Stahl v. Shoemaker

• Citation: 4 O.O.3d 485,50 Ohio St.2d 351,364 N.E.2d 286
• Decision Date: 29 June 1977
• Docket Number: No. 77-63,77-63
• Parties: , 4 O.O.3d 485 STAHL, Appellant, v. SHOEMAKER et al., Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 351

50 Ohio St.2d 351

364 N.E.2d 286, 4 O.O.3d 485

STAHL, Appellant, v. SHOEMAKER et al., Appellees.

No. 77-63.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

June 29, 1977.

On January 20, 1976, appellant, James A. Stahl, petitioned the Court of Appeals for Franklin County for a writ of habeas corpus. Therein, appellant stated that he is in the actual and constructive custody of appellee John W. Shoemaker, chief of the Ohio Adult Parole Authority, and is restricted of his liberty pursuant to conditions upon his parole. In his petition, appellant alleged further that while he previously was on parole pursuant to a sentence for forgery, he was arrested on or about December 18, 1973, for carrying a concealed weapon. By virtue of that arrest, a parole violation was placed against him and he was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. The conviction resulted in a sentence to a term of imprisonment of from one to three years.

Appellant was advised that his forgery sentence would be combined with the sentence for carrying a concealed weapon, and that no revocation hearing would be held on the alleged parole violation until completion of the minimum term of imprisonment for the new sentence, which appellant then was serving. Appellee combined the concealed weapon sentence with the forgery sentence, and appellant's total sentence became two to twenty-three years.

The supposed violation of conditions upon appellant's previous parole was appellant's carrying a concealed weapon and, although appellant requested a hearing on this parole violation, apparently none was ever conducted.

Appellant instituted an action in federal habeas corpus, and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, found that appellant's constitutional rights had been violated in the concealed weapon proceeding. Pursuant to federal court order, he was released from confinement on December 3, 1975. At the time of his release, appellant was placed on parole pursuant to the sentence arising from his forgery conviction.

On November 23, 1976, the Court of Appeals denied appellant's petition and it is from this judgment that he appeals.

The cause is before this court as a matter of right.

Paul Mancino, Jr., Cleveland, for appellant.

William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Dennis L. Sipe, Wilmington, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Relative to considering the allowance or denial of extraordinary writs, this court possesses original jurisdiction in habeas corpus by virtue of specific constitutional statement; ¹ the exercise of such original jurisdiction likewise is constitutionally granted to courts of appeal. ² Our jurisdiction entails the corresponding responsibility to regulate the use by the courts of such extraordinary writ as habeas corpus. ³

Consequently, in the cause before us today, our primary question must concern the appropriateness of the remedy sought. The common and statutory law of this state makes it clear that, generally, relief in habeas corpus is not to be afforded a prisoner if it appears that he is held pursuant to a judgment of conviction of a court of record enjoying jurisdiction to render that judgment.

In the second paragraph of the syllabus in Ex parte Van Hagan (1874), 25 Ohio St. 426, this court declared: "Habeas corpus is not the proper mode of redress, where the relator has been convicted of a criminal offense, and sentenced to imprisonment therefor by a court of competent jurisdiction; if errors or irregularities have occurred in the proceedings or sentence, a writ of error is the proper remedy." (Modified in In re Copley (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 35, 278 N.E.2d 358.)

The fourth paragraph of the syllabus of In re Burson (1949), 152 Ohio St. 375, 89 N.E.2d 651, reiterates: "Where a person restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate, or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment or make the order, a discharge from custody by the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. * * * " See, also, Burns v. Tarbox (1907), 76 Ohio St. 520, 81 N.E. 761; Freeman v. Maxwell (1965), 4 Ohio St.2d 4, 5, 210 N.E.2d 885; Anderson v. Maxwell (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 188, 226 N.E.2d 103; Bradley v. Cardwell (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 1, 2, 251 N.E.2d 605; In re Copley (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 35, 36, 278 N.E.2d 358; Burton v. Reshetylo (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 35, 37, 309 N.E.2d 907.

Appellees rely in part upon R.C. 2725.05 ⁴ in contending that appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus states no claim upon which relief can be granted. Whether or not appellees' conclusion is correct (because appellant is in custody pursuant to a valid judgment of conviction by a court of record having jurisdiction to render the judgment), the conclusion can be reached independently of reliance upon R.C. 2725.05. That statute need not be construed as controlling the exercise of original jurisdiction in habeas corpus constitutionally granted to courts of appeal and this court, and it is unnecessary to the resolution of the instant appeal to perpetuate the view that a statute constitutes the "authority" by which this classic writ subsists. See State ex rel. Halak v. Cebula (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 291, 294, 361 N.E.2d 244 (Herbert, J., concurring).

A party detained pursuant to the judgment of a court is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus if the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment. However, non-jurisdictional errors afford no basis for issuing the writ. Habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal or for a mandamus proceeding. ⁵ Although the writ is available to parties who unlawfully are deprived of their liberty, it is unavailable to those deprived of their freedom pursuant to a lawful...