Stambaugh v. Price

• Decision Date: 26 January 1976
• Parties: Jim W. STAMBAUGH, Appellant, v. Lon F. PRICE et al., Appellees.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 929

532 S.W.2d 929

Jim W. STAMBAUGH, Appellant, v. Lon F. PRICE et al., Appellees.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Jan. 26, 1976.

James E. Beckner, Stambaugh & Beckner, Morristown, for appellant.

John F. Dugger, Dennis H. Inman, William O. Foutch, Jr., Morristown, for appellees.

OPINION

BROCK, Justice.

This is an election contest involving the validity of the election of appellee, Scott Reams, to the office of Judge of the Juvenile Court of Hamblen County at the general election held on August 1, 1974. Appellee, Reams, received a majority of the votes cast, 134 more votes than were cast for appellant, Jim Stambaugh, who was the incumbent judge. Appellant, Stambaugh, filed this action challenging Reams' election upon the ground that the latter was only twenty-six years of age and, thus, disqualified under Article 6, § 4, Constitution of Tennessee, which requires that all judges be not less than thirty years of age. The Chancellor held that the provision of the Private Act creating the Juvenile Court of Hamblen County which purported to fix the minimum age for Judge of the Juvenile Court at twenty-one years was in violation of Article 6, § 4, constitution of Tennessee, and, therefore, void; that Reams was, therefore, not eligible to be a candidate for the office of Juvenile Court Judge and since he received the highest number of votes cast, that the election on August 1, 1974, for Juvenile Court Judge was void under the provisions of T.C.A. § 2--1713. The Chancellor further held that a vacancy existed in the office under the provisions of T.C.A. § 17--112 and that the Governor should appoint a suitable person to fill it until the next biennial election. The Governor has complied by appointing Don D. Greene to serve as Special Judge until the next election.

The incumbent, Stambaugh, has appealed contending that he is entitled to the office. He asserts two theories, viz.: (1) That Reams, the election commission and the voters were informed prior to the election that Reams was not eligible to be a candidate and, therefore, the votes cast for him were not legal votes within the meaning of T.C.A. § 2--1713, leaving Stambaugh as the candidate receiving the highest number of 'legal votes' cast; or, in the alternative, (2) the Governor had no authority to appoint an interim judge under T.C.A. § 17--112 because that statute applies only in the event of a vacancy caused by death, resignation or removal of an incumbent judge, which is not the case here since Reams was never an incumbent; therefore, Stambaugh is entitled to continue in the office as a holdover as provided by Article 7, § 5, Constitution of Tennessee.

I

Appellant cites respectable authority for the proposition that votes knowingly cast for a candidate who cannot possibly exercise the functions of the office, if elected, are thrown away. State ex rel. Bancroft v. Frear, 144 Wis. 79, 128 N.W. 1068 (1910); Fields v. Nicholson, 197 Ind. 161, 150 N.E. 53 (1926). We have no quarrel with the rule but are not persuaded that it is applicable to the facts of this case. Although the candidate, Reams, and the members of the election commission may have known of the constitutional ineligibility of Reams well in advance of the election, the electorate did not have such knowledge. The only such information imparted to the general public consisted of newspaper advertisements published by Stambaugh on the last day before the election. We think that such notice is inadequate to justify a finding that the voters for Reams 'knowingly threw their votes away,' so that their votes were not 'legal votes.' We affirm the decision of the Chancellor that no one was elected to the office of Judge of the Juvenile Court on August 1, 1974, the election being void under T.C.A. § 2--1713, which provides:

'If the person whose election is contested is found to have received the highest number of legal votes, but the election is declared null by reason of constitutional disqualifications on his part or for other causes, the election shall be declared void.'

II

As we understand the alternate theory of appellant, it is that T.C.A. § 17--112, under which the Governor has acted to appoint an interim judge, does not apply in this case and, therefore, that he continues in the office as a holdover under Article 7, § 5, Constitution of Tennessee, which provides: 'Every officer shall hold his office until his successor is elected or appointed, and qualified.'

T.C.A. § 17--112 provides:

'Vacancies in office.--Whenever a vacancy, either by death, resignation, or removal, shall occur in the office of a judge of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, circuit judge, or chancellor, or judge of a criminal court, or judge of a special court of equal dignity with circuit and chancery courts . . . (it shall be filled at the next biennial election) . . . and in the meantime the governor shall appoint a person learned in the law and constitutionally qualified to discharge the duties of said office until such election can be had. . . .'

Appellant argues that no vacancy 'by death, resignation, or removal' has occurred and, therefore, that T.C.A. § 17--112 fails to give the Governor authority to appoint an interim judge. We agree that T.C.A. § 17--112 does not apply and that the Chancellor erred in holding that the Governor was authorized to appoint an interim judge in this case. However, our reasons differ from those advanced by appellant. Without deciding whether or not the facts in this case show a 'vacancy' as contemplated by T.C.A. § 17--112, we hold that statute to be inapplicable because the Juvenile Court of Hamblen County is not 'a special court of equal dignity with circuit or chancery courts . . ..' In our opinion, the Chancellor erred in holding it to be such a court.

In recent years the General Assembly has created a number of special courts possessing virtually the same subject matter jurisdiction as a circuit or chancery court or a combination of the two; their judgments are reviewable only by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals; their judges are paid by the State and enjoy the benefits of regular circuit judges and chancellors. We think the term 'special court(s) of equal dignity with circuit or chancery courts . . .' was intended to designate these special courts and was not intended to refer to juvenile courts.

We note certain attributes of a juvenile court which, in our view, show that it is not 'of equal dignity with circuit or chancery courts.' The juvenile court is one of limited jurisdiction, while both the circuit and chancery courts are courts of general jurisdiction. The statute creating the juvenile court defines seven specific classes of cases in which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction, and three in which it has concurrent jurisdiction with the county court. T.C.A. §§ 37--203 and 37--204.

The chancery court, by contrast, has inherent jurisdiction, extending beyond its statutory jurisdiction, to act in relation to the property and the other interests of minors. Cummings v. Patterson, 54 Tenn.App. 75, 388 S.W.2d 157 (1964), appeal after remand 59 Tenn.App. 536, 442 S.W.2d 640 (1968).

Notwithstanding T.C.A. § 37--204, the juvenile court's jurisdiction to adjudicate custody of children may be pre-empted by circuit courts hearing domestic relations' cases, Dearing v. Dearing, 50 Tenn.App. 394, 362 S.W.2d 45 (1962), and by chancery or circuit courts hearing petitions to adopt. T.C.A. § 36--123, Hall v. Honeycutt, 489 S.W.2d 37 (Tenn.App.1972).

The territorial jurisdiction of a juvenile court is limited to one county, while that of a...