Stafford v. Consolidated Bus Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1942
• Citation: 164 S.W.2d 15,179 Tenn. 185
• Parties: STAFFORD v. CONSOLIDATED BUS LINES, Inc.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

164 S.W.2d 15

179 Tenn. 185

STAFFORD v. CONSOLIDATED BUS LINES, Inc.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 2, 1942

Error to Circuit Court, Sumner County; Dancey Fort, Judge.

Action by Helen Louise Stafford, an infant, by next friend, against the Consolidated Bus Lines, Inc., for personal injuries. A judgment for defendant was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial by the Court of Appeals, and defendant brings certiorari.

Judgment of Court of Appeals reversed, and that of trial court affirmed.

A. O Denning, of Gallatin, for plaintiff in error.

W. M Fuqua, of Nashville, and W. P. Puryear, Jr., of Gallatin, for defendant in error.

McKINNEY Justice.

This is a suit to recover damages for injuries received by plaintiff when struck by an automobile under the following circumstances:

On May 20, 1939, petitioner was a common carrier of passengers and so authorized under the law of Tennessee, and operated busses on highways in the State and among others between Gallatin and Nashville, and on the particular date, at about nine o'clock in the morning, was operating one of its busses toward Nashville from Gallatin along the Gallatin Pike when it approached the northern edge of a little town known as Hendersonville. At this place, as the bus approached, there were three persons standing on the right of the highway and on the shoulder thereof, namely, a negro woman and her little girl, and the plaintiff, a white child of about ten years of age. The bus did not stop entirely off the highway, the right wheels being on the shoulder of the road and the left wheels on the macadam. The road was 17 feet and 9 inches wide and the bus was 7 1/2 feet wide. The bus stopped with its right wheels about 2 feet on the shoulder and there was left about 12 feet of the macadam part of the highway for other vehicles, besides the shoulder on the other side.

Plaintiff was not a passenger nor a contemplated passenger, but was standing with the two passengers aforesaid when the bus stopped. The bus was stopped and while taking on the passengers the plaintiff walked to the back of the bus and although claimed to have looked for vehicles in both directions before going behind the bus, on reaching the back end of the bus (which was toward Gallatin), she ran from behind the same across the highway and was struck by an automobile going in the opposite direction, said automobile being driven by one Parks Smith, and was injured, suffering a broken leg and other minor injuries for which she sued the petitioner.

The first count of the declaration was grounded upon common-law negligence, and the second, on section 2690 of the Code which provides as follows:

"(a) No person shall park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or improved or main traveled portion of any road, street, or highway outside of a business or residence district, when it is practicable to park or leave such vehicle standing off of the paved or improved or main traveled portion of such road, street or highway; provided, in no event shall any person park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon any road, street or highway unless a clear and unobstructed width of not less than fifteen feet upon the main traveled portion of said road, street or highway opposite such standing vehicle shall be left for free passage of other vehicles thereon, nor unless a clear view of such vehicle shall be obtained from a distance of two hundred (200) feet in each direction upon such road, street or highway.

"(b) Whenever any peace officer shall find a vehicle standing upon a road, street or highway in violation of the provisions of this section, he is hereby authorized to move such vehicle or require the driver or person in charge of such vehicle to move such vehicle to a position permitted under this section.

"(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while on the paved or improved or main traveled portion of a road, street or highway in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving such vehicle in such position."

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that defendant had violated the statute, and such holding is supported by the decided weight of authority, including our own case of Ringwald v. Beene, 170 Tenn. 116, 92 S.W.2d 411, and Jaggers v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., D. C., 34 F.Supp. 667, 668, in a well-reasoned opinion by Judge Darr construing the foregoing statute, from which we quote the following:

"It is my judgment that the legislature of Tennessee had an intention to make stronger the statute by adding the words 'leave standing'. I think this was put in to carry the idea that not only was it prohibited to park a vehicle, which might mean for an appreciable length of time, but that stopping at all without leaving the required clearance would violate the statute. The word leave means 'to put, place, deposit, deliver, or the like'. The word stand means 'to cease from movement or progress; to pause; stop; remain stationary or inactive'.

"Applying the meaning of these words, I think that if a vehicle is stopped at a point where the clearance is not left as provided by the statute, even though temporary, the statute is violated.

"Under this construction it would not mean that in all conditions a person would not be excused from violating the letter of the statute. The violation of this statute would be excused for the same reasons as the violation of other statutes are excused--such as, an emergency, the working of undue hardship, the protection of life or limb, and the like.

"It would be against the public weal to decide that passenger busses could stop on highways, not giving the clearance required by this statute, to take on and put off passengers, and not be held to violate the law. This statement is made with due regard to the convenience and comfort of the public who travel by bus and having in mind the common law duties that would be required by bus operators.

"Such stops are not temporary stops

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