St. Lucie County v. Town of St. Lucie Village
| Decision Date | 24 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | 91-1359,Nos. 91-1358,s. 91-1358 |
| Citation | 603 So.2d 1289 |
| Parties | ST. LUCIE COUNTY and St. Lucie County Port and Airport Authority, Appellants, v. TOWN OF ST. LUCIE VILLAGE; Airport Watch, Inc.; James Grimes; William Thiess; Virginia Meeko; Nel Granitz; Robert Terry, Jr.; Mabel Fawsett; Barbara Platts; Terry L. Howard; Ronald Rohm; Katherine B. Goodwin; Steve Hoskins; Jan Lein; Jane Brooks; Harold Hogan; Astor Summerlin; Peggy Berg; Greg Rosslow; Deborah B. Jones; and Chris Haynes, Appellees. 603 So.2d 1289, 17 Fla. L. Week. D1562 |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Nabors and Gregory T. Stewart of Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., Tallahassee, and Daniel McIntyre, Fort Pierce, for appellants.
Richard V. Neill, Jr., of Neill, Griffin, Jeffries & Lloyd Chartered, Fort Pierce, for appellee-Town of St. Lucie Village.
Ben L. Bryan, Jr., of Fee, Bryan & Koblegard, P.A., Fort Pierce, for individual appellees.
John S. Yodice and Donald L. Hardison of Yodice Associates, Washington, D.C., and Cecile S. Hatfield, Miami, for amicus curiae, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass'n.
Alan C. Sundberg and F. Townsend Hawkes of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., Tallahassee, for amicus curiae, Florida Airport Managers Ass'n.
Thornton J. Williams, Gen. Counsel, Russell A. Waldon and Gregory G. Costas, Asst. General Counsels, Tallahassee, for amicus curiae Florida Dept. of Transp.
George A. Golder, Egerton K. van den Berg and John R. Hamilton of Foley & Lardner, Orlando, for amici curiae the City of Tallahassee, the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority, the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, Metropolitan Dade County, the Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, and the City of Naples Airport Authority.
This case involves an injunction against any future expansion of a county airport. The Town of St. Lucie Village, joined by Airport Watch, Inc., and various other persons, filed a five-count Amended Complaint against St. Lucie County [County] and the St. Lucie County Port and Airport Authority [Authority], alleging that the airport was or would become a nuisance.
The St. Lucie County Airport [Airport] is a publicly owned airport facility located wholly within St. Lucie County. It is operated by the Authority, which is a special district created by the Florida Legislature in 1961. The Authority is governed by a board of commissioners who are actually the County Commissioners of County acting ex officio. The Authority is authorized by law to levy ad valorem taxes for the maintenance, operation and enlargement of the Airport. It is also authorized to derive revenues from the operation of the airport through leases, concessions, grants and land sales.
Only counts I and V are at issue in this appeal. Count I alleged that the Authority had entered into "Joint Participation Agreements" [JPA's] with the Florida Department of Transportation [FDOT] whereby FDOT agreed to advance funds to the Authority for the acquisition of adjacent land for the possible, future expansion of the Airport. The Authority promised to pay back the funds with interest when certain, expected federal funds became available or within 10 years from the date of acquisition, whichever was earlier. Plaintiffs alleged that these JPA's violate the Florida Constitution and statutory law. Count V alleged that operation of the Airport constituted a nuisance and, on that account, sought to enjoin the defendants from expanding the airport.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on count I challenging the legality of the JPA's. After a bench trial, the court also entered judgment against County and Authority on Count V seeking the injunction. We reverse both decisions.
We begin with the JPA's. The court concluded that the JPA's violate Article VII, section 12, Florida Constitution, which states:
Section 12. Local bonds.--Counties, school districts, municipalities, special districts and local governmental bodies with taxing powers may issue bonds, certificates of indebtedness or any form of tax anticipation certificates, payable from ad valorem taxation and maturing more than twelve months after issuance only:
(a) to finance or refinance capital projects authorized by law and only when approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation; or (b) to refund outstanding bonds and interest and redemption premium thereon at a lower net average interest cost rate.
