St. Louis County v. University City
| Decision Date | 12 March 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 57998,57998 |
| Citation | 491 S.W.2d 497 |
| Parties | ST. LOUIS COUNTY, Missouri, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. UNIVERSITY CITY et al., Defendants-Appellants, The City of St. Ann, Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant, St. Louis County Municipal League, Amicus Curiae. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
George F. Gunn, Jr., St. Louis County Counselor, Thomas W. Wehrle, Deputy County Counselor, Clayton, for respondent.
Robert C. Jones, Clayton, for City of Webster Groves.
Gregory M. Sheehan, Jr., University City, for University City.
A. E. Nick, Ferguson, for City of Ferguson.
V. Jack Muehlenkamp, Dellwood, for City of Florissant.
Edgar G. Boedeker, Clayton, for City of Clayton.
Robert E. Murray, Crestwood, for City of Crestwood.
Donald U. Biemdiek, St. Louis, for City of Richmond Heights.
William R. Dorsey, Clayton, for City of St. Ann.
Robert C. Jones, Ziercher, Tzinberg, Human & Michenfelder, Clayton, for St. Louis County Municipal League, amici curiae.
Robert E. Staed, Kappel, Neill, Staed & Wolff, St. Louis, for City of Kirkwood, amici curiae.
William R. Dorsey, Clayton, for City of St. Ann, intervenor-appellant.
In a proceeding for declaratory judgment, St. Louis County requested the trial court to declare the rights of the county, and the ninety-six municipal corporations lying wholly or partially within said county, to the tax funds realized from the special road and bridge tax levied against property located in said county for the year 1971. (Mo.Const. Art. X, § 12(a); § 137.555, RSMo 1969.) The uncertainty stemmed from the adoption of House Bill No. 306 by the 76th General Assembly at its first session in 1971, which, in so far as of interest here, changed the percentage of revenue to which the county and such municipalities were entitled. The trial court determined that the new method of distribution called for by House Bill No. 306 (now Section 137.558, RSMo 1969) did not apply to the proceeds of such tax for the year 1971. Defendants have appealed. We affirm.
The basic facts, to which the parties agree, are as follows: (1) That plaintiff is a county of the first class, operating under a charter form of government pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, Section 18, of the 1945 Missouri Constitution, and that defendants are municipal corporations situated within St. Louis County, and are fairly representative of the ninety-six (96) municipal corporations lying wholly or partially within the county and adequately and fairly represent the whole class of municipalities that receive funds from the county's special road and bridge tax that is levied upon property situated within the corporate limits of each of the municipalities; (2) That under the provisions of Section 137.558 (), defendants, and every other city lying wholly or partially within St. Louis County, were entitled to a refund from the county's special road and bridge tax of 50% of the amount accruing to the county from the first 18 cents per $100.00 assessed valuation of the tax levied upon property situated within the limits of any such city; (3) That the 76th General Assembly, at the session which ended on June 30, 1971, enacted House Bill No. 306, which amended Section 137.558 to provide that the county would refund to said cities 100% of the amount accruing to the county from the first 18 cents per $100.00 assessed valuation by virtue of said tax; and (4) That House Bill No. 306 became part of the statutory law of this state on September 29, 1971, by virtue of Sections 20a and 29 of Article III of the 1945 Missouri Constitution.
In addition, the record reflects that the county, in compliance with existing laws, did approve its budget for the year 1971, and levy and road and bridge tax, now in dispute, for the year 1971 during the month of December, 1970.
Several briefs have been submitted on behalf of the different municipalities, and each tends to emphasize a different argument why the trial court erred. However, they may be summarized fairly as follows: (1) That House Bill No. 306 contained neither an emergency clause nor an effective date in the future, and it became law on September 29, 1971; (2) That the statutory language refers to taxes 'accruing' and would be applicable to those 1971 taxes then in the 'process of maturing'; (3) That the trial court ruling, in effect, called for the county ordinances (those adopted in December, 1970, setting the 1971 budget and levying the questioned tax) to supersede the legislative enactment found in House Bill No. 306; (4) That the county did not rely on the previous method of distribution while approving the budget for 1971; and, (5) That the trial court erred in concluding that changing the method of distribution, in September of 1971, of taxes levied prior thereto would be violative of the restrictions against retroactive laws.
In contrast thereto, the county takes an opposite approach to each argument noted.
Since we believe that the law controlling disposition of this case is well established, this opinion need not be extended by detailed consideration of the validity of each and every reason given by the trial court for its ruling.
First, legislative action by the General Assembly in this taxing area is generally controlling. As said in Padberg v. Roos, (Mo. banc 1966) 404 S.W.2d 161 at l.c. 171: More specifically, in a case actually involving a road and bridge tax, State v. Burton, 266 Mo. 711, 182 S.W. 746, l.c. 748--749 (1916), this court concluded that: 'The legislative power to tax being inherent, the creation of agencies or instrumentalities for the levy, collection, and disbursement of such taxes follows as a necessary consequence, and hence the right of the Legislature to enact a law delegating in this case the disbursement of the taxes collected to a board of commissioners of a special road district is not an improper exercise of such power.' See also State v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 270 Mo. 251, 192 S.W. 990 (1917), and State v. Pemiscot Land & Cooperage Co., 317 Mo. 41, 295 S.W. 78 (banc 1927). 'Subject to constitutional restrictions, the legislature has full power and control over the disposition of taxes.' 85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1057. As was said in State ex rel....
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