Stambaugh v. Butler
Decision Date | 09 August 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CV 14-0817,1 CA-CV 14-0817 |
Citation | 379 P.3d 250,745 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 24,240 Ariz. 353 |
Parties | David Stambaugh, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Donald Butler, acting in his capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Agriculture; Arizona Department of Agriculture, an agency of the State of Arizona; Suzette Taylor, acting in her capacity as State Brand Clerk at the Arizona Department of Agriculture; State of Arizona; and Eureka Springs Cattle Co., LLC, an Arizona limited liability company and real party in interest, Defendants/Appellees. |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Salmon Lewis & Weldon, PLC, Phoenix, By Paul R. Orme, Mark A. McGinnis, R. Jeffrey Heilman, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix, By Aaron Thompson, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, Donald Butler, Suzette Taylor, Arizona Dept., of Agriculture and State of Arizona.
OPINION
¶ 1 David Stambaugh appeals the superior court's ruling upholding the recording by Defendants Donald Butler, Suzette Taylor, the Arizona Department of Agriculture (Department) and the State of Arizona (collectively, Defendants) of the Eureka Springs Cattle Co. livestock brand. The Eureka Springs brand is identical to Stambaugh's brand, but placed in a different location on the animal. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 2 Stambaugh is the owner in Arizona of the bar seven brand1 applied to the left hip of his cattle. Eureka Springs owns the bar seven brand in California applied to the left rib of its cattle. Eureka Springs wanted to move its cattle from California to Arizona without rebranding its herd.2 Therefore, Eureka Springs applied to the Department to use the bar seven brand in Arizona on the left rib.
¶ 3 According to the record, the Department in the past has approved requests to record brands that are identical to other recorded brands, as long as the new application specifies that the brand will be placed on a different location of the animal (i.e., left or right ribs, hip or shoulder). When it received Eureka Springs' brand application, the Department researched potential conflicts and noted Stambaugh's existing bar seven brand. Even though the Eureka Springs brand is identical to Stambaugh's, the Department decided to accept Eureka Springs' brand for recording because its brand would be placed on a different location; Stambaugh's on the left hip of a cow and Eureka Springs' on the left rib. The Department also noted the Eureka Springs brand was not so similar to any other brand on the left rib that the brand could be converted or cattle could be misidentified. The Department then publicly advertised Eureka Springs' request to record its brand.
¶ 4 After learning of the Eureka Springs application, Stambaugh filed a protest. The Department denied Stambaugh's protest and issued a certificate to Eureka Springs signifying its approval and recording of the bar seven brand applied on the left ribs of cattle.
¶ 5 Stambaugh then filed suit challenging the Department's recording of Eureka Springs' bar seven brand, and the parties moved for summary judgment. The superior court granted the Defendants' motion in part, explaining that “A.R.S. § 3–1261 and related statutes give the [Department] and its employees discretion, as a matter of law, to consider the location of a brand on an animal in determining whether two brands are of the same design or figure.” The superior court remanded the matter to the Department to conduct a hearing on the brand and the protest. Stambaugh timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12–120.21.A.1 and –2101.A.1 (West 2016).3
¶ 6 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Andrews v. Blake , 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12, 69 P.3d 7 (2003). We also review issues of statutory construction de novo. Short v. Dewald, 226 Ariz. 88, 93–94, ¶ 26, 244 P.3d 92 (App. 2010). “If a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation.” Hayes v. Cont'l Ins. Co. , 178 Ariz. 264, 268, 872 P.2d 668 (1994). “However, if more than one plausible interpretation of a statute exists, we typically employ tools of statutory interpretation.” Haag v. Steinle , 227 Ariz. 212, 214, ¶ 9, 255 P.3d 1016 (App. 2011). Such tools include “the statute's context, its language, subject matter and historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” Id. In addition, when “the legislature has not spoken definitively to the issue at hand, ‘considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.’ ” Ariz. Water Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of Water Res. , 208 Ariz. 147, 155, ¶ 30, 91 P.3d 990 (2004) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ). The Department's interpretation is not infallible, however, and courts remain the final authority in an issue of statutory construction. U.S. Parking Sys. v. City of Phoenix , 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989).
¶ 7 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 3–1261 :
¶ 8 The Arizona legislature has given the Department “general supervision over the livestock interests of the state, [including] protect[ing] the livestock industry from theft.” A.R.S. § 3–1203.A. Livestock brands help prevent theft by identifying the owners of livestock. See A.R.S. §§ 3–1267.B (); –1371.1 (“The question of ownership may be raised ... [if] [t]he livestock is not branded as required by this chapter.”).
¶ 9 The recording of a brand “shall consist of depicting a facsimile of the brand adopted ... [and] the place upon the livestock or other animals where the brand is proposed to be used.” A.R.S. § 3–1262.A. When the Department approves and records a brand, it issues a registration certificate, see A.R.S. § 3–1266, which specifies where the brand must be applied on the animal. The Department is also authorized to issue brand books, A.R.S. § 3–1268, which identify recorded brands and note where they are to be applied to their owners' livestock.
¶ 10 To protect brands and the function they serve, the legislature has criminalized misconduct related to brand usage. For example, it is a crime to brand “livestock with an unrecorded, cancelled, suspended or forfeited brand [,]” A.R.S. § 3–1269.A, to brand livestock “with a brand other than the recorded brand of the owner,” A.R.S. § 3–1304, or to apply a recorded brand in a location other than that specified on the brand registration certificate, A.R.S. § 3–1261.G.
¶ 11 The narrow issue the superior court decided is whether the Arizona livestock branding statutes grant the Department discretion to consider the location a brand is to be applied on an animal when deciding if a proposed brand is of the “same design or figure” as another under A.R.S. § 3–1261.B. Stambaugh contends that “[A.R.S.] § 3–1261.B is a plain and unambiguous directive from the Arizona Legislature that prohibits the [Department] from recording duplicate brands with the ‘same design or figure,’ ” regardless of where on an animal a brand is to be applied. In contrast, the Department asserts that, “[g]iven A.R.S. § 3–1261(G), it is at the very least unclear whether the Legislature intended to allow the Department to consider a brand's location in determining whether the brand consists of the ‘same’ design or figure as an existing brand[.]” We agree with the Department that the statute is ambiguous.
¶ 12 In discerning the meaning and significance of the term “same design or figure” in A.R.S. § 3–1261.B, we cannot disregard the repeated references in A.R.S. § 3–1261 and surrounding statutes to the significance of the location at which a brand is approved for placement on the owner's livestock. Although Stambaugh argues the first clause of A.R.S. § 3–1261.B () establishes the sole basis on which the Department is to decide whether to approve a brand, other statutes in the same chapter and article distinguish brands based on their location on livestock. As recited above, subpart G of the same statute provides that “application of a brand in any other location is the equivalent of the use of an unrecorded brand.” A.R.S. § 3–1261.G. Subsection G's reference to an “unrecorded brand” indicates that an owner's choice of where a brand will be placed on the animal is part of the brand that the Department ultimately accepts and records.
¶ 13 Other statutes in the same chapter and article relating to branding also undercut Stambaugh's contention that we must read the first clause of A.R.S. § 3–1261.B in isolation. For example, A.R.S § 3–1262.A requires that the record of a...
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