State, Dept. of Social Services v. Brundage, WD 60535.

• Decision Date: 16 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. WD 60535.,WD 60535.
• Citation: 85 S.W.3d 43
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF MEDICAL SERVICES, Appellant, v. Donald Lee BRUNDAGE, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

85 S.W.3d 43

STATE of Missouri, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF MEDICAL SERVICES, Appellant, v. Donald Lee BRUNDAGE, Respondent.

No. WD 60535.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

July 16, 2002.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied August 22, 2002.

Application for Transfer Denied October 22, 2002.

Carolyn Hajaved Kerr, Division of Legal Services, Jefferson City, for Appellant.

Carlyle L. Foley, Daniel Ray Dunham, Columbia, for Respondent.

RONALD R. HOLLIGER, Judge.

Vincent Brundage died in February 1998, leaving a small estate. Respondent Donald Brundage ("Brundage") filed an "Affidavit to Establish Distributees of Decedent Where Total Estate Is Less than $40,000.00" (the "small estate affidavit") on May 11, 1998.¹ The decedent's will was admitted to probate on May 18, 1998, but no application for letters testamentary was filed, nor was full administration of the estate sought by any interested party. Notice to creditors was published in a county newspaper on May 30 and June 6, 1998, but no claims were filed. Distribution of the decedent's assets was apparently made several weeks later.

On September 17, 1998, appellant, Division of Medical Services ("DMS"), filed a claim in the probate court seeking to recover $41,492.85 from the estate for Medicaid assistance paid to the decedent and his predeceased spouse. DMS sent a demand letter to counsel for Brundage and the other distributees on the following day. Correspondence was apparently exchanged between the attorney and DMS over the following months in an attempt to settle the claim,² but the claim was never paid. There appears to be no serious dispute regarding the validity of DMS' claim or of the amount of DMS' claim. The stumbling block in resolving the claim was the distributees' request that DMS execute a quitclaim deed releasing any interest it had to the real property in the estate. Because the amounts offered by distributees ($10,000 from sale of the real property plus $2,208.84 from liquidated personal property) would not completely satisfy DMS' claim, the distributees contended that a quitclaim deed was necessary to render the real estate title marketable. DMS refused to execute the quitclaim deed, believing it unnecessary as it had no lien on that property. Due to DMS' refusal, it never received any of the proposed payment from the distributees.

Over two years after the decedent's death, on June 17, 2000, DMS filed an amended claim with the probate court changing the amount sought to $33,662.73. (There is no explanation offered by DMS for the amended filing.) It sought to call the amended claim for hearing, but Brundage and the other distributees argued that DMS' only remedy was to file an application for full administration of the estate under § 473.020, RSMo. As the time to seek full administration had elapsed, they also argued that DMS' claim was time barred. The probate court agreed and dismissed DMS' claim with prejudice on February 9, 2001. This dismissal was not appealed by DMS.

Subsequently, on April 11, 2001, DMS filed a petition in circuit court seeking to recover against Brundage in his capacity as the affiant in the small estate affidavit. The substantive allegations of the petition were that: (1) Brundage had promised, in the affidavit, to pay all unpaid debts owed by the estate; and (2) Brundage had failed to pay the state's claim, despite notice of the claim. DMS, therefore, claimed that. Brundage was liable to DMS for failing to satisfy the debt owed by the estate.

Brundage filed a motion to dismiss DMS' petition for failure to state a claim. The motion to dismiss was ultimately granted by the court.³ DMS now appeals that dismissal.

Standard of Review

DMS incorrectly claims that the standard of review in this matter is supplied by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). This error may be due to the fact that DMS mischaracterizes the cause as having been "heard without a jury pursuant to Rule 73.01." This is not accurate, as the case was dismissed by the court for failure to state a claim. The merits of the case were not reached by the trial court. Thus, Murphy v. Carron is not applicable to the present matter.

The proper standard of review applicable to an appeal of a trial court's dismissal for failure to state of claim is discussed in Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. banc 1993):

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is solely a test of the adequacy of the plaintiff's petition. It assumes that all of plaintiff's averments are true, and liberally grants to plaintiff all reasonable inferences therefrom. No attempt is made to weigh any facts alleged as to whether they are credible or persuasive. Instead, the petition is reviewed in an almost academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case.

