Burton v. Reshetylo
| Decision Date | 17 April 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 73-439,73-439 |
| Citation | 309 N.E.2d 907,38 Ohio St.2d 35,67 O.O.2d 53 |
| Parties | , 67 O.O.2d 53 BURTON, Appellee, v. RESHETYLO, Supt., Lima State Hospital, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A Court of Common Pleas has jurisdiction over an accused pursuant to R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.38 when a magistrate's transcript has been filed against the accused.
2. An accused, committed pursuant to R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.38, can be held only for the period of time reasonably necessary to determine whether it is probable that he will attain the mental competency required to stand trial in the foreseeable future.
3. Once it is determined that an accused is unlikely over to attain the mental competency necessary to stand trial, he must be provided the full panoply of civil commitment rights provided in R.C. Chapter 5122.
On August 2, 1962, a magistrate's transcript was filed against Robert L. Burton, Sr., alleging that he had issued checks with insufficient funds in violation of R.C. 2911.111. He was then bound over to the grand jury on the charge.
At that point, it was suggested to the Court of Common Pleas that Burton was not sane. The court ordered that he be examined pursuant to R.C. 2945.37, and, after a hearing on September 25, 1962, the court determined that Burton was not then sane, and committed him to Lima State Hospital until restored to reason, pursuant to R.C. 2945.38.
No information was filed and no indictment was returned by the grand jury against Burton, either before or after his commitment.
On February 23, 1973, Burton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals for Allen County. The court granted the writ, holding that an indictment is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Common Pleas to commit a person under R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.38. The court then determined that Burton was still not sane and could be dangerous to himself or society if released. The release was delayed for ten days to permit his civil commitment (35 Ohio App.2d 113, 300 N.E.2d 249). He was then committed pursuant to an order of the Probate Court of Allen County and is now confined in the Dayton Mental Health Center.
In this court, the state, in an appeal as of right, challenges the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus by the Court of Appeals.
Robert L. Balyeat, Lima, for appellee.
William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Thomas D. Rooney, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Initially, appellee filed a motion to dismiss with this court, alleging that the issues are now moot because petitioner is no longer in custody of the Lima State Hospital.
This court has dismissed actions in habeas corpus on the sole ground that a petitioner-appellant, or a petitioner in an action originally filed here, was no longer in the custody of his named respondent. McDonald v. Keiter, Sheriff (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 281, 268 N.E.2d 283; Smith v. Sacks (1961), 172 Ohio St. 59, 172 N.E.2d 915. The court has also dismissed such appeals and actions when it appeared that the petitioner had been released from all custody arising out of the facts alleged. In re Popp (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 142, 298 N.E.2d 529; Kaiser v. Hall (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 23, 262 N.E.2d 865; Ware v. Haskins (1963), 175 Ohio St. 207, 109 N.E.2d 780; State, ex rel. Shaw, v. Switzer (1952), 158 Ohio St. 329, 109 N.E.2d 8. However, in only one case has the court dismissed a cause in habeas corpus where the respondent was the appellant and the dismissal was based upon a lack of custody in the named respondent. Sakacsi v. McGettrick (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 156, 224 N.E.2d 527.
For whatever reason a petitioner may be out of a respondent's custody, a respondent's appeal of the granting of a writ of habeas corpus should not be dismissed solely as a result of that lack of custody. To so hold destroys appellate review of the granting of a writ, a circumstance which is undesirable. Hence, the rule implied by Sakacsi is disapproved, and the ground of mootness urged by the instant appellee is not well taken.
This court has often said that if the committing court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the action, habeas corpus relief will not be granted. 1 The Court of Appeals granted relief in this case after it determined that an indictment is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Common Pleas for purposes of commitment pursuant to R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.38.
R.C. 2945.37, in pertinent part, provides:
'If the attorney for a person accused of crime whose cause is pending in the court of common pleas, before or after trial suggests to the court that such person is not then sane, and a certificate of a reputable physician to that effect is presented to the court, or if the grand jury represents to the court that any such person is not then sane or if it otherwise comes to the notice of the court that such person is not then sane, the court shall proceed to examine into the question of the sanity or insanity of said person or in its discretion may impanel a jury for such purpose. * * *' (Emphasis added.)
