St. Mary's Medical Center v. Loomis

Decision Date17 December 2002
Docket NumberNo. 82A01-0112-CV-488.,82A01-0112-CV-488.
Citation783 N.E.2d 274
PartiesST. MARY'S MEDICAL CENTER OF EVANSVILLE, INC., Appellant-Defendant, v. Gregory J. LOOMIS, M.D., Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Karl L. Mulvaney, Nana Quay-Smith, Candace L. Sage, Bingham McHale, Indianapolis, D. Timothy Born, Terrell, Baugh, Salmon & Born, Evansville, James W. Riley, Jr., Riley Bennett & Egloff, Indianapolis, Attorneys for Appellant.

David M. Mattingly, Fred R. Biesecker, Brian J. Paul, Indianapolis, Gregory G. Meyer, Evansville, Gregory J. Bubalo, Becker Law Office, Louisville, KY, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BAKER, Judge.

Appellant-defendant St. Mary's Medical Center of Evansville, Inc. (the Hospital) appeals the jury verdict granted to appellee-plaintiff Gregory J. Loomis, M.D. Specifically, the Hospital argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Hospital's motion for judgment on the evidence and in refusing to give an instruction stating that Dr. Loomis was a licensee on the Hospital's premises instead of an invitee at the time of the accident. The Hospital also contends that the $16,950,000 damage award is excessive. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that the damage award is not excessive, we affirm.1

FACTS

The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that Dr. Loomis, a neurosurgeon in private practice in Evansville, had surgery privileges at the Hospital. On November 19, 1998, Dr. Loomis was visiting his patients in the east wing of the Hospital's fourth floor (4-East). Dr. Loomis stopped at the 4-East pantry to pour himself a cup of coffee. Dr. Loomis, other physicians, and the Hospital's employees regularly used the pantry for coffee breaks. As he entered the pantry, he noticed that the pot was not near the coffee maker. He saw the pot, full of water, sitting near the sink at the opposite end of the room. He walked to the sink, picked up the pot with his left hand, turned toward the coffee maker, took a step, and slipped. Dr. Loomis fell backwards onto his left side. He landed on the region of his left kidney. His outstretched left arm hit the floor as well, the water in the pot sloshing out to Dr. Loomis's left. When he sat up, water was on the back of his scrubs in the area where he had landed. A nurse's assistant and secretary entered the pantry after hearing Dr. Loomis fall. Upon arrival, they saw Dr. Loomis sitting up, holding his left arm.

Lisa Bihm, the assistant nurse manager for 4-East prepared an incident report, noting that there had been water on the floor of the pantry. Bihm escorted Dr. Loomis to Employee Health Services. When Dr. Loomis expressed embarrassment about his fall, Bihm responded, "There's always water on the floor." Appellee's App. p. 27. Patricia Borst, a nurse practitioner with Employee Health Services, noted that Dr. Loomis complained of pain in his left flank and left elbow, along with the fact that Dr. Loomis's back was wet.

After the accident, Dr. Loomis developed severe pain in his left elbow. While Dr. Loomis had had surgery on his elbow in September 1998 for "tennis elbow," the pain after the slip was "the worst pain [he had] ever had in [his] life." Appellant's App. p. 32. The pain kept him from sleeping at night. While Dr. Loomis usually performed about 250 surgeries per year, after his fall he could perform only three, and those with great difficulty.

Dr. Loomis's condition worsened. He developed an arm tremor. The hair on his arm fell out and the skin underneath became shiny. His arm would occasionally turn purple, and his arm muscles atrophied. He began to compensate by using his right arm, but the overuse he placed on the right arm produced carpal tunnel syndrome and arthritis in that arm.

By December 1998, Dr. Paul Perry, Dr. Loomis's physician, diagnosed reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD), a syndrome where the body's repair mechanisms are activated in response to a normal injury "but never get turned off." Appellee's App. p. 228-29. Dr. Perry testified that the symptoms Dr. Loomis was experiencing were unlike those associated with tennis elbow. In April 1999, Dr. Loomis stopped seeing patients on account of the pain in his arm and sold his practice. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Perry told Dr. Loomis that it was unlikely he would ever be able to practice neurosurgery again.