Id. at 306 (internal citation omitted). The facts alleged in the petition are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Sullivan v. Carlisle, 851 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Mo. banc 1993). If the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom state any ground for relief, then we must reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings. Id.

Adequacy of DMS' Brief Under Rule 84.04(d)

Before looking to the specific issues raised by DMS' appeal, it should be noted that Brundage urges this court to dismiss the appeal for failure to comply with Rule 84.04(d). That Rule describes three essential components to each point on appeal. First, the point must state the specific trial court action that is challenged. Second, the point must state how that action was erroneous. Third, the point must show why the error requires reversal of the trial court. Brundage claims that DMS has failed to comply with Rule 84.04(d)(1)(C), which requires that each point on appeal "explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons [asserted by the Appellant] support the claim of reversible error."

DMS' first point on appeal states:

The trial court erred in dismissing the Department's cause of action because the Department asserted valid claims against the affiant in that the state, as a creditor must and does have various means by which to collect its debt, including filing suit against the affiant for failing to meet his obligations under § 473.097, RSMo, and, alternatively, for failing to keep his common law promise to pay a creditor of the estate.

This point meets at least two of the requirements of Rule 84.04(d). It identifies an alleged error, the dismissal of DMS' petition. It also arguably states the nature of the error, that dismissal was inappropriate because DMS stated a cause of action. This first point, however, does not clearly explain why the trial court must be reversed. Instead, the point launches into a discussion of whether DMS has a claim against Brundage.

DMS' second and third points on appeal state:

The trial court erred in dismissing the Department's cause of action because the Department, as a creditor of the estate must have a legal recourse against the affiant for his knowing failure to pay a lawful claim against the estate, in that an affiant operating under § 473.097, RSMo, should be bound by the same duties and obligations to collect the assets of the decedent and distribute them to the creditors and distributees of the estate as a personal representative does under § 473.270, RSMo, and should, therefore, be treated by the court in the same manner.

* * *

The trial court erred in dismissing the Department's cause of action because the Department possessed the authority to assert and collect its claim from and against the estate of Vincent Lee Brundage in that federal and state statutes mandate the Department to recover Medicaid assistance paid to or on behalf of a Medicaid recipient and his predeceased spouse during their lifetimes from the estate of the last-surviving spouse.

These points on appeal both fail to meet two of the requirements of Rule 84.04(d). They do not specifically identify how the trial court erred, but instead are affirmative claims that DMS should have legal recourse to seek reimbursement against Brundage and is required by federal law to seek such reimbursement. In essence, these latter points merely offer policy and legal reasons in support of permitting DMS to seek reimbursement from a small estate affiant but do not themselves set up any independent allegations of error.

Discussion

Despite the deficiencies in DMS' stated points on appeal, we decline to exercise our jurisdiction to dismiss DMS' appeal. Its first point on appeal does raise an arguable claim of error by the trial court. Further, the specifics of that claim of error are clear from the argument portion of the brief and there is no confusion of the issues involved. As such, the deficiencies do not impede our resolution of the issues. See Wilkerson v. Prelutsky, 943 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Mo. banc 1997). Under similar circumstances, we have previously stated that "because it is our preference to dispose of cases on the merits rather than to dismiss them for deficiencies in the briefs." Robin Farms v. Bartholome, 989 S.W.2d 238, 245 (Mo.App.1999) (citing Jordan v. Stallings, 911 S.W.2d 653, 664 (Mo.App. 1995)). DMS' first point on appeal will therefore be addressed upon its merits. The remaining two points will be disregarded, given they do not present any claims of trial court error. The motion to dismiss is denied.

Accordingly, DMS' appeal presents us with the sole question of whether its petition stated a claim against Brundage. This requires resolution of two related issues. First, we must determine whether, under the facts pled, DMS has a claim against Brundage under any legal or equitable basis. Second, we must determine whether DMS' petition sufficiently pled that claim.

DMS claims that it has a right...