R.C. 2945.38 provides:
Both sides agree that the emphasized language is dispositive in this case. The person must be 'accused' and his 'cause' must be 'pending in the Court of Common Pleas' in order for the court to exercise jurisdiction.
Appellee argues that the foregoing statutory language excludes pre-indictment commitment. He reaches this conclusion from a study of the development of the legislation. 2
The Court of Appeals determined that 3
However, a careful reading of the statutes involved reveals that the portions which disappeared all dealt with the situation after indictment. The statutory interpretation suggested by the Court of Appeals would lead to the conclusion that R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.38 should no longer apply to a post-indictment situation; but such a conclusion cannot be correct, since one who is indicted must first be accused.
Appellant produces strong arguments for the contention that a person is 'accused' within the meaning of R.C. 2945.37 even before he is bound over to the grand jury. The word 'accused' is consistently used in R.C. Chapters 2931, 2933, 2935 and 2937, 4 all of which pertain to activities prior to indictment.
Appellant also argues that the General Assembly had other obvious choices of language. If, for instance, the General Assembly had used the words 'subsequent to indictment,' its intent would have been clear. Absent such a choice, appellant argues that we should accord to the word 'accused' its ordinary and general meaning.
We are persuaded that the enactment of G.C. 13441-1 (now R.C. 2945.37) was not only directed to the post-indictment situation, but was intended to encompass, within the terms of one clause, both situations formerly separated into two parts in the statute.
The other requirement of R.C. 2945.37 is that the cause must be 'pending in the court of common pleas.'
In Hartnett v. State (1885), 42 Ohio St. 568, this court held:
'When a person is arrested and duly committed for a crime, for which he is thereafter indicted, the prosecution for that crime is pending * * * as soon as he is arrested and committed.' This position was approved and followed in State v. Morrow (1914), 90 Ohio St. 202, 208, 107 N.E. 515, 516, with the statement that:
Those cases, while not recent, withstand the test of time. Jurisdiction should be continuously held by a court once it is vested. A statement in State v. Pealy (1947), Ohio Com.Pl., 75 N.E.2d 714, 715, 49 Ohio Law Abst. 282, 285, seems pertinent: 'It would be a terrible situation if an insane person accused of a crime and confined in the county jail had to be held there until he was indicted or the Grand Jury suggested his insanity, before a hearing and commitment could be hald.'
Having decided that R.C. 2945.37 and 2945.38 were properly applied by the trial court, the ultimate question for resolution is whether petitioner was properly afforded habeas corpus relief. It is at this threshold that we wish to make clear what we are not deciding.
Appellee in this case spent almost 11 years in Lima State Hospital because he was (and is) not 'of sufficient soundness of mind to understand and appreciate the nature of the charge against him, to comprehend his situation, and * * * (was not) mentally capable of furnishing his counsel the facts essential to the presentation of a proper defense.' State, ex rel. Townsend, v. Bushong (1946), 146 Ohio St. 271, 274, 65 N.E.2d 407, 408. We are not here deciding any question concerning the classifications made in R.C. 5125.01, nor are we deciding any question concerning the quality of care received in an institution designated under that section.
The dispositive question here is the procedure necessary to protect the constitutional rights of a person...
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State v. Williams
...for 11 years solely because he was incompetent to stand trial was denied due process and equal protection. Burton v. Reshetylo (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 35, 67 O.O.2d 53, 309 N.E.2d 907. The court recognized that "[d]ue process requires that the duration of [Burton's] commitment must bear a rea......
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... ... Sullivan at 405, citing Burton v. Reshetylo , 38 Ohio St.2d 35, 46, 67 O.O.2d 53, 309 N.E.2d ... 907. Because R.C. §2945.38(D) prohibits holding Appellant for more than sixty ... ...
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