Stanek v. A.P.I., Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 August 1991
• Docket Number: CX-91-518,Nos. C8-91-453,s. C8-91-453
• Citation: 474 N.W.2d 829
• Parties: Stanley STANEK, et al., Respondents, v. A.P.I., INC., et al., Defendants, Lac d'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee, Appellant. Robert LINDHOLM, Respondent, v. A.P.I., INC., et al., Defendants, Cassiar Mining Corp., Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 829

474 N.W.2d 829

Stanley STANEK, et al., Respondents, v. A.P.I., INC., et al., Defendants, Lac d'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee, Appellant.

Robert LINDHOLM, Respondent, v. A.P.I., INC., et al., Defendants, Cassiar Mining Corp., Appellant.

Nos. C8-91-453, CX-91-518.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Aug. 27, 1991.

Review Denied Oct. 31, 1991.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is appealable as of right.

2. An appellate court may consider documents which were filed and provided to the trial court but not placed in the trial court file by the court administrator because of a filing technicality. See Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 110.05.

3. Minnesota courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign asbestos-mining corporation, when the plaintiffs allege personal injuries due to exposure to the product while working at Minnesota companies and when the foreign corporation had direct contacts with Minnesota and placed its product in the nationwide stream of commerce.

Michael A. Jaksa, Shermoen, Leduc & Jaksa, International Falls, for Stanley Stanek, et al.

Eric J. Magnuson, Patricia A. Burke, Stephen O. Plunkett, Rider, Bennett, Egan & Arundel, Minneapolis, Roy A. Cohen, Porzio, Bromberg & Newman, Morristown, N.J., for Lac d'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee.

Dale J. Craft, David C. Thompson, Craft, Thompson & Boechler, Fargo, N.D., for Robert Lindholm.

Gary J. Haugen, Mark W. Lee, Maslon, Edelman, Borman & Brand, Minneapolis, Wendy S. White, Elizabeth Runyan Geise, J. Theodore Gentry, Shea & Gardner, Washington, D.C., for Cassiar Min. Corp.

Considered and decided by PARKER, P.J., and FOLEY and FORSBERG, JJ.

OPINION

PARKER, Judge.

Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee, formerly known as Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd. ("LAQ"), moved the trial court to dismiss Stanley Stanek's and Robert Lindholm's personal injury lawsuits against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion. LAQ appeals from this order. ¹ Stanek and Lindholm challenge the appealability of the order. LAQ moved this court to strike portions of Stanek's and Lindholm's brief. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondents Stanley Stanek and Robert Lindholm brought personal injury claims against miners of raw asbestos fiber and manufacturers and distributors of products containing asbestos. LAQ is in the business of mining, milling and selling raw asbestos fiber.

Stanek and Lindholm have used and been exposed to asbestos and asbestos-containing products through their employment. As a result, they allegedly suffer from asbestos-caused pulmonary diseases, cancer and disability.

Since 1952, LAQ has been a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Black Lake, Province of Quebec, Canada. LAQ has supplied raw asbestos fiber to a number of manufacturers, including Armstrong World Industries; Fiberboard Corporation; H.K. Porter Company, Inc.; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation; Raybestos Manhattan (a/k/a Raymark); United States Gypsum Company; and United States Mineral Products Company.

LAQ does not maintain an office in Minnesota or employ any officers or employees in Minnesota. It has never had a subsidiary company doing business in Minnesota and has never been registered as a foreign corporation doing business in Minnesota. In addition, it does not maintain any bank accounts in Minnesota; own or lease any real or personal property in Minnesota; have a listing in any Minnesota telephone directory; have a Minnesota mailing address; or advertise in the Minnesota media.

LAQ did sell raw asbestos fiber, "F.O.B. Black Lake, Quebec," to a Ruberoid plant in Minneapolis between 1959 and 1963. LAQ dealt with a Minnesota sales representative in the mid-1960s. LAQ corresponded with 3M Company five times between May 1962 and November 1964 regarding the potential sale of raw asbestos fiber, and an LAQ salesman visited 3M in St. Paul in 1963. LAQ mailed price lists to 3M in 1970, 1974 and 1976.

ISSUES

1. Is a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction appealable as of right?

2. Should this court consider on appeal documents which were filed and provided to the trial judge but returned by the court administrator due to a filing technicality?

3. Does LAQ have sufficient minimum contacts with Minnesota to permit exercise of personal jurisdiction over it in Minnesota?

