Stambaugh v. Killian

• Decision Date: 03 August 2017
• Docket Number: No. CV-16-0217-PR,CV-16-0217-PR
• Citation: 398 P.3d 574
• Parties: David STAMBAUGH, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Mark KILLIAN, acting in his capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Agriculture; Arizona Department of Agriculture, an agency of the State of Arizona; Suzette Taylor, acting in her capacity as State Brand Clerk at the Arizona Department of Agriculture; State of Arizona; and Eureka Springs Cattle Co., LLC, an Arizona limited liability company and Real Party in Interest, Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

398 P.3d 574

David STAMBAUGH, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.Mark KILLIAN, acting in his capacity as Director of the Arizona Department of Agriculture; Arizona Department of Agriculture, an agency of the State of Arizona; Suzette Taylor, acting in her capacity as State Brand Clerk at the Arizona Department of Agriculture; State of Arizona; and Eureka Springs Cattle Co., LLC, an Arizona limited liability company and Real Party in Interest, Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV-16-0217-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed August 3, 2017

Paul R. Orme, Mark A. McGinnis (argued), R. Jeffrey Heilman, Salmon Lewis & Weldon, PLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for David Stambaugh

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Kathleen P. Sweeney, Senior Appellate Counsel, Christopher William McCormack (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Mark Killian, the Arizona Department of Agriculture, Suzette Taylor, and the State of Arizona

JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, JUSTICES TIMMER, BOLICK, and GOULD, and JUDGE PETERSON^* joined. JUSTICE BOLICK filed a concurring opinion.

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 Arizona Revised Statute § 3–1261(B) provides that no two brands of the same design or figure shall be adopted or recorded. Nonetheless, the Arizona Department of Agriculture ("Department") allowed Eureka Springs to record a "bar seven" brand (—7), even though it was identical to a previously recorded brand owned by David Stambaugh, because it was placed on a different location on the animals. We hold that the plain language of the statute precludes the Department from recording "two brands of the same design or figure" regardless of their location.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Eureka Springs planned to move its bar-seven branded cattle from California to Arizona. Rather than re-brand the cattle, it applied to the Department to use the bar seven brand in Arizona. Stambaugh had previously recorded an identical brand in Arizona. Eureka Springs' cattle, however, are branded on their left rib, and Stambaugh's cattle are branded on their left hip. Because the brands are identical, the Department's brand clerk twice rejected Eureka Springs' application but was eventually overruled by her supervisors. Because the brands were placed on different locations on the cattle, the Department approved Eureka Springs' brand.

¶ 3 When the Department publicly advertised Eureka Springs' request to record its brand pursuant to A.R.S. § 3–1261(C), Stambaugh filed a protest. The Department rejected the protest and issued a certificate to Eureka Springs approving and recording its bar seven brand applied to the left rib.

¶ 4 Stambaugh sued the Department, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The superior court granted the Department's motion in part, explaining that " A.R.S. § 3–1261 and related statutes give the [Department] and its employees discretion, as a matter of law, to consider the location of a brand on an animal in determining whether two brands are of the same design or figure." The superior court remanded the matter to the Department to conduct an administrative hearing on the brand and the protest.

¶ 5 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that A.R.S. § 3–1261(B) is ambiguous. Stambaugh v. Butler , 240 Ariz. 353, 356 ¶ 11, 358 ¶ 18, 379 P.3d 250 (App. 2016). Because the brands are in separate locations, the court reasoned they are not identical, and the Department therefore did not violate § 3–1261 when it approved Eureka Springs' brand. See id . at 357 ¶ 14, 379 P.3d 250. One judge dissented, reasoning that the phrase "design or figure" is unambiguous and "excludes consideration of placement; both ‘design’ and ‘figure’ are defined to include only a pattern, shape, or pictorial representation." Id . at 358 ¶ 20, 379 P.3d 250 (Jones, J., dissenting).

¶ 6 We granted review because this case presents an issue of statewide importance that is likely to recur. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3), of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶ 7 We review the interpretation of statutes de novo. Wade v. Ariz. St. Ret. Sys. , 241 Ariz. 559, 561 ¶ 10, 390 P.3d 799, 801 (2017). "Our primary goal is to effectuate the legislature's intent." Id. "If the statute is subject to only one reasonable interpretation, we apply it without further analysis." Id . (citation omitted). Words in statutes should be read in context in determining their meaning. See J.D. v. Hegyi , 236 Ariz. 39, 40–41 ¶ 6, 335 P.3d 1118, 1119–20 (2014). In construing a specific provision, we look to the statute as a whole and we may also consider statutes that are in pari materia —of the same subject or general purpose—for guidance and to give effect to all of the provisions involved. See David C. v. Alexis S. , 240 Ariz. 53, 55 ¶ 9, 375 P.3d 945, 947 (2016).

