Stankevich v. Milliron

• Decision Date: 19 November 2015
• Docket Number: Docket No. 310710.
• Citation: 882 N.W.2d 194,313 Mich.App. 233
• Parties: STANKEVICH v. MILLIRON (On Remand).
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

313 Mich.App. 233

882 N.W.2d 194

STANKEVICH

v.MILLIRON (On Remand).

Docket No. 310710.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 5, 2015, at Lansing.

Decided Nov. 19, 2015, at 9:00 a.m.

Finch & Finch, PC (by Nancy B. Finch, Iron Mountain and Andrea Mashak), for plaintiff.

Michele Hebner, PC (by Michele Hebner), for defendant.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MARKEY and K.F. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition for failing to state a claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8)

. Pursuant to the dictates of the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015), we remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

In our October 17, 2013 opinion in this matter, we summarized the factual background of the case:

The parties entered into a same-sex marriage in Canada in July 2007. Before that date, defendant had been artificially inseminated, and later gave birth to a child. Defendant is the biological mother of the child.

The parties' [sic] separated in March 2009. While they initially agreed to a visitation schedule, they subsequently found that they could not agree. Thus, plaintiff filed a verified complaint, asserting that she fully participated in the care and rearing of the minor child. She requested relief from the trial court, which included an order dissolving the marriage, an order affirming that she is the parent of the child, and orders regarding custody, parenting time, and child support.

Defendant, however, filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8)

. She asserted that plaintiff did not have standing to petition for custody of the child. The trial court granted defendant's motion. Plaintiff now appeals. [Stankevich v. Milliron, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 17, 2013 (

Docket No. 310710), p. 1, 2013 WL 5663227

, vacated and remanded 498 Mich. 877, 868 N.W.2d 907 (2015).]

In our previous opinion, we upheld the grant of summary disposition to defendant because plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action. Stankevich, unpub. op. at 5. We noted that the Child Custody Act (CCA) defines “parent” as the “ ‘natural or adoptive parent of a child.’ ” Id. at 2, quoting MCL 722.22(h)

.¹ Plaintiff is not a parent under this definition because she is not an adoptive parent and because she is not related to the child by blood. Id., citing Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2005) (defining “natural” as, in part, “related by blood rather than by adoption: one's natural parents. ”). Likewise, we rejected plaintiff's request to apply the equitable-parent doctrine that was adopted in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich.App. 601, 608–609, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987). Stankevich, unpub. op. at 3–5. The basis of our conclusion was that applying the doctrine in this case would be contrary to Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320, 330–331, 597 N.W.2d 15 (1999), in which the Michigan Supreme Court declined to extend the equitable-parent doctrine outside the context of marriage, because recognizing plaintiff's same-sex union as a marriage under the equitable-parent doctrine would have violated the constitutional and statutory provisions defining marriage. Stankevich, unpub. op. at 3–5.

On November 25, 2013, plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. In light of the pending appeals from the decision in DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F.Supp.2d 757 (E.D.Mich., 2014)

, rev'd 772 F.3d 388 (C.A.6, 2014), rev'd sub nom. Obergefell, 576 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015), on April 25, 2014, our Supreme Court entered an order holding the application in the instant matter in abeyance. Stankevich v. Milliron, 844 N.W.2d 724 (Mich., 2014).

After the United States Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated our judgment in this case and remanded it to us for reconsideration. Stankevich v. Milliron, 498 Mich. 877, 868 N.W.2d 907 (2015)

.

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the grant of summary disposition de novo. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999)

. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint,” and “[a]ll well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Id. at 119, 597 N.W.2d 817. Furthermore, the motion only should be granted when the claims are “so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Whether a party has legal standing to assert a claim constitutes a question of law that we review de novo.” Heltzel v. Heltzel, 248 Mich.App. 1, 28, 638 N.W.2d 123 (2001)

.

B. ANALYSIS

As a result of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Obergefell, plaintiff has standing under the equitable-parent doctrine because Michigan now is required to recognize the parties' same-sex marriage, and plaintiff's complaint alleges facts that, if proven, are sufficient to establish equitable parenthood.²

“Generally, a party has standing if it has some real interest in the cause of action, ... or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” In re Anjoski, 283 Mich.App. 41, 50, 770 N.W.2d 1 (2009)

(quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). But “this concept is not given such a broad application in the context of child custody disputes involving third parties, or any individual other than a parent [.]” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).

However, this Court adopted the equitable-parent doctrine in Atkinson, 160 Mich.App. at 608–609, 408 N.W.2d 516

, holding:

[W]e adopt the do[c]trine of equitable parent and find that a husband who is not the biological father of a child born or conceived during the marriage may be considered the natural father of that child where (1) the husband and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father and child, or the mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such a relationship over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the husband desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the husband is willing to take on the responsibility of paying child support.

This Court stated that, given its recognition that “a person who is not the biological father of a child may be considered a parent against his will, and consequently burdened with the responsibility of the support for the child,” such a person, in being treated as a parent, may also seek the rights of custody or parenting time. Id. at 610, 408 N.W.2d 516

. This Court also has applied the equitable-parent doctrine in later cases. See, e.g., York v. Morofsky, 225 Mich.App. 333, 335, 337, 571 N.W.2d 524 (1997)

; Soumis v. Soumis, 218 Mich.App. 27, 34, 553 N.W.2d 619 (1996). However, as mentioned earlier, our Supreme Court declined to extend the equitable-parent doctrine outside the context of marriage in Van, 460 Mich. at 337, 597 N.W.2d 15.

In our previous opinion, we concluded that the equitable-parent doctrine should not be expanded to include same-sex couples, such as the parties in this case, because Michigan statutory and constitutional provisions precluded recognition of the parties' same-sex marriage, and Van limited the application of the equitable-parent doctrine to the confines of marriage. Stankevich, unpub. op. at 3–5. However, under Obergefell, Michigan now is required to recognize the parties' same-sex marriage.

In Obergefell, 576 U.S. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 2604–2605

, the United States Supreme Court held,

[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex [sic] may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them.

The Supreme Court therefore held invalid state laws—including Michigan's constitutional provision defining marriage as a union between one man and one woman, Const. 1963, art. 1, § 25

, Obergefell, 576 U.S. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 2593 —“to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples,” id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 2605.

The Court also addressed “whether the Constitution requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of State” and concluded that “the recognition bans inflict substantial and continuing harm on same-sex couples.” Id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 2607

. Accordingly, the Court held that “same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States. It follows that the Court also must hold—and it now does hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.” Id. at ––––, 135 S.Ct. at 2607–2608. Thus, under Obergefell, the holding in Van limiting the equitable-parent doctrine to the confines of marriage is no longer a barrier to the application of that doctrine in this case, Van, 460 Mich. at 337, 597 N.W.2d 15, and we are required to conclude that plaintiff is not barred from asserting the applicability of the equitable-parent doctrine.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the parties in the instant matter were married in Canada in 2007 and that defendant's biological child was born during the course of that marriage. As Obergefell requires that same-sex couples be permitted to exercise the fundamental right to marry on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples, an application of a legal doctrine excluding same-sex married couples from the doctrine of equitable parenthood goes against the dictates of Obergefell, which we are bound to follow.

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