Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Thornton

Decision Date19 March 1900
Docket Number757
Citation100 F. 582
PartiesSTANDARD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. THORNTON.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

G. T Fitzhugh, for plaintiff in error.

Wm. M Randolph, for defendant in error.

Before LURTON and DAY, Circuit Judges, and CLARKE, District Judge.

DAY Circuit Judge.

This is an action on a contract of accident insurance evidenced by a ticket issued to Stephen P.

Locke on the 28th day of December, 1897. The insurance was in the sum of $3,000, against immediate, continuous, or entire disability or death caused by bodily injuries inflicted solely by external, violent, and accidental means. Certain agreements and conditions are attached to the contract as conditions of the insurance,-- among others, that the contract did not cover disappearance nor suicide, sane or insane; nor death nor disability resulting wholly or partly directly or indirectly, from certain causes, conditions, and actions,-- among others, voluntary and unnecessary exposure to danger, entering or trying to enter or leave a moving conveyance using steam as a motor, or while riding on the platform or steps of any railway car. The declaration was in the usual form, averring the issue of the accident ticket containing the terms above set forth; that complainant had kept and complied with the conditions and terms of the contract; and that on the 29th day of December, about 4 a.m., traveling as a passenger, in the regular and usual way, on a car attached to a train of cars passing along the railroad of the company known as the Kansas City, Memphis & Birmingham Railroad Company, from the city of Memphis, in the state of Tennessee, to the town of Jasper, in the state of Alabama, and at a point near the said town of Jasper, Locke was externally, violently, and accidentally thrown from the said train of cars, and thereby instantly killed. The answer, after pleading the general issue, sets up certain special pleas, in which it is averred: First. That the insured was not accidentally thrown from a train of cars, and that his injuries and death were not accidental. Second. That the contract expressly provided that it did not cover, and should not be enforcible in the event said Locke should commit suicide, sane or insane; and avers that said Locke did commit suicide on the 29th day of December, 1897, by voluntarily, and with intent to destroy his life, jumping or falling off a train of cars of the Kansas City, Memphis & Birmingham Railroad Company, he being then a passenger on said train, and said train at the time running at a high rate of speed. Third. That, in violation of the terms of said contract, said plaintiff's intestate came to his death in consequence of riding on the platform or steps of said train. Said train was at the time running at a high rate of speed between the city of Memphis and Jasper. Avers that the injuries were caused wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, while the said Locke was riding on the platform or steps of said railway car in express violation of the conditions of the contract. Fourth. Avers that said Locke came to his death because of a violation of the conditions of said contract, providing for no liability in case the assured should voluntarily and unnecessarily expose himself to danger. A replication was filed, taking issue on these several pleas, and the case went to trial to a jury, resulting in a recovery upon the policy.

Upon conclusion of the evidence a motion was made by the defendant to arrest the case from the jury, and to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. The court, however, submitted the case to the jury, and afterwards overruled the motion for a new trial. In this court, upon this branch of the case, the only proper inquiry is, should the court have directed a verdict? The practice in this respect is too well settled to need extended discussion. It was held in the case of Insurance Co. v. Randolph (decided in this court in February, 1897) 24 C.C.A. 305, 78 F. 754, in which the opinion was written by Mr. Justice Harlan, that:

'The jury should be permitted to return a verdict according to its own views of the facts, unless, upon a survey of the whole evidence, and giving effect to every inference to be fairly or reasonably drawn from it, the case is palpably for the party asking a peremptory instruction. On the other hand, a case cannot properly be withdrawn from the consideration of the jury simply because, in the judgment of the court, there is a preponderance of evidence in favor of the party asking a peremptory instruction.'

The learned justice cites with approbation the opinion of Judge Lurton upon the same subject in the case of Railway Co. v. Lowery, 20 C.C.A. 596, 74 F. 463.

How stands the present case? Was it palpably with the defendant and could the jury fairly draw no other inference from the testimony than that the decedent came to his death with suicidal intent? A careful examination of the facts disclosed in the record convinces us that, giving effect to the presumption of law against self-destruction, the case was not so palpably one of suicide as to justify this court in interfering with the action of the court below. The exact manner of decedent's death is left in great doubt from the testimony. Locke was a man about 50 years of age, of good character and habits, in good health, and with a family to whom he was devoted. It appears that upon the evening in question he remarked to a friend that he was going to Jasper, Ala., to get some money, and took passage from his home, the city of Memphis, to Jasper; purchasing before starting the accident ticket now sued upon, and one in the Travellers' Insurance Company for $6,000, both of which he mailed to his wife. This, however, appears to have been in accordance with his custom, as the testimony shows that he had been in the habit of buying such tickets and mailing them to his wife. Taking passage about 9 o'clock p.m., he went aboard the sleeping car, in which he had purchased a lower berth. He sat in the smoking room, conversing, until nearly 11 o'clock. About this time he went to his berth. The conductor of the Pullman testifies that about 12 o'clock he came in contact with the feet of a man sitting on the berth supposed to be occupied by Mr. Locke. It does appear that his berth was only occupied by lying down thereon. The porter had been instructed to call Mr. Locke before the train reached Jasper, and after it left Carbonhill The train was due at Jasper at 4:02 a.m., and at Carbonhill at 3:25 a.m. The train was on time, running at about the rate of 32 miles an hour; and, after it left Carbonhill, the porter having ascertained that no one was in the berth assigned to Locke, a search was made for the missing passenger. The passenger and Pullman conductors and porter made a pretty thorough search of the car and train. There is some conflict in the proof as to whether they looked upon the rear platform, but it appears that Locke might have been seen, had he been on the platform at the time of the search. The search failed to discover his presence, and at Jasper the conductor reported to the master of transportation at Birmingham the loss of a passenger. The car upon which Locke took passage was supplied with vestibule appliances, and with a gate something over three feet high, and which the testimony tends to show was fastened when the car left Memphis, and was found secure when the car reached Birmingham. On the early morning after Locke had started upon his journey, his body was found on a trestle of the railroad 3 1/2 miles from Jasper. It was lying upon the cross-ties, between the rails of the track, with head towards Jasper, face down, arms stretched above head, and feet between the cross-ties. Near the top, in the back part of the head, was a cut, and on one of the cross-ties between the rails there was a small quantity of blood. The body had on the overcoat, as Locke had when last seen before he went to his berth in the sleeper. Upon examination it was found that his right arm was broken at the elbow, and that several ribs were broken, and it is testified that the injury upon the skull was sufficient to produce death. It seems that Locke had had some difficulty with the Cole Manufacturing Company in the July preceding the accident. He had long been connected with that company, and in July of 1897 a charge was made before the board of directors which Mr. Locke regarded as affecting his character, and which caused him to immediately tender his resignation, which was as promptly accepted. He did not have other employment up to the time of his decease, and had been engaged in the attempt to organize another company, but had not succeeded in doing so. There is a difference in the testimony of witnesses as to whether he was despondent or not, but the weight of the evidence is that he was not. While out of employment he was in good credit, and not in danger of immediate want. He is said to have been a man of unusual business qualifications, reticent about his affairs, and having no very close or confidential relations with others. Just how he came by his death is a matter of conjecture. On the one hand, it is argued that he could not have severed connection with the car except at the real platform, where the vestibule doors would have prevented his getting off the train, except by throwing himself over the iron gate. On the other hand, it is claimed that he may have been thrown from the train, either from this car or from some of the connecting day coaches, which were not provided with vestibules, or may have gone to the rear platform of the train, to ascertain how far he was from his station, and have been suddenly thrown against the rear gate, which, if not fastened, would have given...

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