregard of its obligation as a common carrier, neglected and refused to put said car at a place convenient of access for the purpose of unloading the freight therein, but placed it on a portion of its main track highly inconvenient of access. That the track was obstructed by other cars at either end of the car containing plaintiff's goods, and so remained for some time after his wagons and teams were ready to haul; that after some delay the plaintiff was enabled by the assistance of defendant's employees to remove the car containing his goods alongside the nearest end of the platform attached to defendant's depot; that plaintiff's teamsters then proceeded to remove his goods from the car to the platform and then to carry them to the wagons, and that they did so as rapidly as possible, "until the darkness of night made a further continuance of the work burdensome and inconvenient;" that a considerable part of the goods were then left in the car which was locked by defendant's employees; that if the car had within a reasonable time after its arrival been placed on a part of the track convenient of access, the plaintiff could and would have removed his goods before night; that during the night (April 19th) the defendant's depot, which was carelessly left unguarded was destroyed by fire, and the car containing the plaintiff's goods was also destroyed, together with nearly all of the goods it contained; that the danger from fire to which the plaintiff's goods were exposed, was greatly increased by the necessity he was under of pushing the car containing them, to the platform in close proximity to the depot; and that the defendant neglected and refused to afford him usual, reasonable and necessary facilities for unloading and securing his goods.

The bill of lading was in the usual form, and contained these stipulations:

That "neither of said carriers, or either or any of them, or this company, shall be liable for * * * loss or damage by fire."

"NOTICE.--This contract is accomplished, and the liability of the companies as common carriers thereunder terminated, on the arrival of the goods or property, at the station or depot of delivery and the companies will be liable as warehousemen only thereafter. "

The answer denied all negligence on defendant's part, but charged that it was plaintiff's own negligence in not removing his goods after they had been delivered to him in time to have prevented the loss by the fire.

The answer further charged that on the arrival of said carload of goods, the freight had immediately been paid by plaintiff, and the goods delivered and received by him, and that by reason of such delivery and receipt, all responsibility on defendant's part had ceased; that from that moment, and when plaintiff left a part of said goods in said car for the night, the defendant was, and became nothing more, than a gratuitous bailee without hire, and was, therefore, in no wise liable except for wilful and wanton negligence; that the defendant was not liable for any loss by fire, and could in no event be held for a greater liability than that of warehouseman.

The answer then denied that the fire was occasioned by any negligence on defendant's part.

The evidence showed that the car containing plaintiff's goods arrived at Batesville about 12:30 p. m. on the 19th of April 1886, and that he immediately paid the freight on it. That the car was moved up to the depot platform about 4 o'clock p. m. That it could not be put there sooner on account of other cars which were being unloaded. That as...