Stanley v. HANCOCK COUNTY COM'RS

• Decision Date: 23 December 2004
• Citation: 2004 ME 157,864 A.2d 169
• Parties: Ronald STANLEY v. HANCOCK COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

864 A.2d 169

2004 ME 157

Ronald STANLEY v. HANCOCK COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: March 10, 2004.

Decided: December 23, 2004.

Arthur J. Greif (orally), Julie D. Farr, Christopher L. Dalton, Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Bangor, for plaintiff.

Linda D. McGill, Matthew Tarasevich (orally), Moon Moss McGill & Shapiro, P.A., Portland, for defendant.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.

LEVY, J.

[¶ 1] Ronald Stanley appeals from the entry of a summary judgment by the Superior Court (Hancock County, Hjelm, J.) in favor of the Hancock County Commissioners. Stanley's complaint alleges that he was terminated from his job as a maintenance worker for Hancock County in violation of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, 26 M.R.S.A. §§ 831-840 (1988 & Supp.2004), because he had complained to the County about its use of unlicensed workers to perform electrical work. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Stanley adequately controverted statements in the Commissioners' statement of material facts regarding their nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment. We affirm the judgment because there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the absence of a causal connection between Stanley's protected report to his employer and his termination. We also address the requirement in M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(1), (2), and (3) that the facts set forth in supporting and opposing statements of material fact be "separate, short, and concise."

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] We consider the facts contained in the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Stanley. Hancock County employed Ronald Stanley in its maintenance department from October 1994 to March 2001. In February 2000, the Commissioners hired Perley Urquhart as the County's facilities director. Urquhart is a licensed electrician and was authorized to contract electrical work to outside contractors. His duties included supervising Stanley.

[¶ 3] Stanley asserts that during his employment he was required to perform electrical work and that he had complained, first to the county clerk and then to Urquhart, that it was illegal and unsafe for him to perform electrical work because he was not a licensed electrician. In February 2001, Urquhart ordered Stanley to rewire floodlights. Stanley initially refused, but at Urquhart's insistence, he performed the work.

[¶ 4] In December 2000, Urquhart conducted a formal performance review of Stanley. In a memo addressed to the County Commissioners dated January 19, 2001, Urquhart described problems he had been having with Stanley and recommended that Stanley's employment be terminated. The memo stated that Stanley (1) failed to perform tasks assigned to him, including certain carpentry and painting jobs; (2) failed to comply with the County's personnel policies governing the use of the telephone for personal calls, breaks, tardiness, lunch breaks, and attendance; (3) failed to comply with directions and to complete work orders; and (4) lacked the knowledge or capacity to perform various tasks.

[¶ 5] The Commissioners conducted a hearing on Urquhart's recommendation in March 2001. Stanley was informed of Urquhart's recommendation to the Commissioners the morning of the hearing. At the hearing, Urquhart spoke first and stated his reasons for recommending that Stanley be terminated as outlined in the January 19 memorandum. Stanley spoke next and informed the Commissioners that he had recently been required to perform electrical work for the County (rewiring the floodlights) even though he was not licensed to do the work. He also showed the Commissioners several work orders for other electrical projects that, he claimed, Urquhart expected him to complete.¹ After the hearing, the Commissioners voted 3-0 to accept Urquhart's recommendation that Stanley's employment be terminated.

[¶ 6] Stanley filed a discrimination complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission, alleging that his termination had been in retaliation for his complaints about unsafe and illegal employment practices. See 26 M.R.S.A. § 834-A (1988) (authorizing an employee who has complied with provisions of the Whistleblowers' Protection Act to bring a complaint before the Maine Human Rights Commission). The Human Rights Commission gave Stanley a right-to-sue letter, and this action followed. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4612(6) (2002).

[¶ 7] After the completion of discovery, the Commissioners filed a motion for a summary judgment. The Commissioners' motion was supported by a statement of material facts pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(1) containing 191 separate facts, several of which repeated the same facts in various forms two or more times. This apparently occurred because the statement was organized to correspond roughly to the three affidavits and Stanley's deposition, which were cited in support of the 191 facts.

[¶ 8] Stanley responded with an opposing statement of facts pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(2) that (1) admitted many of the Commissioners' points; (2) disputed or qualified many of the Commissioners' points with appropriate affirmative statements and record references; and (3) conceded many of the Commissioners' points with the following statement and case citation:

Plaintiff admits that this is what is contained in [the named person's] affidavit [cited in support of the fact],² but notes that, to the extent this statement reflects the affiant's state of mind or opinion, the Judge is free to completely disregard this self-serving statement, as it is not from a disinterested witness. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, [150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105] (2000) (citations omitted).

[¶ 9] Separate from his response to the Commissioners, Stanley filed a statement of additional facts pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(2). This statement asserted forty-nine additional facts supported by record references. Among other things, these additional facts alleged that Stanley discussed "the issue of [Stanley] performing electrical work without a license" with county officials as early as October 1997, and that "Urquhart told Stanley shortly after he started with the County that the Commissioners had told him to find a reason to fire Stanley." The Commissioners filed a reply statement to Stanley's statement pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(3) that largely denied Stanley's proffered facts regarding the timing and substance of many communications concerning electrical work between Stanley, Urquhart, and the Commissioners.

[¶ 10] The Superior Court granted the Commissioners' motion for a summary judgment. It determined that Stanley failed to controvert the Commissioners' assertion that his complaints about performing electrical work did not contribute to the Commissioners' decision to terminate his employment. Stanley appeals from this decision.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Whistleblowers' Protection Act

[¶ 11] "To prevail on a claim of unlawful retaliation pursuant to the [Whistleblowers' Protection Act], an employee must show (1) that she engaged in activity protected by the WPA, (2) that she experienced an adverse employment action, and (3) that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." DiCentes v. Michaud, 1998 ME 227, ¶ 14, 719 A.2d 509, 514; see also 26 M.R.S.A. § 833(1), (2) (1988 & Supp. 2004).

[¶ 12] We evaluate WPA claims with the "shifting burdens" analysis articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). DiCentes, 1998 ME 227, ¶ 14, 719 A.2d at 514. Under that formula, after the WPA claimant establishes a prima facie case, the defendant assumes the burden of producing evidence that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1262 (Me.1979). If the defendant produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, the employee has the burden to show that the reason offered by the defendant was pretextual; that is, "that there was, in fact, a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." DiCentes, 1998 ME 227, ¶ 16, 719 A.2d at 515. In the summary judgment context, a plaintiff can meet that final burden and survive a defense motion for a summary judgment by establishing a factual dispute as to whether a causal connection exists between the report protected by the WPA and the adverse employment action.

B. Summary Judgment Analysis

[¶ 13] Entry of a summary judgment is appropriate only if the portions of the evidentiary record "referred to in the statements [of material facts] show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact set forth in those statements and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Botka v. S.C. Noyes & Co., 2003 ME 128, ¶ 18, 834 A.2d 947, 952-53. A party's opposing statement of material facts "`must explicitly admit, deny, or qualify facts by reference to each numbered paragraph, and a denial or qualification must be supported by a record citation.'" Doyle v. Dep't of Human Servs., 2003 ME 61, ¶ 10, 824 A.2d 48, 52-53 (quoting Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, ¶ 6 n. 5, 770 A.2d 653, 655); see also M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(2). "Facts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted." M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4).

The existence of a dispute of material facts and entry of summary judgment are questions of law which we review de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment has been entered, to decide whether the parties' statements of material facts and the referenced record evidence reveal a genuine issue of material fact, and whether the moving

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