St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. . McBride
| Decision Date | 25 November 1924 |
| Docket Number | 14882. |
| Citation | 231 P. 284,104 Okla. 216,1924 OK 1066 |
| Parties | ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RY. CO. v. McBRIDE et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The land in controversy in this case was condemned by the plaintiff railroad company for right of way and station ground purposes, and therefor the defendants and their grantors went upon a certain part of the right of way in the town of Sulphur, Okl., and occupied the same for several years when the railroad company desired to use the land so occupied for railway purposes, and brought ejectment against the defendants who were occupying same, and defendants pleaded as a defense adverse possession and the statute of limitations. Held, that neither defense was good as against property condemned for right of way. The land in question was not granted for private use or disposal, but only for the quasi public uses named in the act under which it is condemned.
Where property is condemned for right of way purposes by a railway company, neither laches on the part of the company nor any local statute of limitation can invest individuals with any interest in the tract, or with a right to use it for private purposes.
Neither courts nor juries nor the general public may be permitted to conjecture that a portion of such right of way is no longer needed for the use of the railroad and title to it as vested in whomsoever chooses to occupy the same. The whole of the granted right of way must be presumed to be necessary for the purpose of the railway as against a claim by an individual or an exclusive right of possession for private purposes.
In this case the property in controversy was taken from the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations under condemnation proceedings, and the railway company is entitled to said property as against any individual company or corporation, so long as it uses it for the purposes for which it was condemned, and, when the railway company ceases to use it for the purposes for which it was taken, it will revert to the Chickasaw and Choctaw tribes of Indians from whom it was taken, and until after such nonuser and reverter no private individual, company, or corporation can acquire any right of possession as against the railway company or the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations.
Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1.
Appeal from District Court, Murray County; W. L. Eagleton, Judge.
Action by the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company against George McBride and another. From a judgment for defendants plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
W. F Evans, of St. Louis, Mo., and Stuart, Sharp & Cruce, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
W. N Lewis, of Davis, for defendants in error.
This is a suit in ejectment by the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company against George McBride and T. H. Slover to recover certain lands consisting of a part of its station grounds and right of way in the city of Sulphur, Okl. The plaintiff alleges that it is the owner of the above-described lands and tenements by reason of having purchased the same from the Sulphur Springs Railway Company, which company became the owner of said lands by virtue of condemnation proceedings on the 22d day of December, 1902, under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved February 28, 1902 (32 Stat. 43) commonly known as the Enid and Anadarko Act; that the Sulphur Springs Railway Company immediately went into possession of said lands and tenements under and by virtue of said condemnation proceedings; and that the plaintiff herein purchased all the right, title, and interest in and to said property so acquired by the Sulphur Springs Railway Company for a valuable consideration, and is entitled to all the rights and privileges which the Sulphur Springs Railway Company acquired by virtue of said condemnation proceedings. The petition then alleges that the defendants George McBride and T. H. Slover are asserting some right, title, or interest in and to the above-described lands and tenements, and that they are in possession of a portion thereof, and refuse to vacate or surrender possession to the plaintiff herein, although demand has been made for possession. They pray judgment and that they be entitled to the exclusive possession of said land and the defendants be ordered and directed to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff. The defendant George McBride filed a disclaimer, and the defendant T. H. Slover set up in his answer that they and their predecessors in title have been in possession of said land since August 28, 1903, and have been in the open, notorious, and peaceable possession of said land since said date. They plead adverse possession and the statute of limitations, and pray that their title be quieted to said real estate. The defendants deraign their title through T. R. Cook and T. F. Gafford, Gafford holding a quitclaim deed from Cook and McBride and Slover holding quitclaim deeds from Gafford.
The case was tried to the court without a jury, and the court found for the defendants, and after unsuccessful motion for a new trial the plaintiffs appealed to this court by petition in error, with case-made attached, and the case is now regularly before this court for final disposition. There are six assignments of error in the petition in error, and they are argued under four heads in the brief. The first proposition urged by plaintiff in error is:
"A decision of this case involves the construction of an act of Congress, and is therefore a federal question and the decisions of the federal courts thereon are binding upon the state courts."
There is no question but what the act of Congress under which the land in controversy was condemned is a federal statute, and that the Supreme Court of the United States is the final arbiter in cases of this character, and their decisions in the Townsend and Ely Cases are controlling. This court has on numerous occasions accepted this well-defined doctrine of law, and has held that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are binding on such questions. Miller v. State, 3 Okl. Cr. 457, 106 P. 810; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Walston, 37 Okl. 517, 133 P. 42; Ex parte Owen, 10 Okl. Cr. 284, 136 P. 197, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 522; A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 71 Okl. 712, 175 P. 539; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Bentley, 71 Okl. 165, 176 P. 250; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Railway Company v. Patterson, 75 Okl. 204, 182 P. 701. From the foregoing decisions it is plain that decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, construing similar acts granting railroad right of ways through the public domain and Indian lands, should be followed by this court. The second proposition stated is:
"The federal courts have without exception held that adverse possession will not run against railway right of ways obtained under similar act of Congress."
The land in controversy in this case was condemned from the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations under the Act of February 28, 1902 (32 Stat. at Large, 43), and was an act to grant a right of way to the Enid & Anadarko Railway Company. It contains the width of right of ways, restrictions upon the use of same, and provides for a reversion to the Indian tribes in case of failure to use the property for railway purposes. The important section of said act as applied to this case is section 2, and is as follows:
It will be observed that the closing paragraph of said section provides:
"And when any portion thereof shall cease to be so used such portion shall revert to the nation or tribe of Indians from which the same shall have been taken."
In this case it would be the Chickasaw and Choctaw tribes of Indians. Congress has passed many similar acts to this, and there can be no question but that Congress had the power to grant this right of way through the Indian country, provided only that a method for payment to the Indian tribes for the land taken was contained in the act. This question has been definitely decided in the case of Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Company, 135 U.S. 641, 10 S.Ct. 965, 34 L.Ed 295, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the right of Congress to enact legislation exactly similar to the Enid and Anadarko Act. The condemnation deed in question shows that the particular piece of land was condemned from, and that the money therefor was paid to, the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations. The deed also shows a settlement with certain people claiming possessory rights to portions of...
To continue reading
Request your trial