St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Ward
Decision Date | 16 January 1939 |
Docket Number | 4-5335 |
Parties | ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY v. WARD |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Crawford Circuit Court; J. O. Kincannon, Judge reversed.
Judgment reversed and cause dismissed.
J W. Jamison and Warner & Warner, for appellant.
George A. Hurst and Partain & Agee, for appellee.
OPINION
This action was brought by appellee against J. M. Kurn and John G. Lonsdale, trustees in bankruptcy, for the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, hereinafter called appellants, and one Hollowell, to recover damages in a large sum alleged to have been sustained by reason of personal injuries on October 14, 1937, while in the employ of appellants, occasioned by the alleged negligence of said Hollowell, a fellow-servant. Trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for $ 5,000, for a reversal of which this appeal is prosecuted.
Appellee, Hollowell and a number of other employees were engaged as laborers in the dismantling and removing of the railway tracks, including rails, ties, etc., of the St. Paul branch of appellant railway company and in loading the rails and ties on cars. At the time of the alleged accident to appellee, he and Hollowell were carrying a heavy crosstie, weighing from 350 to 400 pounds, on their right shoulders to a box car some 300 feet away, appellee being in front, into which it was to be loaded. The complaint alleged that, "as was the custom and practice, when they got to the car they both stopped for the purpose of permitting two other employees inside the car to lift same off of plaintiff's shoulder, so that same could be loaded into the car; that when plaintiff and said defendant so stopped the said defendant (meaning Hollowell) suddenly and without any signal or warning whatever to the plaintiff, carelessly and negligently stepped forward, thereby causing the plaintiff to be pushed against said railroad car and to stumble and his body to be twisted and wrenched by the heavy weight of said crosstie so that plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured," as later detailed. Appellant's answer was a general denial of all the material allegations of the complaint, and a plea of contributory negligence and of assumed risk, in bar of the action. Hollowell filed no answer or other pleading in the case, and did not testify to any fact in connection with this action, his only testimony being directed to the fact that he worked for appellants on the St. Paul branch job, and that he has a claim against appellants for an injury he received, he being represented in said claim by one of counsel for appellee.
We think the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for appellants at their request on the ground that no actionable negligence is shown, conceding that the complaint states a cause of action, a question not raised or presented.
In detailing how the accident occurred, appellee testified as follows: On cross-examination he testified:
Two other witnesses testified they saw Hollowell take a step forward and shove appellee into the car. The two men working inside the car said they knew nothing about his getting hurt at the time, and only learned about it afterwards.
For the purpose of this decision we accept appellee's testimony and that of his witnesses as true. The mere fact that Hollowell took a step forward without notice to appellee that he would do so cannot be said to be negligence. Negligence is the doing of something that a person of ordinary prudence would not do, or the failure to do something that a person of ordinary prudence would do, under the same or similar circumstances, and to be actionable there must be a violation of duty resulting in injury to another. Armour & Co. v. Rose, 183 Ark. 413, 36 S.W.2d 70. Negligence is never presumed, but the burden is on the party asserting it to establish the fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Nor is it to be presumed from the fact of injury, and no one is liable in damages for a purely accidental injury. In this case, we think the evidence discloses a pure accident, for which appellants are not liable. Appellee and Hollowell were performing a very simple operation--the carrying of crossties to a box car...
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