Stambor v. One Hundred Seventy-Second Collins Corp.
Decision Date | 12 March 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 84-1358,SEVENTY-SECOND,84-1358 |
Citation | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 690,465 So.2d 1296 |
Parties | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 690 Betty STAMBOR, Appellant, v. ONE HUNDREDCOLLINS CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, d/b/a Rascal House, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Friedman & Miller and Robert Miller, North Miami Beach, for appellant.
Richard Owen, Richard A. Sherman and Rosemary Wilder, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL and HUBBART, JJ.
The plaintiff Betty Stambor appeals a final judgment entered below on an adverse jury verdict in a negligence action. The action arose out of a slip-and-fall accident at a Miami Beach restaurant owned by the defendant One Hundred Seventy-Second Collins Corporation d/b/a Rascal House.
The principal points raised on appeal are: (1) the trial court committed reversible error in admitting in evidence a certain accident report prepared by the manager of the restaurant immediately after the accident in this case, forwarded to the restaurant's insurance carrier in anticipation of litigation arising from this accident and offered by the defense at trial; 1 and (2) the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to admit as evidence the testimony of a restaurant owner-manager-waitress offered by the plaintiff that, in her experience at other restaurants which she had operated or worked at, anti-skid safety mats were used at water stations similar to the place where the accident in this case took place. We agree and reverse for a new trial.
First, it is plain that the accident report which was prepared solely in anticipation of litigation was not admissible in evidence. It constituted, without dispute, hearsay evidence and was not admissible, as urged, under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. 2 § 90.803(6)(a), Fla.Stat. (1983). Although clearly the report was a business record kept in the regular course of the defendant restaurant's business, the report was nonetheless inadmissible under the business records exception because "the sources of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness." § 90.803(6)(a) Fla.Stat. (1983). This report was made solely for litigation purposes to help defend against a claim which might arise from the accident. The report therefore lacks the reliability which business records are ordinarily assumed to have; the manager here had a business motive to fabricate and no business motive to be truthful in preparing this report. Accident reports made under these circumstances have generally been held inadmissible in evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule for lack of trustworthiness. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943); Campbell v. Nordco Products, 629 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir.1980); Bracey v. Herringa, 466 F.2d 702 (7th Cir.1972); Puggioni v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 286 F.2d 340 (2d Cir.1961); Gilmour v. Strescon Industries, 66 F.R.D. 146 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd, 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir.1975); McCormick on Evidence § 308, at 876-77 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984), and cases collected; see Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927, 102 S.Ct. 1974, 72 L.Ed.2d 443 (1982); Sabatino v. Curtiss National Bank of Miami Springs, 415 F.2d 632 (5th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1057, 90 S.Ct. 750, 24 L.Ed.2d 752 (1970); United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.1957); Hartzog v. United States, 217 F.2d 706 (4th Cir.1954). Ehrhardt states the controlling law here:
1 C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 803.6, at 490-91 (2d ed. 1984) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Compare CF Chemicals, Inc. v. Florida Department of Labor & Employment Security, 400 So.2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) ( ). Indeed, these accident reports have generally been considered not discoverable pre-trial as falling with the "work product" privilege because they are prepared by a party solely for litigation purposes and have no other business purpose. Winn-Dixie Stores v. Nakutis, 435 So.2d 307 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), pet. for review denied, 446 So.2d 100 (Fla.1984); Sligar v. Tucker, 267 So.2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 271 So.2d 146 (Fla.1972); Grand Union Co. v. Patrick, 247 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). This further supports our view that such reports ought not be admissible in evidence as trustworthy business records.
Moreover, we are unpersuaded that the admission of this report below constituted a harmless error. It was a crucial piece of evidence at trial as it was prepared on the day of the accident and directly contradicted the testimony of a plaintiff's witness at trial that there was water on the floor where the plaintiff had fallen. Nor was the evidence merely cumulative in nature. Although the manager did testify at trial, in accord with the report, that there was nothing on the floor where the plaintiff had fallen, the report which was prepared contemporaneous to the accident carried with it a far more persuasive impact than the manager's testimony at trial over a year later. Beyond that, the Florida Supreme Court has, in effect, rejected this position as constituting a "bootstrap argument" because, if accepted, it would insulate from reversal the erroneous admission of all hearsay documents where, as here, a witness testifies to the facts reflected by the document. Garrett v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 336 So.2d 566, 570 (Fla.1976).
Second, the excluded testimony of the restaurant owner-manager-waitress offered by the plaintiff, concerning the use of anti-skid mats at water stations, was clearly admissible below under the rule stated in Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Watson, 94 Fla. 571, 113 So. 716 (1927) (syllabus by court):
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