DISCUSSION

I

An order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is appealable as of right. See In re State & Regents Asbestos Cases, 435 N.W.2d 521, 522 (Minn.1989) (orders granting or denying pretrial motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction are appealable as a matter of right under principles independent of the appellate rules); S.B. Schmidt Paper Co. v. A to Z Paper Co., 452 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn.App.1990) ("appeal from an order denying a pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is properly before this court because such orders are constitutionally appealable as of right").

LAQ was not required to seek discretionary review under Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 105. Thus, its appeal is proper.

II

LAQ moved to strike the deposition excerpts of William F. Justice at pages 45-50 of Stanek's and Lindholm's appendix and the references to this appendix at page five of their brief. This deposition testimony indicates that LAQ was a major supplier of Canadian asbestos to the United States market. LAQ asserts that these deposition pages were not filed with the trial court. See Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 110.01; Safeco Ins. Co. v. Diaz, 385 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Minn.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 30, 1986) (appellate court cannot base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal).

Stanek and Lindholm argue that these deposition excerpts were included as appendices to a joint supplemental memorandum of plaintiffs. The memorandum was initially filed in the court administrator's office on February 13, 1991. On February 14, 1991, a deputy court administrator returned the memorandum with a note indicating that original memoranda must be filed for each case. Stanek and Lindholm had filed one original for their two cases. Copies of the memorandum and its appendix were served on LAQ and copies were sent to the trial judge.

The deposition excerpts were available for the trial court to consider. The original was omitted from the record because of a technical necessity of the court administrator's office; this does not vitiate the fact that the deposition excerpt was originally filed and before the trial court.

Under Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 110.05, this court can correct an omission from the record. We deny LAQ's motion to exclude and strike a portion of respondents' brief and appendix. We also deny LAQ's motion for attorney fees and sanctions.

III

Two criteria must be met before a Minnesota court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: (1) the long-arm statute, Minn.Stat. Sec. 543.19 (1990), must be satisfied; and (2) there must be "minimum contacts" between the defendant and this state to satisfy the due process clause. Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn.1985).

This court need not defer to the trial court's decision, because the determination of whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 433 N.W.2d 115, 117 (Minn.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 10, 1989); Janssen v. Johnson, 358 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn.App.1984). "The reach of a state's long-arm statute is a question of state law, while the extent to which the reach of the long-arm statute is limited by due process is a question of federal law." Now Foods Corp. v. Madison Equip. Co., 386 N.W.2d 363, 366 (Minn.App.1986), pet. for rev. granted and summarily vacated, 395 N.W.2d 926 (Minn.1986).

Personal jurisdiction may be exercised over any foreign corporation in the same manner as if it were a domestic corporation "[a]s to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated by this subdivision." Minn.Stat. Sec. 543.19, subd. 1 (1990). This subdivision applies if a foreign corporation:

(d) Commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property damage in Minnesota, subject to the following exceptions when no jurisdiction shall be found:

(1) Minnesota has no substantial interest in providing a forum; or

(2) the burden placed on the defendant by being brought under the state's jurisdiction would violate fairness and substantial justice * * *.

Id.

Both the Minnesota Supreme Court and this court have held that the legislature intended Minnesota's long-arm statute to "have the maximum extraterritorial effect allowed under the due process clause of the federal constitution." Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 719; S.B. Schmidt Paper v. A to Z Paper, 452 N.W.2d at 487. The Rostad court stated, "the permissibility of an attempted exercise of jurisdiction [under the long-arm statute] may be tested by analyzing whether it meets constitutional muster." Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 719.

Accordingly, personal jurisdiction is proper in this case, where Minnesota workers sustained injuries in Minnesota, so long as the due process clause is satisfied.

When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction at the pretrial stage, "the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of minimum contacts through its complaint and supporting evidence, 'which will be taken as true.' " Johnson Bros. Corp. v. Arrowhead Co., 459 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Minn.App.1990) (quoting Hardrives, Inc. v. The City of LaCrosse, 307 Minn. 290, 293, 240 N.W.2d 814, 816 (Minn.1976)). "[D]oubt should be resolved in favor of retention of jurisdiction." Hardrives, 307 Minn. at 296, 240 N.W.2d at 818, cited in Johnson Bros., 459 N.W.2d at 163.

"Due process requires that a defendant have minimum contacts with a jurisdiction before being required to defend against a lawsuit in that jurisdiction." Rostad, 372 N.W.2d at 719 (Minn.1985) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, ...