State ex rel. Moberly Special Road District v. Burton
| Decision Date | 15 February 1916 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. MOBERLY SPECIAL ROAD DISTRICT, Appellant, v. G. R. BURTON et al., Judges of County Court, Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court. -- Hon. A. H. Waller, Judge.
Affirmed.
Willard P. Cave for relator.
(1) The law passed by the General Assembly, authorizing and directing the payment of special road and bridge funds to the incorporated special road district is valid, and within the legal rights of the Legislature to enact such law. Sec 10482, R. S. 1909, Laws 1913, pp. 669, 670; Harris v. Bond Co., 244 Mo. 664; State ex rel v. Sheppard, 192 Mo. 506; State ex rel. v Warner, 197 Mo. 656; Ex parte Roberts, 166 Mo. 212; Cass County v. Jack, 49 Mo. 196; Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5 Ed.), sec. 92, p. 142, sec. 108, p. 181; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 310; Elting v. Hickman, 172 Mo. 237; State ex rel. v. County Court, 128 Mo. 427; Road District v. Embree, 257 Mo. 593. (2) The amendment of the Constitution in 1908 (Sec. 22, art. 10) does not limit the power of the Legislature to designate the agency through which the taxes collected shall be expended, provided same are used for the purposes limited in the constitutional amendment; in other words, the constitutional limitations are merely upon the uses and purposes to which the special fund may be put, and is not a limitation upon the power of the Legislature to designate the agency through which such uses and purposes shall be accomplished. Elting v. Hickman, 172 Mo. 237; Harris v. Bond Co., 244 Mo. 687. (3) The discretionary power to levy the taxes is vested in the county court, but the appropriation of the funds derived therefrom is not the county's business. Railroad v. Marion Co., 36 Mo. 303; State v. County Court, 34 Mo. 546; Barton County v. Walser, 47 Mo. 189; Ray County v. Bentley, 49 Mo. 236; Express Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 680; Glasgow v. Rouse, 43 Mo. 479; Railroad v. State Board of Equalization, 64 Mo. 294; 37 Cyc. 724; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264. (a) The taxing power is not granted by the Constitution, but is inherent in the Legislature. Unless the Constitution expressly forbids the Legislature has the absolute power to assess property and levy taxes, and provide the general scheme by which to carry out such purpose. In re Sanford, 236 Mo. 684. (b) Since there are no constitutional restraints placed upon the Legislature, the State has the power to create such agencies as the Legislature may deem fit and proper for the collection of its revenue. In re Sanford, 236 Mo. 684; St. Louis v. McCann, 157 Mo. 307. (4) The act of the General Assembly of 1913, being the amendment to section 10482, which requires the counties in which there is a special road district to pay such districts the funds raised from the property in such districts, by virtue of a levy of taxes, under section 22, article 10, of the Constitution, is not in conflict with the constitutional provision, and is a valid act of the Legislature. Express Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 680; Elting v. Hickman, 172 Mo. 237; State ex rel. v. County Court, 128 Mo. 427; Harris v. Bond Co., 244 Mo. 664; Road District v. Embree, 257 Mo. 593.
Jerry M. Jeffries for respondents.
