Stackhouse v. Emerson

• Citation: 611 So.2d 1365
• Decision Date: 22 January 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-1228,92-1228
• Parties: 18 Fla. L. Week. D347 Richard STACKHOUSE, Appellant, v. Dr. Ben D. EMERSON, Humana Hospital, Inc. and Heritage Health Corporation, Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)

Page 1365

611 So.2d 1365

18 Fla. L. Week. D347

Richard STACKHOUSE, Appellant, v. Dr. Ben D. EMERSON, Humana Hospital, Inc. and Heritage

Health Corporation, Appellees.

No. 92-1228.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Fifth District.

Jan. 22, 1993.

Richard E. Gentry, St. Augustine, for appellant.

Mark C. Dabold and Pamela Mark Burke of Parker, Johnson, Anderson, Goodwin, McGuire and Michaud, P.A., Orlando, for appellee Dr. Ben D. Emerson.

J. Charles Ingram and Kurt M. Spengler of Hannah, Marsee, Beik & Voght, P.A., Orlando, for appellee Humana Hosp., Inc.

Gregory W. Johnson and O. Mark Zamora of Rumrell & Johnson, P.A., Jacksonville, for appellee Heritage Health Corp.

DIAMANTIS, Judge.

Appellant Richard Stackhouse appeals an order dismissing with prejudice his four-count amended complaint. We reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings.

Appellant filed the instant action on October 15, 1991. Appellant subsequently filed an amended complaint which states in substance that on March 17, 1989 he voluntarily admitted himself into appellee Humana Hospital for treatment of alcoholism; that appellee Heritage Health Corporation had a contract with Humana Hospital to provide that type of treatment to appellant; that appellee Dr. Ben D. Emerson was an employee of Heritage; and that for several days appellees refused to release appellant and forced medical treatment upon him for their sole financial aggrandizement even though he demanded to be released, which resulted in physical injury to appellant and in the loss of his employment and his employer's medical coverage. In four counts, the amended complaint alleges (1) conspiracy, fraud, and theft; (2) false imprisonment; (3) violation of a patient's medical or civil rights through forced medical treatment and attendant restraint; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Appellees filed motions to dismiss the complaint in which they raised several grounds supporting dismissal. The order dismissing appellant's complaint with prejudice does not indicate the ground or grounds for dismissal; however, the parties agree that the trial court dismissed the action upon finding that the factual allegations in the complaint sound in medical malpractice, and that appellant's action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice, section 95.11(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1989).

Section 95.11(4)(b) provides in pertinent part:

An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years from the time of the incident giving rise to the action occurred....

An "action for medical malpractice" is defined as:

... a claim in tort or contract for damages because of the death, injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental, or surgical diagnosis, treatment or care by any provider of health care.

Sec. 95.11(4)(b), Fla.Stat. (1989).

This court must consider as true the factual allegations made in the complaint when considering the correctness of a trial court's order on a motion to dismiss. Rankin v. Colman, 476 So.2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) rev. denied, 484 So.2d 7 (Fla.1986); Price v. Morgan, 436 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) rev. denied, 447 So.2d 887 (Fla.1984).

We hold that the above counts, as alleged, do not fall within the ambit of section 95.11(4)(b). The causes of action stated in these counts do not allege medical malpractice, but instead, involve independent intentional acts committed upon appellant by appellees while appellant was a patient at Humana Hospital. On their face appellant's claims are not for medical malpractice arising from a consensual or otherwise legitimate health care provider/patient relationship. Succinctly stated, what we have here are claims for intentional torts independent of any medical diagnosis, treatment or care, which, at best, originate rather remotely from a health care provider/patient relationship. See St. Vincent's Medical Center v. Oakley, 371 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Jackson v. Biscayne Medical Center, Inc., 347 So.2d 721 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). ¹ See also McAlpin v. Sokolay, 596 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). To accept appellees' contention that their acts, as set forth in the complaint, are barred by the statute of limitations for medical malpractice "would lead to the absurd result that every wrongful act committed by a [health care provider] amounts to medical malpractice." Jackson, 347 So.2d at 722.

Appellant is entitled to plead his claims as he wishes, thereby assuming the duty to prove that the acts of the appellees constituted intentional torts unrelated to, or independent of, any consensual or legitimate medical diagnosis, care or treatment. Oakley, 371 So.2d at 591. Appellees have a corresponding right to plead as an affirmative defense the statute of...