St. Louis Police Officers' Association v. Board of Police Commissioners, No. ED 88894 (Mo. App. 10/9/2007)
| Decision Date | 09 October 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 88894,ED 88894 |
| Parties | St. Louis Police Officers' Association, Gary Phelps and William Gooden, Plaintiffs/Appellants v. Board of Police Commissioners of the City of St. Louis, Chris Goodson, Joann F. Morrow, Michael J. Quinn, Julius K. Hunter, and Francis G. Slay, Defendants/Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Hon. Julian L. Bush.
James J. Wilson and Elkin L. Kistner, for Appellant.
John M. Hessel, for Respondent.
Before Richter, P.J., and Norton, J.
The St. Louis Police Officers' Association, Gary Phelps, and William Gooden (collectively "Association") appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their petition for an injunction to prevent the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of St. Louis ("Police Board") from reducing the free health insurance benefits of retired police officers that is mandated by statute. Finding no error, we affirm.
Prior to 2001, the Police Board1 had provided health insurance coverage to police retirees at no cost to the retirees. In Fiscal Year 2001-2002, the Police Board tried to require retirees to pay a portion of the premiums for their health insurance coverage. The Association and several of its members filed a petition that sought to enjoin the Police Board from so doing. The trial court in that case issued an interlocutory judgment on April 30, 2002 in favor of the Association and the named plaintiffs. The trial court determined that:
... The Board is free to craft a basic health insurance plan for all retirees. Such a basic health insurance plan may incorporate a less than superlative plan with an array of cost-saving attributes for the Board. For a more comprehensive plan, a monthly charge to retirees could be required.
But, at a minimum, some basic health insurance must be furnished for these retirees. ...
The Retiree Insurance Coverage Statute requires that the Police Board "provide health ... insurance coverage" for the Plaintiffs. The statutory mandate compels the Police Board to make sure that the Plaintiffs receive — not merely have "access to" — at least some basic health insurance policy. (Citations omitted). Thereafter on March 3, 2005, the Police Board and the class members of retirees entered into a consent decree that ended this initial litigation without admitting liability on the part of the Police Board.2
Pursuant to Section 84.160.8(3) RSMo Cum. Supp. 2006, the Police Board "shall provide health, medical, and life insurance coverage for retired officers and employees of the police department."3 In Fiscal Year 2006, the Police Board altered the health insurance plans offered to police retirees. Two plans were presented: a basic plan ("Basic Plan"), which was provided at no premium cost to police retirees, and a premium plan ("Buy Up Plan"), which was offered for $251 per month. The free Basic Plan marked a significant change from the previous free health insurance plans offered to police retirees. Annual deductibles and the coinsurance maximum increased significantly, while the coinsurance coverage percentage decreased noticeably. Co-payments for office and hospital visits increased as well. The Buy-Up Plan offers police retirees the same comprehensive coverage that active police officers receive, which provides comprehensive medical coverage at a moderate cost, but is not free.
Thereafter, the Association filed a petition seeking injunctive relief, naming the Police Board as defendants. The Association sought to enjoin the Police Board from implementing the new health insurance plan, alleging that the statutory mandate that the Police Board "shall provide" health insurance to police retirees requires "a commercially reasonable free health insurance plan." The Association also alleged that implementation of the Police Board's new free insurance plan would unreasonably, arbitrarily, and capriciously deprive police retirees of a vested property right without due process of law in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the Missouri Constitution, and their civil rights protected under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The Association also requested that the Police Board pay its attorney's fees.
After adducing evidence, the trial court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the Association. Thereafter, a bench trial took place in July 2006 at which a number of persons testified, including experts on health insurance. On August 4, 2006, the trial court entered judgment denying the Association's request for a permanent injunction, and denying the request for attorney's fees and court costs. The Association now appeals from this judgment.
In its first point relied on, the Association contends that the trial court erred in finding that the Basic Plan met the statutory mandate of section 84.160.8(3) to "provide ... health insurance" to the police retirees because the Basic Plan provides "such a uniquely meager benefits package" that it does not satisfy the plain purpose of the statute. The Association contends that the trial court accordingly committed reversible error in denying its request for a permanent injunction.
An action for an injunction is an equitable action. Supermarket Merchandising & Supply, Inc. v. Marschuetz, 196 S.W.3d 581, 585 (Mo. App. 2006). The trial court's judgment in an equitable suit will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. v. Missouri Dept. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Mo. banc 2003).
Injunctive relief is a harsh remedy, one which is to be used sparingly and only then in clear cases. Marschuetz, 196 S.W.3d at 585. An absolute prerequisite for gaining injunctive relief is the wrongful and injurious invasion of a legal right belonging to the plaintiff. Id. A party seeking an injunction has the burden of proving that it is entitled to that relief. Id.
The Association essentially contends that the trial court erred in its construction of section 84.160.8(3). Statutory construction is a matter of law. City of St. Joseph v. Village of Country Club, 163 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Mo. banc 2005). We review questions of law de novo. Otte v. Missouri State Treasurer, 141 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Mo. App. 2004). The primary role of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the legislature by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute. State ex rel. Womack v. Rolf, 173 S.W.3d 634, 638 (Mo. banc 2005). "[E]ach word, clause, sentence and section of a statute should be given meaning." Id. (). Courts will reject a statutory interpretation that requires ignoring the very words of the statute. Id. Courts avoid interpreting statutes to include qualifying language "where '[s]uch an interpretation impermissibly adds language to the statute.'" BHA Group Holding, Inc. v. Pendergast, 173 S.W.3d 373, 379 (Mo. App. 2005) (quoting Kincade v. Treasurer of State of Missouri, 92 S.W.3d 310, 312 (Mo. App. 2002)). This Court is not permitted to "'engraft upon the statute provisions which do not appear in explicit words or by implication from the words in the statute.'" State Department of Social Services, Division of Medical Services v. Brundage, 85 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Mo. App. 2002) (quoting Wilson v. McNeal, 575 S.W.2d 802, 810 (Mo. App. 1978)).
Section 84.160.8(3) states that the Police Board"[s]hall provide health, medical, and life insurance coverage for retired officers and employees of the police department." Generally the use of the word "shall" connotes a mandatory duty. Bauer v. Transitional School District of City of St. Louis, 111 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Mo. banc 2003). Where the legislature fails to include a penalty for failure to do that which "shall" be done, courts have said that "shall" is directory, not mandatory. Id. However, the absence or presence of a penalty provision is only one method for determining if a statute is directory or mandatory. Id. "Indeed, '[t]he absence of a penalty provision does not automatically override other considerations.'" Id. (quoting Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Mahn, 766 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. banc 1989)). Whether the use of the word "shall" in a...
To continue reading
Request your trial