We first note that the form of the JPA which the trial court construed is no longer the form used by FDOT and Authority. The JPA now states that the:
reimbursement obligation shall be payable solely from the non-ad valorem revenues of the Agency and shall not be or constitute a general obligation or indebtedness of the Agency or a 'bond' within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory provision * * *.
In Rainhard v. Port of Palm Beach District, 186 So.2d 503 (Fla.1966), the Florida Supreme Court held:
[O]nly bonds or certificates which directly obligate ad valorem taxing power contravene the constitutional provision requiring a freeholder election, and the incidental effect on use of ad valorem taxing power occasioned by pledging of other sources of revenue does not subject the bonds or revenue certificates to the constitutional requirement.
Here, the amended JPA specifically requires repayment only from non-ad valorem revenues. In other words, it excludes repayment from ad valorem revenues. Hence, the constitutional provision regarding an election is no longer implicated, even if it ever was. Thus, the conclusion of the trial court that the JPA's violate the constitution cannot stand.
The trial court, however, also concluded that the JPA's violate section 16, Chapter 88-515, Laws of Florida, the special act which established the Authority. Section 16 states:
The board for and on behalf of the [Authority] is authorized to provide from time to time for the issuance of bonds to pay all or part of the cost of acquisition, construction, reconstruction, or improvement of any facilities provided in this act. However, the issuance of such bonds shall have been approved at an election of the qualified electors who reside in such district, such election to be called, noticed, and conducted as provided by law. [e.s.]
The trial court also held that the JPA:
constitutes a contractual device for the present funding of tax revenues contemplated to be raised or made available for reimbursement in future years under which the obligee acquires a legal or equitable right to require by judicial process the repayment of money and therefore is a 'bond' under Florida law.
Furthermore, the court noted that the repayment of the obligation occurs more than twelve months after issuance, that the bonds were not submitted to a vote of the electors for approval, and that the bonds did not restrict or prohibit payment from ad valorem taxation.
The Authority argues that it is empowered to enter into the JPA's by section 20(d) of the special act, which states:
The authority is hereby authorized to provide by resolution from time to time for the issuance of revenue certificates for the purpose of paying all or part of the costs of any future project of the authority; provided, such revenue certificates are payable solely from revenue derived from the sale, operation, or leasing of the project or projects and shall not be deemed to be a pledge of the full faith and credit or the ad valorem taxing power of the authority.
County and the Authority argue that the JPA's are essentially "revenue certificates" within the meaning of section 20(d), under which no vote of the electors is necessary.
We agree with County and the Authority. The language of the amended JPA's expressly states that the obligation shall not constitute a bond within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory provision. At the same time, the obligations designate non-ad valorem revenue as the sole fund from which they will be repaid. From a functional standpoint, we are unable to discern any difference between a pledge of lease revenues and a pledge of revenues received from the federal government for the expansion of airports. Because these obligations plainly come within the framework of section 20(d), a vote of the electorate is not required. We therefore conclude that the amended JPA's do not violate Chapter 88-515.
We next turn to the injunction against future expansion. The injunction is premised solely on the court's finding that the operation of the Airport is, or will become, a nuisance. The court's actual findings and conclusions on this subject are set forth in the following paragraphs, which say:
3. Judgment is entered in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants on Count V of the Complaint, being the Count asserting a nuisance and requesting the enjoining thereof. The Defendants are enjoined and restrained from physically expanding the nuisance that exists at the Airport. Specifically, the Defendants shall not extend the existing 6500 foot runway, construct a proposed 3700 foot runway to the North, or increase the load-bearing capacity of the runways to allow utilization by aircraft such as three-engine jets, DC-9's, 727's, or 747's.
4. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit usage of the existing physical facilities in conformance with Federal or State laws, rules or regulations.
From the evidence adduced, the foregoing findings/conclusions are predicated upon the present lawful operation of the airport, because there is no...
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