Stanfield v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 11 January 1896
• Docket Number: Civil 443
• Citation: 5 Ariz. 1,43 P. 221
• Parties: WILLIAM T. STANFIELD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. OLAF M. ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellee
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

43 P. 221

5 Ariz. 1

WILLIAM T. STANFIELD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. OLAF M. ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellee

Civil No. 443

Supreme Court of Arizona

January 11, 1896

APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the County of Gila. Owen T. Rouse, Judge.

Reversed.

E. J Edwards, W. H. Barnes, and J. F. Moriarty, for Appellant.

If there is any evidence, however slight, tending to show negligence, the case should be submitted to the jury; and where the facts are such that from them different minds may reasonably draw different conclusions, the case should be submitted to the jury. Woods on Master and Servant, secs. 76 82, 84, 85; Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 11 Neb 333, 9 N.W. 50; Smith v. S. C. P. Ry. Co., 15 Neb. 583, 19 N.W. 638; Johnson v. M. P. Ry. Co., 18 Neb. 690, 26 N.W. 347; Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Wymore, 40 Neb. 645, 58 N.W. 1120; Nixon v. Selby S. Co., 102 Cal. 458, 36 P. 803.

"The rider or driver of a horse must use ordinary care in its management, and is liable for all damages occasioned by his careless riding or driving." Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, sec. 303.

"If a non-negligent foot-traveler is injured by a runaway horse of a negligent person he may have compensation." Schienfeld v. Norris, 115 Mass. 17; Williams v. Grealy, 112 Mass. 97; Bishop on Non-Contract Law, sec. 1148.

If a person knows his horse to be easily frightened, he is bound to provide against sudden starting, as by the intervening act of third persons. Bigelow v. Reed, 51 Mo. 325.

Cox & Street, for Appellee.

Baker, C. J. Hawkins, J., and Bethune, J., concur.

OPINION

The facts are stated in the opinion.

BAKER C. J.--

This is an action brought to recover for very serious injuries sustained by the appellant on February 9, 1894, in being run over in a public highway by a horse ridden by the appellee. The charge in the complaint is, that while the appellant was walking along the public highway the appellee approached him from the rear on horseback, going in the same direction as the appellant, and so carelessly and so negligently rode the horse that appellant was run over, and thrown to the ground, and his leg broken, etc. Upon the trial, and at the close of appellant's case, and without any testimony being offered in behalf of the appellee, the court, upon his motion, directed a verdict for him. This is assigned as error. In this jurisdiction, in a proper case, we think the court may direct a verdict; but to authorize such action the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must be insufficient to support a verdict in favor of the party having the onus of proof, so that, if such a verdict is returned, the court would feel compelled to set it aside. And in passing upon the whole question the judge ought to inquire, not how he himself would vote as a juror, but, taking the jury as fair-minded men, with their different habits of reasoning and dispositions of judgment, could they reasonably differ upon the question? If they could, no matter how clear the judge is himself upon the question, nor how confident he may be that...