B. A.R.S. § 3–1261(B) is unambiguous and does not include location.

¶ 8 Section 3–1261(B) states, "No two brands of the same design or figure shall be adopted or recorded, but the associate director may, in his discretion, reject and refuse to record a brand or mark similar to or conflicting with a previously adopted and recorded brand or mark."

¶ 9 The court of appeals majority determined that the statute is ambiguous and held that it was within the Department's discretion to consider a proposed brand's location on an animal to decide if it was the same "design or figure" as an already recorded brand. Stambaugh , 240 Ariz. at 356–58 ¶¶ 11–17, 379 P.3d 250. We disagree. The statutory language, when considered in context and in relation to the statutory scheme, is unambiguous and does not refer to the location of the brand.

¶ 10 We start with the statutory language. Because the statute does not define "design or figure" we use the common meaning of those words. See State v. Pena , 235 Ariz. 277, 279 ¶ 6, 331 P.3d 412, 414 (2014). "Design" is defined as "[a] drawing or sketch"; "[a] graphic representation, especially a detailed plan for construction or manufacture"; and "[a]n ornamental pattern." Design , American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 491 (5th ed. 2011). "Figure" is defined as "[a] written or printed symbol representing something other than a letter, especially a number"; "[t]he outline, form, or silhouette of a thing"; and "[a] pictorial or sculptural representation, especially of the human body." Figure , American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 656 (5th ed. 2011). Based on these definitions, the phrase "no two brands of the same design or figure" does not refer to location as part of its meaning.

¶ 11 We next look to the statute as a whole to determine whether the provision is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. The Department, citing State v. Sweet , 143 Ariz. 266, 269, 693 P.2d 921, 924 (1985), posits that a statute may be found to be ambiguous if there is uncertainty concerning the meaning of its terms or its scope when all its provisions are examined. But here, the remaining provisions of the statute confirm that subsection (B) can only reasonably be interpreted as barring the recording of two brands of the same design or figure, even in different locations.

¶ 12 Subsection (G) of the statute provides, "It is unlawful to apply a recorded brand in any location on an animal except as specified on the brand registration certificate. The application of a brand in any other location is the equivalent of the use of an unrecorded brand." A.R.S. § 3–1261(G). Subsection (G) recognizes a distinction between a brand and its location as specified on the registration. Reading "design or figure" to incorporate location would conflate that distinction.

¶ 13 The Department unconvincingly argues otherwise. The Department contends that subsection (G) requires this Court to interpret a brand's design or figure as including its proposed location. But subsections (B) and (G) serve different functions. Subsection (B) refers to adopting and recording a brand. Adopting and recording a brand is the province of the Department, and thus (B) governs the exercise of the Department's authority. Subsection (G), on the other hand, refers to applying a recorded brand. Although the Department records brands, the livestock owner applies them, and the owner, not the Department, is subject to criminal liability for a misapplication. Subsection (G) is a directive to the livestock owners, not the Department. The limitation on brand placement by the owner in subsection (G) does not expand the limitation on the Department's authority to approve designs or figures under subsection (B).

¶ 14 Additionally, if location were included in "design or figure," the second sentence of subsection (G) would be superfluous. See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. , 209 Ariz. 544, 552 ¶ 31, 105 P.3d 1163, 1171 (2005) ("Whenever possible, we do not interpret statutes in such a manner as to render a clause superfluous."). If the Department's interpretation were correct, placing a brand in a location other than the one specified on the certificate would not be "the equivalent of the use of an unrecorded brand"—it would be an unrecorded brand. Thus, this language in (G) would be unnecessary. Equating a misapplied brand to an unrecorded brand, rather, serves the purpose of putting ranchers on notice that placing a brand in a location other than the one specified leads to the same criminal consequences as using an unrecorded brand. See A.R.S. § 3–1269(A) ("A person who knowingly brands livestock with an unrecorded ... brand is guilty of a class 3 misdemeanor.").

¶ 15 The court of appeals reasoned that "location" should be read into subsection (B) because the surrounding subsections reference location. Stambaugh , 240 Ariz. at 356 ¶ 12, 379 P.3d 250. But under traditional methods of statutory interpretation, the opposite is true—the fact that the legislature intentionally used the word "location" in...