St. Peter v. Ampak-Division of Gatewood Products, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 February 1997
• Docket Number: AMPAK-DIVISION,No. 23678,23678
• Citation: 484 S.E.2d 481,199 W.Va. 365
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: , 7 A.D. Cases 1709, 9 NDLR P 166 Terry Lee ST. PETER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant v.OF GATEWOOD PRODUCTS, INC. and E.R. Gateman, Defendants Below, Appellees.

Page 481

484 S.E.2d 481

199 W.Va. 365, 7 A.D. Cases 1709, 9

NDLR P 166

Terry Lee ST. PETER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant v. AMPAK-DIVISION OF GATEWOOD PRODUCTS, INC. and E.R. Gateman,

Defendants Below, Appellees.

No. 23678.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 15, 1997.

Decided Feb. 21, 1997.

Syllabus by the Court

1. " 'A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.' Syllabus Point 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). Syllabus Point 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992)." Syllabus Point 1, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

2. "Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the evidence presented, the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove." Syllabus Point 2, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

3. "In order to make a prima facie case of discrimination under W.Va.Code, 23-5A-1, the employee must prove that: (1) an on-the-job injury was sustained; (2) proceedings were instituted under the Workers' Compensation Act, W.Va.Code, 23-1-1, et seq.; and (3) the filing of a workers' compensation claim was a significant factor in the employer's decision to discharge or otherwise discriminate against the employee." Syllabus Point 1, Powell v. Wyoming Cablevision, Inc., 184 W.Va. 700, 403 S.E.2d 717 (1991).

4. "The propriety of piercing the corporate veil should rarely be determined upon a motion for summary judgment. Instead, the propriety of piercing the corporate veil usually involves numerous questions of fact for the trier of the facts to determine upon all of the evidence." Syllabus Point 6, Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 177 W.Va. 343, 352 S.E.2d 93 (1986).

5. "The term 'person,' as defined and utilized within the context of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, includes both employees and employers. Any contrary interpretation, which might have the effect of barring suits by employees against their supervisors, would be counter to the plain meaning of the statutory language and contrary to the very spirit and purpose of this particular legislation." Syllabus Point 3, Holstein v. Norandex, Inc., 194 W.Va. 727, 461 S.E.2d 473 (1995).

Walt Auvil, Pyles & Auvil, Robert K. Tebay, III, Lantz & Tebay, Parkersburg, WV, for Appellant.

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Sandra K. Henson, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Charleston, WV, for Amicus Curiae, The West Virginia Human Rights Commission.

Fred F. Holroyd, Scott Evans, Holroyd & Yost, Charleston, WV, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM:

Terry St. Peter appeals a summary judgment order of the Circuit Court of Wood County dismissing his complaint against his former employer, AMPAK-Division of Gatewood Products, Inc. ("AMPAK"), and E.R. Gateman, the principal stockholder of Gatewood Products, Inc. ("Gatewood"). On appeal, Mr. St. Peter maintains that the circuit court erred in finding: first, that, as a matter of law, Mr. St. Peter's discharge was unrelated to his workers' compensation claim; second, that discrimination based on the perception of handicap was not prohibited; and, third, that Mr. Gateman could not be sued as an individual. Because we find that the circuit court erred in these matters, we reverse the circuit court and remand this case for further proceedings.

I. Facts and Background

On January 12, 1993 Mr. St. Peter fell while working at AMPAK and fractured his right shoulder. When Mr. St. Peter returned to work on January 25, 1993, he told Mr. Gateman that he would be working a limited schedule for several months because his shoulder would need physical therapy. Mr. Gateman allegedly responded by saying he would have to "think about it because I [Mr. Gateman] don't have room for half a man in my organization." On January 26 1993 Mr. St. Peter was informed that at a meeting on January 25, 1993 Gatewood's Board of Directors had approved of his discharge. On January 27, 1993 Mr. St. Peter filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. According to Mr. St. Peter, the delay in filing his workers' compensation claim was because AMPAK, which usually filed forms for injured workers, failed to file when Mr. St. Peter was absent from work. The filing of workers' compensation forms was one of the duties Mr. St. Peter performed for AMPAK. Five days later, on February 1, 1993, Mr. St. Peter was told it was his last day of work.

