St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Bragg

• Decision Date: 15 June 1901
• Citation: 64 S.W. 226,69 Ark. 402
• Parties: ST. Louis, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. BRAGG
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

64 S.W. 226

69 Ark. 402

ST. Louis, IRON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. BRAGG

Supreme Court of Arkansas

June 15, 1901

Appeal from Nevada Circuit Court JOEL D. CONWAY, Judge.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

Mrs Emma Bragg, who lived at Gurdon, Arkansas, on the night of November 26, 1897, took passage on one of the Iron Mountain's trains from Gurdon to Beirne, a small village and station on the same road, about four miles south from Gurdon. She was going on a visit to her father, who lived at Beirne, and had with her two children, of whom one was about three years and the other about nine months of age. After she got on the train, she walked back and took a seat with her two children in the chair car. When the train going south stopped at Beirne, the engine and front coach were opposite or near the depot, but the chair car in which Mrs. Bragg rode was several coaches away. There is a public crossing some forty or fifty feet north of the depot. North of this crossing the railroad track is enclosed by a wire fence, and this enclosed track is separated from the crossing by a cattle guard. Mrs. Bragg was assisted by the porter, and alighted from the front end of the chair car, which was standing on the enclosed track north of the public crossing. Mrs. Bragg supposed that she was getting off at the crossing but after she got off the brakeman said to her: "Here is the cattle guard. You will have to get across that before you get to the road." She then asked him to take her back on the train, but she did not know that he heard this request for the train had commenced to move, and did not stop. She could see the depot by the light of the train, but after the train left she says there was no light there. On realizing that she was left in the dark, with the cattle guard between her and the crossing, she says that she was frightened very much. But in a minute or two she saw two persons approaching who proved to be a Mr. Oglesby and his son, who knew Mrs. Bragg, and, seeing her alight from the train alone with her children, had gone to assist her. They assisted her to cross the cattle guard, and accompanied her to her father's house, about three hundred yards away. She made no complaint to them of fright or injury, but afterwards claimed that her health was permanently injured by fright from being put off the train away from the depot and crossing; and brought this action to recover $ 10,000 as damages. On a trial, there was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $ 1,000, from which judgment the company appealed.

Judgment reversed.

Dodge & Johnson, for appellant.

There can be no recovery of damages for mere fright or mental shock, unaccompanied by any personal or physical injury. 151 N.Y. 10; 60 F. 552; 85 Ill. 331; 1 Cush. 451; 6 C. C. A. 432; 6 Nev. 224; 60 F. 557; 25 Ia. 268; 105 U.S. 249; 176 Ill. 401; 62 Ill. 313; 85 Ill. 11; 47 L. R. A. 394; 168 Mass. 485; id. 216; 64 Ark. 544; 65 Ark. 182; 67 Ark. 123.

Scott & Jones, for appellee.

Since in objection here raised to in appellee's cause of action--that there can be no recovery for mere mental shock--was not raised in the lower court, it cannot be considered here. But damages are recoverable for such an injury as in this case. 44 P. 322; 50 N.W. 1034; 94 U.S. 469; 2 W. Bl. 892; 2 Sedg. Dam. 642; 26 Exch. Div. 428, 422; 13 App. Cas. 222; 1 Strobh. 525; 29 S.E. 905; 50 N.W. 1034; 18 R. I. 791; 25 S.W. 1032; 25 S.W. 953;47 Minn. 307; S. C. 50 N.W. 238; 111 Ala. 135; S. C. 18 So. 565.

OPINION

RIDDICK, J., (after stating the facts).

This is an action against a railway company by a female passenger to recover damages for being put off at a place away from the station. It is evident, though, that she was put off near the station, and only a few yards from in public crossing where she wished to alight. But she was frightened, she says, by reason of the fact that it was dark, and that a cattle guard separated her from the crossing. Now it is doubtless true that the employees of the train were guilty of carelessness in putting off the appellee and her young children at night at a place where they would have to pass the cattle guard before reaching the depot or public crossing. If she or her children has been injured in attempting to pass the cattle guard, it would have been entirely just to have held the company responsible for the damages suffered. But no such injury followed. A neighbor saw them alight, and went to them at once, and assisted them to cross the cattle guard, and to reach their destination in safety. Admitting that the plaintiff is liable for the inconvenience caused by putting the plaintiff off in the enclosed part of the railroad track, so that she was compelled to pass a cattle guard at night, this by no means justifies the judgment for $ 1,000 rendered in her favor, unless the company is responsible for the consequences of the fright and nervous shock which she claims to have sustained, and which, according to the testimony of her father, a physician, resulting in excessive nervous prostration, and in permanent loss of health. Plaintiff, indeed, bases her right to recover in this case, not on any immediate physical injury suffered by reason of the negligence of the defendant, but upon fright and subsequent prostration and in health caused by the fright. But the right to recover for a physical injury resulting from fright or mental anguish only would seem to depend on whether a recovery could be had for such fright and mental anguish.

We held in a recent case that damages could not be recovered at law for mental pain and anguish...