(1) Any law passed by the General Assembly authorizing or directing the payment of public funds secured by taxation to an incorporated special road district, is in violation of the Constitution and void. Constitution, art 9, secs. 46 and 47; State ex rel. v. St. Louis County, 142 Mo. 575; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 216 Mo. 89; State v. Curators, 57 Mo. 178. (2) The funds derived from the levy made under section 22 of article 10 of the Constitution are public funds collected for a special purpose. Green City v. Martin, 237 Mo. 274; State ex rel. v. County Court, 142 Mo. 576. (3) The levy of taxes and the appropriation of the funds derived therefrom is the county's business. An act of the General Assembly which requires the county court to pay a part of a fund collected for a particular purpose to the commissioner of a special road district, is void because it takes from the county court its constitutional right to transact all county business. Constitution, art. 6, sec. 36; State ex rel. v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205. (4) All of the county must be under township organization or none. To so organize requires a vote of the people of the entire county. Constitution, art. 19, sec. 8. (5) Constitutions are instruments of practical nature to be construed with the help of common sense to carry out the intent. In construing them it is proper to consider the consequence of the proposed construction, the circumstances and conditions of the people who adopted them. State ex rel. v. Callegin, 172 Mo. 129; State ex rel. v. County Court, 34 Mo. 549; Railroad v. Evans, 85 Mo. 370; Kenefick v. St. Louis, 127 Mo. 1; Water Co. v. City of Lamar, 128 Mo. 188; Test Oath Cases, 41 Mo. 188. (6) Under the Constitution, article 10, section 12, the counties are required to keep within the revenues of each year, with their expenditures of that year. Andrew County ex rel. v. Schell, 135 Mo. 38; Trask v. Livingston County, 210 Mo. 582. (7) The act of the General Assembly of 1913 requires the counties of this State in which there is a special road district, to pay to such special district the funds raised from the property in such special district by virtue of a levy of taxes under section 22 of article 10 of the Constitution, and Sec. 10482, R. S. 1909, is in conflict with such section of the Constitution and void. State ex rel. v. St. Louis County, 34 Mo. 548; Railroad v. Evans, 85 Mo. 370; Kenefick v. St. Louis, 27 Mo. 1; Water Co. v. City, 128 Mo. 188; Hamilton v. St. Louis, 15 Mo. 3; Green City v. Martin, 237 Mo. 477; State v. Curators, 57 Mo. 178; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 216 Mo. 94; State ex rel. v. Everett, 245 Mo. 706; Lamar v. City of Lamar, 169 S.W. 12.
The city of Moberly and contiguous territory in Randolph County for a distance of four miles in each direction from said city, was, under the authority of sections 10576-10586, Revised Statutes 1909, Laws 1911, p. 370, organized as a body corporate, to be thereafter designated as the "Moberly Special Road District." This action by mandamus was brought in the circuit court of said county by the State at the relation of said road district as plaintiff against the judges of the county court of Randolph County as defendants, to compel the latter to pay over (under the provisions of Sec. 10482, R. S. 1909, Laws 1913, p. 669) to said road district all money arising from a twenty-five-cent levy for road and bridge purposes collected on the property within said district. The levy, however, was made upon all the property of the county. The total fund collected in said district under said levy for road and bridge purposes, was $ 9334.60. In anticipation of the revenue to be derived from said twenty-five-cent levy, defendants had caused work to be done and debts to be contracted for roads and bridges over the entire county and had issued warrants therefor.
Upon a hearing on the application for the writ of mandamus the circuit court found that defendants had issued warrants in said district for $ 3303.90 for work done therein, and it was ordered that they pay or issue warrants to plaintiff in the sum of $ 6030.70, or the balance remaining in the county treasury which had been collected in said district under the twenty-five-cent levy.
Cross appeals were perfected from this judgment, plaintiff contending that it was entitled to the entire revenue collected in said district for the preceding year for road and bridge purposes, and defendants that the statute under which the levy was made was unconstitutional and hence void.
The constitutionality of section 10482, Revised Statutes 1909, as amended (Laws 1913, p. 669), providing for the apportionment by county courts of taxes collected for road purposes within certain special road districts, is assailed by defendants on various grounds. It is first contended that this statute violates section 22 of article 10 of the State Constitution. It will be recalled that this section provides in addition to taxes authorized to be levied for county purposes (under Sec. 11, art. 10, Constitution), that the county courts of the several counties, not under township organization, and the township board of directors in counties having township organization, may levy and collect as State and county taxes are collected, a special tax of not more than twenty-five-cents on each one hundred dollars' valuation, to be used for roads and bridges, but for no other purpose whatever, and the power thus conferred on the county courts and township boards is declared to be discretionary.
Three limitations, two express and one implied, say defendants, are found in this section; the first is as to the rate, the second as to the application of the tax when collected, and the third (which defendants say is implied) that the tax must be expended under the direction of the county court over the entire county.
As to defendants' contention in regard to the first and second limitations, there is no question, the Constitution in this regard being express and unequivocal. As to the third, it may be conceded as a general proposition that under section 36 of article 6 of the State Constitution county courts are created for the transaction of county business and express jurisdiction is given them in this regard, but it must be borne in mind, despite this provision, that our organic law is not like the Federal Constitution, a grant of power, but is simply a limitation upon power which ...
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