St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 17 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-14320-CIV.,98-14320-CIV. |
| Citation | 117 F.Supp.2d 1349 |
| Parties | ST. PAUL GUARDIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee of Alice I. Cherry, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Marc T. Millian, Michaud Buschmann Fox & Mittelmark PA, Boca Raton, FL, for Plaintiff.
Maureen Donlan, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorneys Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant.
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (DE # 30) and Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (DE # 36).
UPON CONSIDERATION of the motions, responses, and the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court enters the following Order.
Plaintiff St. Paul Guardian Insurance Company ("Plaintiff" or "St. Paul"), as subrogee of Alice I. Cherry, filed the instant case against Defendant United States of America ("Defendant" or "United States") under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. This matter arises out of an automobile accident on May 20, 1995 involving Cherry and Keith Sloane.
At all times relevant to this action, Sloane was enlisted in the United States Naval Reserve. As a Naval Reservist, Sloane was required to report to the Naval Air Station in Jacksonville, Florida one weekend every month for active duty training. Additionally, Sloane was required to report for two continuous weeks of active duty training once a year, at a naval air station selected by the Navy.
On May 3, 1995, Sloane was issued orders by the Department of the Navy, ordering him to report to the Naval Air Station in Key West, Florida no later than May 21, 1995 at 7:30 a.m. for his two-week active duty training session. Sloane had been given the option of selecting his mode of travel to the two-week training session. Sloane elected to drive his own personal vehicle to the training session, and this mode of travel became part of the May 3, 1995 orders.
Pursuant to the orders dated May 3, 1995, Sloane's active duty began on May 20, 1995, and ended on June 1, 1995. Sloane was subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice throughout this period. Also pursuant to the May 3, 1995 orders, Sloane was paid for a total of 13 days, including one paid day for his travel to the Naval Air Station in Key West. Furthermore, Sloane was entitled to mileage reimbursement, travel expenses, and a per diem for his travel to Key West.
Sloane left his home in Middleburg, Florida at approximately 1:00 p.m. on May 20, 1995 in his private vehicle to travel to Key West. While traveling south on I-95 in Marion County, Florida, Sloane was involved in an accident with an automobile driven by Cherry. After some delay resulting from the accident, Sloane proceeded to Key West, arriving at the Naval Air Station that same day, May 20, 1995, at approximately 10:00 p.m.
Cherry brought an action for damages against St. Paul, her uninsured motorist carrier. St. Paul reached a settlement with Cherry for the sum of $600,000.00. In return for the settlement, Cherry executed a Complete Release and Hold Harmless Agreement, dated November 5, 1997 ("November 5, 1997 Release"), which provided as "Releasees":
[T]he St. Paul Guardian Insurance Company, the St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Keith William Sloane, the United States Government, the United States Navy, and the United States Department of Defense, as well as each of their sister, parent, successor, predecessor, affiliated corporations, divisions and any other agents, servants, employees, officers, directors, shareholders, independent contractors, creditors, agents and assigns.
(November 5, 1997 Release ¶ 5). On or about November 13, 1998, Cherry executed a revised Complete Release and Hold Harmless Agreement ("Revised Release"). The Revised Release did not include Sloane, the United States Government, the United States Navy, or the United States Department of Defense as releasees. (See Revised Release ¶ 5).
In its motion for summary judgment, the United States contends that the instant subrogation action should be dismissed because: (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action because Sloane was not acting within the scope of his employment with the Navy at the time of the subject accident; and (2) Plaintiff's claim against the United States is barred by the November 5, 1997 Release executed by Cherry.
Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that: (1) Sloane was acting within the scope of his employment with the Navy at the time of the subject accident; and (2) the November 5, 1997 Release does not bar its subrogation claim because it is the owner and real party in interest of the subrogation claim against the United States, the November 5, 1997 Release does not unambiguously bar this action, and, to the extent that the November 5, 1997 Release did release the United States, it did so as a result of a mutual mistake by St. Paul and Cherry, the parties to the settlement.
The standard to be applied in reviewing a summary judgment motion is stated unambiguously in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Summary judgment may be entered only where there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Twiss v. Kury, 25 F.3d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir.1994). The moving party has the burden of meeting this exacting standard. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). An issue of fact is "material" if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997). It is "genuine" if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Id.
In applying this standard, the district court must view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See id. However, the non-moving party:
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
In other words, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In determining whether this evidentiary threshold has been met, the trial court "must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" applicable to the particular cause of action before it. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the non-movant fails to adduce evidence which would be sufficient, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, to support a jury finding for the non-movant, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 254-55, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Additionally, the non-moving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and requires the court to grant the motion for summary judgment. See id.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), the United States' liability for the acts of its employees is limited to those instances where a government employee is "acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). As applied to members of the United States military, "acting within the scope of his office or employment" is defined as "acting in the line of duty." 28 U.S.C. § 2671. For purposes of the FTCA, "acting in the line of duty," in turn, means acting within the scope of employment under the respondeat superior law of the place where the act or omission occurred. See Bennett v. United States, 102 F.3d 486, 489 (11th Cir.1996). Thus, the Court must first determine whether, under Florida law, Sloane was acting within the scope of his employment with the Navy when the subject accident occurred.
Under Florida's respondeat superior law, an employee is acting within the scope of his employment if his conduct: (1) is the kind he is employed to perform; (2) occurs substantially within the time and space limits of the employment; and (3) was activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master. See Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Rabideau v. State, 391 So.2d 283 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980), aff'd, 409 So.2d 1045 (Fla.1982)); Ashworth v. United States, 772 F.Supp. 1268, 1271 (S.D.Fla. 1991).
The first issue is whether Sloane's conduct on May 20, 1995 was of the kind he was employed to perform. As a Naval Reservist, Sloane...
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