St. Laurent v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 1850-A,1850-A
• Citation: 316 A.2d 504,113 R.I. 10
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: Robert ST. LAURENT v. KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL CORPORATION. ppeal.

Page 504

316 A.2d 504

113 R.I. 10

Robert ST. LAURENT v. KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL CORPORATION.

No. 1850-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 22, 1974.

Lovett & Linder, Ltd., Raul L. Lovett, Stephen G. Linder, Providence, for petitioner.

Carroll, Kelly & Murphy, Ambrose W. Carroll, Providence, for respondent.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

This is an employee's petition for specific compensation for permanent disfigurement about the head and face under the Workmen's Compensation Act. General Laws 1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 28-33-19(n)(2), as amended by P.L.1969, ch. 144, sec. 1. The trial commissioner entered a decree ordering specific compensation for disfigurement, and the full commission affirmed. Both Robert St. Laurent, the employee, and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation (Kaiser), the employer, have appealed.

On October 30, 1969, St. Laurent was employed as a millwright for Kaiser. While he was operating a power drill on that date, the drill bit fractured. A metal fragment from the bit entered St. Laurent's right eye, causing him to lose his sight in that eye. The parties entered into preliminary agreements providing for the payment of specific compensation for the entire and irrecoverable loss of sight in the right eye and for total disability and dependency benefits until he returned to work on January 5, 1970. The condition of his eye deteriorated after he returned to work, and it became necessary to enucleate the eye on June 25, 1970. The parties then executed a supplementary preliminary agreement for total disability and dependency benefits. Kaiser, a self-insurer, supplied St. Laurent with a custom-built artificial eye, which the trial commissioner found '* * * matches his left eye in color and shape and to some extent, moves in tandum (sic) with the left eye.'

At the hearing before the trial commissioner, St. Laurent testified that occasionally his eye socket was irritated by the artificial eye, which he then removed and wore dark glasses. At that hearing, photographs, both in black and white and in color, were admitted into evidence, depicting St. Laurent with and without the artificial eye in place. The trial commissioner also visually examined St. Laurent with and without the artificial eye in place. Subsequently, the trial commissioner awarded specific compensation for disfigurement. The full commission entered a decree affirming the decree of the trial commissioner and awarded specific compensation in the amount of $45 per week for a period of $60 weeks.

On appeal Kaiser argues that there was no disfigurement within the meaning of the statute and alternatively that if St. Laurent's claim was within the statute, the amount awarded should be based on the appearance of St. Laurent with his artificial eye in place. St. Laurent argues on his appeal that the amount of the award was 'totally inadequate,' 'not equitable,' and 'shocks the conscience of anyone with ordinary sensibilities.'

It is clear that § 28-33-19(n)(2), as amended, ¹ provides compensation for permanent disfigurement about the face, head, neck, hand, or arm. The thrust of the legislative intent is best appreciated when it is realized that the section awards such compensation for disfigurement in addition to and concureently with all other compensation provided for by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Disfigurement is compensable under the Act even though there is no impairment of earning capacity. Matthews v. Falvey Linen Supply, Inc., 110 R.I. 558, 294 A.2d 398 (1972).

This court has never defined 'disfigurement' within the contemplation of our statute. However, a disfigurement is 'that which impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person or thing; that which renders unsightly, misshapen or imperfect or deforms in some manner.' Superior Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 309 Ill. 339, 340, 141 N.E. 165, 166 (1923); see also Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 50 A.2d 799 (1947); Murdaugh v. Robert Lee Construction Co., 185 S.C. 497, 194 S.E. 447 (1937). It must be an 'observable impairment of the natural appearance of a person.' Arkin v. Industrial Comm'n, 145 Colo. 463, 472, 358 P.2d 879, 884 (1961).

We see no merit in Kaiser's contention that disfigurement within the meaning of the statute is not here present because it had supplied the employee with an artificial eye. Neither do we agree with the contention that the disfigurement contemplated in the Act is to be determined on the basis of the employee's appearance with the artificial eye in place. Clearly, the implication of this argument is that such disfigurement, to be compensable under the statute, must be of such magnitude as to substantially diminish the employment potential of the employee and thus to adversely affect his pecuniary or economic interests. Nothing in the language of the statute, in our opinion, warrants such an implication.

We are persuaded that the Legislature was not motivated, in providing compensation for such disfigurement, by an intent to penalize the employer. Rather, the Legislature clearly sought to provide a proper and equitable compensation to the disfigured employee in addition to and concurrently with all other...