Mr. St. Peter filed suit against AMPAK and Mr. Gateman alleging the following: (1) his discharge violated W.Va.Code, 23-5A-1 [1978] and 23-5A-3 [1990], of the Workers' Compensation Act, which prohibits discrimination for filing a workers' compensation claim; and (2) his discharge violated W.Va.Code, 5-11-1 [1967] et seq., of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination based on a handicap or on the perception of a handicap. On June 19, 1995, the circuit court granted partial summary judgment by dismissing Mr. Gateman as a party to the action.

AMPAK, by motion for summary judgment filed on October 23, 1995, sought dismissal of all remaining causes. After a hearing, the circuit court, by order entered on January 12, 1996, dismissed the remaining claims finding: (1) the workers' compensation prohibition did not apply because Mr. St. Peter "was not 'off work' " when he was discharged; (2) the handicap discrimination prohibition did not apply because a broken shoulder "was not an injury that 'substantially' limited the Plaintiff and such injury did not affect the Plaintiff over a 'substantial' period;" and (3) that there was no prohibition against discrimination based on the mere perception of handicap.

Mr. St. Peter appeals to this Court alleging that the circuit court erred in finding that the workers' compensation prohibition did not apply, in finding there was no cause of action based on the perception of handicap and in dismissing Mr. Gateman.

II. Discussion

A.

Standard of Review

"A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo." Syllabus Point Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). Our traditional principle for granting summary judgment is stated in Syllabus Point 3 of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of N.Y., 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963):

A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.

In accord Syllabus Point 1, Williams v. Precision Coil, 194 W.Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d 329 (1995); Syllabus Point 2, Painter v. Peavy, supra; Syllabus Point 1, Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W.Va. 706, 421 S.E.2d 247 (1992). Syllabus Point 2 of Williams states:

Summary judgment is appropriate if, from the totality of the evidence presented, the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, such as where the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case that it has the burden to prove.

See Rule 56 [1978] of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure; Williams, supra and Painter, supra for discussions of the principals for granting summary judgment.

In Williams, we noted that " '[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge[.]' " Williams, 194 W.Va. at 59, 459 S.E.2d at 336, quoting, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986).

With this standard in mind, we review the circuit court's grant of summary judgment, beginning with the holding that Mr. St. Peter's discharge did not violate our Workers' Compensation Law. B.

Workers' Compensation

Our Workers' Compensation Act in W.Va.Code, 23-5A-3 [1990] prohibits the termination of an injured employee and finds the failure "to reinstate an employee who has sustained a compensable injury to the employee's former position upon demand" is a discriminatory practice. ¹ In Powell v. Wyoming Cablevision, 184 W.Va. 700, 403 S.E.2d 717 (1991), we used the proof schemes of our discrimination cases under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code, 5-11-1 [1967] et seq., to determine when discrimination had occurred under W.Va.Code, 23-5A-3 [1990]. Syllabus Point 1 of Powell states:

In order to make a prima facie case of discrimination under W.Va.Code, 23-5A-1, the employee must prove that: (1) an on-the-job injury was sustained; (2) proceedings were instituted under the Workers' Compensation Act, W.Va.Code, 23-1-1, et seq.; and (3) the filing of a workers' compensation claim was a significant factor in the employer's decision to discharge or otherwise discriminate against the employee.

In this case, AMPAK alleges that Mr. St. Peter's fails to establish a prima facie case because "it is undisputed that the process for terminating the petitioner (Mr. St.Peter) was already underway before the petitioner even filed a Workers' Compensation claim." AMPAK maintains that there is no nexus between Mr. St. Peter's workers' compensation claim and his discharge.

AMPAK's quirk of timing argument was discussed and rejected in Powell. In Powell, we noted that "employers who practice retaliation may be expected to seek to avoid detection, and it is hardly to be supposed that they will not try to accomplish their aims by subtle rather than obvious methods...." Powell, 184 W.Va. at 704, 403 S.E.2d at 721, quoting, Axel v. Duffy-Mott Co., 47 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 416 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556, 389...