St. Paul's Church v. City of Concord

• Decision Date: 01 February 1910
• Citation: 75 N.H. 420,75 A. 531
• Parties: ST. PAUL'S CHURCH v. CITY OF CONCORD.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

75 A. 531

75 N.H. 420

ST. PAUL'S CHURCH

v. CITY OF CONCORD.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Merrimack.

Feb. 1, 1910.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Merrimack County; Stone, Judge.

Petition by St. Paul's Church against the City of Concord for abatement of taxes. The court abated the taxes, and defendant excepts. Transferred from the Superior Court. Exceptions overruled.

The premises in question were conveyed to the Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Paul's Church, in trust for the use and benefit of St. Paul's Church. They consist of a lot of land and a brick building of two stories and a basement. The basement contains a dining room, kitchen, and serving room. The first floor contains a coatroom, a hall fitted with benches seating about 250 persons, with kneeling boards, a rack containing hymnals and prayer hooks, a stage equipped with lectern, kneeling stool, and other ecclesiastical furniture, and also having a drop curtain, and a room beside the stage used as a vesting room for the clergy, or as a dressing room for persons taking part in entertainments. The second story contains rooms used for meetings of various parochial organizations and for Sunday school classrooms, and a large choirroom used for choir practice. There are also toilet rooms on the second floor and in the basement, and furnace and fuel rooms in the basement.

It is agreed that, so far as the taxability of the property depends upon the use made of the premises, the question shall be determined by its use in the year preceding April 1, 1908. During that year there were held in the hall on the first floor about 40 services on Friday evenings, conducted by a clergyman, and consisting of the regular service of evening prayer of the Episcopal Church, sometimes with and sometimes without a sermon or address. On about 40 Sunday mornings, the Sunday school of St. Paul's parish was held in the hall; its sessions being preceded by a children's service of prayer and praise, conducted generally by one of the parish clergy, and in his absence by a layman. After the opening of Sunday school, some of the classes regularly retired to rooms on the second floor, where their sessions were held. Various organizations connected with the church hold their meetings in the parish house. It is also used for the business and social purposes of the parish. When not otherwise engaged, the hall was to let for hire to reputable parties for such purposes as meetings of societies, lectures, musical recitals, and private dancing parties. The premises are almost immediately in the rear of, but not directly adjoining, the lot on which stands the parish church. Arrangements have been made for connecting the parish house with the church by a covered walk of awning cloth, which is used on special occasions, when more room is required for the vesting of those who take part in the service than is furnished by the vesting room connected with the church building.

Upon the above facts, the plaintiffs claim that the premises in question constitute a "house of public worship" and are exempt from taxation; and the court rules that the property above described is a "house of public worship" within the meaning of section 2, c. 55, Pub. St 1901, and therefore exempt from taxation. To this ruling the defendants excepted.

Edward C. Niles and Edward K. Woodworth, for plaintiff.

Edmund S. Cook, for defendant.

WALKER, J. "Real estate * * * is liable to be taxed, except houses of public worship." Pub. St. 1901, c. 55, § 2. This is a legislative declaration that such buildings are not taxable, or that they are exempt from taxation. Whether an exemption of that character is constitutional is a question not argued by counsel and not considered in this opinion.

The parish house is situated near the principal church building, and is used in connection with it for the observance of various religious services usually deemed essential in the support and maintenance of public worship. This was the primary purpose of its erection; and, so far as that purpose and its observance furnish the test of the character of the house, it cannot be doubted that it is a house of public worship. The principal contention arises upon the assumption that it is a house of public worship, and therefore not taxable under the statute, unless its use and occupation during the year preceding April, 1908, were such that it does not have that character within the meaning of the statute. The court ruled that the facts relating to its use during that period did not show that it had ceased to be a house of public worship as a matter of law. In other words, the question presented is whether it conclusively appears from the facts relating to the use of the building that it falls within the language of the exemption.

It must also be assumed that the parish house is suitable in its appointments for such religious purposes as the plaintiff, a religious corporation, seeks to promote in the performance of its corporate functions, and that it is primarily devoted to the worship of the Deity and such incidental exercises as are usually connected with and deemed directly helpful to, the exercise of religious functions, according to the regulations of the Episcopal Church. There is no suggestion that the plaintiff does not use the building for all such religious exercises as it was devoted to, or that its use of it for such purposes is interfered with, or curtailed, by the fact that it is sometimes, and perhaps frequently, used for entertainments of a nonreligious character. The building subserves all the religious uses for which it was erected, and it is maintained as a house of public worship, so far as the needs and convenience of the church require. Its religious use is not rendered less because of its secular use. The plaintiff's occupation of it for the promotion of religion has not in fact been abandoned or diminished in consequence of its temporary use, at times, for secular entertainments. This seems to be conceded.

Counsel for the defendant insists upon what is often called a strict construction of the statute. As taxation is the general rule, it is said that the burden is upon the party claiming that his property is exempt from taxation to establish the fact by clear and convincing proof that the Legislature so intended, and that all doubts upon that point must be resolved against its exemption. This general statement of the rule of construction in such cases has often been reiterated and Justified upon constitutional grounds (Phillips Academy v. Exeter, 58 N. H. 306, 42 Am. Rep. 589; Franklin St. Society v. Manchester, 60 N. H. 342; Alton Bay Ass'n v. Alton, 69 N. H. 311, 45 Atl. 95; New London v. Academy, 69 N. H. 443, 46 Atl. 743; Williams v. Park, 72 N. H. 305, 56 Atl. 463, 64 L. R. A. 33; Portsmouth Shoe Co. v. Portsmouth, 74 N. H. 222, 66 Atl. 1045; Canaan v. District, 74 N. H. 517, 525, 70 Atl. 250); and, while it serves to express a principle governing the court in this jurisdiction when passing upon the question of the intention of the Legislature in tax-exemption statutes, it is not so narrow and rigid in its application as to defeat the lawmakers' Intention ascertained from all the competent evidence. Though called a rule, for convenience of expression, it is merely evidence to be weighed; and its weight depends upon its reasonableness and not alone upon its verbal applicability. In other words, it is the duty of the court to ascertain and carry out the intention of the...