On December 15, 1999, Dr. Loomis filed a complaint against the Hospital, alleging that the Hospital negligently failed to maintain its floor in a reasonably safe condition. After motions for partial summary judgment filed by both parties were denied, a jury trial began on July 24, 2001. After Dr. Loomis rested his case, the Hospital moved for judgment on the evidence, alleging that no evidence existed to show that the 4-East pantry was in a dangerous condition and that it owed Dr. Loomis no duty. The trial court denied the Hospital's motion.

Both parties submitted final jury instructions. One of the Hospital's tendered instructions defined the term "licensee" and outlined the duty owed to a licensee by an occupier of land.2 The trial court refused the Hospital's instructions and instead instructed the jury that Dr. Loomis was an invitee to whom the Hospital owed a duty of reasonable care.

On July 31, 2001, the jury returned a verdict for Dr. Loomis. The jury assessed 100% of the fault to the Hospital and none against Dr. Loomis. The jury awarded Dr. Loomis $16,950,000 that constituted damages for loss of income, pain and suffering, and medical expenses. The Hospital now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Motion for Judgment on the Evidence

The Hospital contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Hospital's motion for judgment on the evidence. Specifically, the Hospital argues that it had no notice of any dangerous condition in the pantry and that it exercised reasonable care in keeping the premises safe. The Hospital also maintains that Dr. Loomis failed to show that the Hospital's negligence proximately caused his injuries.

When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for judgment on the evidence, this court uses the same standard as the trial court. Schloot v. Guinevere Real Estate Corp., 697 N.E.2d 1273, 1275 (Ind.Ct. App.1998). This court has held that "`a judgment on the evidence is proper only when there is a total absence of evidence in favor of the plaintiff, that is, that the evidence is without conflict and is susceptible of only one inference and that inference is in favor of the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Hampton v. Moistner, 654 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ind.Ct.App.1995)).

A. Notice

The Hospital argues that no evidence was offered to support a finding that it had notice that the 4-East pantry presented a danger. Appellant's Br. p. 31. Specifically, the Hospital argues that its employees did not notify it of a dangerous condition because the employees themselves did not consider the pantry to be dangerous.

This court has held that the issue of notice of a dangerous condition is an issue of fact for the jury. Schloot, 697 N.E.2d at 1276. For the Hospital to prevail on a motion for judgment on the evidence "there must not have been any evidence or reasonable inferences that [the defendant] failed to exercise reasonable care." Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the evidence put forth by the plaintiff to defeat a defendant's motion for judgment on the evidence need not be conclusive, only sufficient to create a reasonable inference that defendant knew of and should have remedied the dangerous condition. Id.

This court has held that employees' knowledge of a dangerous condition may be imputed to their employer. Southport Little League v. Vaughan, 734 N.E.2d 261, 275 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). In Vaughan, a director of the Little League molested a child involved in the baseball program. The child sued the Little League, alleging negligence. At the trial's close, the trial court gave an instruction over the Little League's objection that the knowledge of the Little League's employees could be imputed to the Little League itself. The jury returned a verdict for Vaughan, and the Little League appealed. The Little League argued that no employee had knowledge of the director's propensity to molest children. This court upheld the jury's verdict, noting that the plaintiff had "presented substantial evidence at trial that employees and agents of the Little League gained knowledge about [the director], a Little League official, which should have raised a `red flag.'" Id. The Vaughan court noted that a groundskeeper had seen the director "inappropriately hugging a child." Id. Players' mothers had complained that the director was personally fitting their children for uniforms even though they knew their children's uniform sizes. Another Little League official had seen the director "sitting in a parked car in Garfield Park, an area known for its homosexual activity." Id. at 276.

In arguing that it had no notice of the floor's dangerous condition, the hospital notes that Laura Mitchell, a nurse that works on 4-East; Lisa Bihm; and Virginia Happe, director of the Ortho-Neuro surgical unit at the Hospital, all testified that no one had fallen in the pantry before. Tr. p. 439, 631, 643. While acknowledging that at least nine nurses testified that they had seen ice or water occasionally on the pantry floor, the Hospital notes that the nurses would clean the ice or water off the floor when this occurred. Tr. p. 435, 460, 477, 523, 527, 531, 543, 550, 568. Finally, the Hospital observes that the nurses who slipped neither reported the slips nor prepared incident reports because they did not consider the pantry to be dangerous. Tr. p. 436, 456, 474, 491-92, 523, 533, 544, 569.

While the Hospital's argument holds merit, it did not entitle the Hospital to judgment on the evidence. In this case, twelve employees, including the chairman of the Hospital's safety committee, testified...

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