Standridge v. Alabama Power Co.

Decision Date30 July 1982
Citation418 So.2d 84
PartiesMelba STANDRIDGE, Administratrix of the Estate of Marvin Standridge, Deceased v. ALABAMA POWER COMPANY. 81-292.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Ralph E. Coleman, Birmingham, for appellant.

Robert D. Norman and Gary A. Parker of Norman, Fitzpatrick & Wood, Birmingham, for appellee.

FAULKNER, Justice.

Melba Standridge brought an action on behalf of the estate of her husband, Marvin Standridge, against Alabama Power Company for negligently causing Standridge's death. The claim arose on July 21, 1976, when Marvin Standridge died from a heart attack he suffered while on the construction site of Miller Steam Plant in Jefferson County, Alabama. The steam plant was being constructed for Alabama Power Company.

Mr. Standridge was an iron worker, and an employee of Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, one of the subcontractors hired for construction of the plant. Approximately 1500 to 2000 workers were employed for the construction of the plant. The plant is located several miles from the nearest hospital, and ten to fifteen minutes from the nearest ambulance service. There is a first aid facility located at the plant; however, the facility was equipped with only basic first aid supplies such as splints, bandages, eye wash and so forth. The first aid station did not have any equipment to treat heart attack victims, nor were any trained medical personnel on the premises.

On July 21, 1976, at 6:30 A.M., Marvin Standridge suffered a heart attack and died. His estate alleged that Alabama Power Company had a duty to provide medical services for heart attack victims, and that the company's breach of this duty proximately caused Mr. Standridge's death. The cause was tried to a jury. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant, Alabama Power Company. Mr. Standridge's estate appeals.

The estate asserts several points as error. First, the estate challenges two of the trial judge's evidentiary rulings. Second, the estate asserts that the trial judge erred in its jury instructions and in making comments to the jury on the evidence. Alabama Power Company contends that even if these constitute error, it is harmless error because as a matter of law, it could not be liable.

We will address the issue of Alabama Power's possible liability first. Alabama Power asserts that as a matter of law, it could have no duty to Mr. Standridge, an employee of a subcontractor on a construction site. The company notes that the heart attack occurred prior to the beginning of the work day. Furthermore, the company pointed out that it had no contractual agreement with the various independent contractors on the steam plant construction site to provide medical services for the employees of the contractors. No regulatory agency required Alabama Power to provide such facilities. The company also contends that the estate presented no evidence at trial to prove that Alabama Power's failure to provide such services proximately caused the death of Mr. Standridge. Thus, the company asserts that any error of the trial court is harmless error, since Standridge would not be entitled to recover in any case.

We cannot rule on Alabama Power's contention that any error by the trial judge is harmless because there was no evidence that the company's acts or omissions were the proximate cause of Standridge's activities. The effect of the company's argument is that the trial judge erred in failing to direct a verdict in favor of Alabama Power. The issue of the trial judge's failure to direct a verdict should have been raised by a cross-appeal, but the company failed to do so. See ARAP 4(a)(3).

The estate attempted to place in evidence an article from the Journal of the American Medical Association, authored by the Council on Industrial Health. The article was entitled "A Guide for Medical Services for Construction Projects." The article described what sort of medical services were necessary on a construction site, and suggested that on a site, such as the steam plant, full time medical personnel and facilities for the treatment of heart attacks should be provided. The estate sought to establish the article's trustworthiness through the expert testimony of a doctor whose specialty is emergency health services. The trial judge refused to admit the article into evidence, but the judge permitted the physician to testify concerning the contents of the article.

The general rule in Alabama is that "[a] learned treatise, essay or pamphlet on a subject of science or art, which is testified to by an expert on the subject as being standard or trustworthy authority on the subject, is admissible as an exception to the hearsay evidence rule." Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 258.01(1) (3rd ed. 1977). In order for a document to be admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule, an expert in the field must attest to the document's acceptance as an authority on a particular subject. Meadows v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 392 So.2d 825 (Ala.1981).

The trial judge attempted to ascertain whether the plaintiff's expert was qualified to testify concerning the article's trustworthiness:

"THE COURT; Well, doctor, what we are getting down to is whether or not you have the knowledge to make a determination as to whether or not it is authoritative or not. That is the question that is really here and that is before me and that is why I am asking you. You said you had no knowledge of this before and you have said that you don't operate in the area of industrial health where this is talking about.

"Is this outside, even though it may be in a book, is it outside of your knowledge of whether, in fact, it is authoritative or not in that field in which it is being offered?

"THE WITNESS: My knowledge is of the organization and the publication and the way they arrived at the standards, for example, for CPR and in terms of general knowledge about how they produce those publications or come to consensus opinions. I think they have been authoritative. I don't have any particular expertise about industrial health.

"THE COURT: You don't have any expertise in the area in which this is here?

"THE WITNESS: Correct."

The plaintiff's attorney did not attempt to establish the doctor's knowledge of the area of industrial health, but merely relied on the doctor's knowledge as a physician.

The trial judge is vested with a large measure of discretion in admitting evidence under the "learned treatise"...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Terry v. McNeil-PPC, Inc. (In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.)
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • 19 Abril 2016
    ...or the availability of better design or the feasibility of a more adequate warning of the risk involved.").See alsoStandridge v. Alabama Power Co., 418 So.2d 84, 87 (Ala.1982) ( "[Under Alabama law,] [t]here are several exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility of evidence of subseq......
  • Click v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 20 Diciembre 1996
    ...The appellant should have established at trial the reasons that the testimony would have been admissible. See Standridge v. Alabama Power Co., 418 So.2d 84, 88 (Ala.1982) (holding that the burden was on the party introducing the evidence to show that it is admissible under some exception to......
  • Alabama Power Co. v. Marine Builders, Inc.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 2 Agosto 1985
    ...is controverted. Werner at 853. That position is also followed by Alabama case law, which follows Werner. In Standridge v. Alabama Power Co., 418 So.2d 84 (Ala.1982), this Court stated: "There are several exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility of evidence of subsequent repairs or......
  • Wallace v. Alabama Power Co.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 19 Septiembre 1986
    ...rule in Alabama is that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is inadmissible to show a party's negligence. Standridge v. Alabama Power Co., 418 So.2d 84 (Ala.1982). The trial judge granted the defendant's motion in limine to exclude any testimony concerning the movement of the lines at ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT