Stanley v. Justice Court

• Decision Date: 13 February 1976
• Citation: 127 Cal.Rptr. 532,55 Cal.App.3d 244
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Douglas Harry STANLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JUSTICE COURT OF the AUBURN JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF PLACER, State of California, and Justice Court of the Tahoe Judicial District, County of Placer, State of California, Defendants, Daniel J. Higgins, as District Attorney of the County of Placer, State of California, Defendant and Respondent; The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 14535.

Page 532

127 Cal.Rptr. 532

55 Cal.App.3d 244

Douglas Harry STANLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JUSTICE COURT OF the AUBURN JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF PLACER, State of California, and Justice Court of the Tahoe Judicial District, County of Placer, State of California, Defendants Daniel J. Higgins, as District Attorney of the County of Placer, State of California, Defendant and Respondent The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 14535.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Feb. 13, 1976.

Joseph Q. Joynt and Robert M. Holley, Tahoe City, for plaintiff and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen. by Susan E. Cohn, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, Daniel J. Higgins, Dist. Atty., Auburn, for defendants and respondents.

PUGLIA, Presiding Justice.

The resolution of this appeal requires that we interpret the qualifying phrase 'nearest or most accessible' as descriptive of the magistrate before whom one arrested for felony without a warrant must be taken 'without unnecessary delay.' (Pen.Code, § 849, subd. (a).) ¹ Appellant ² herein asserts that the qualifying phrase imposes essentially a geographic limitation. We conclude that such a literal interpretation of the phrase would create unmanageable discordance among various Penal Code provisions governing felony pretrial procedure. Consequently, we reject the interpretation sought by defendant.

Defendant was arrested by sheriff's deputies on July 4 at Kings Beach, Placer County, California, for violation of section 647, subdivision (f) (public intoxication), a misdemeanor, and violation of Health and Safety Code section 11357 (possession of marijuana), a felony. The officers did not have a warrant of arrest. Defendant was booked and jailed at the Placer County Sheriff's substation at Tahoe City. He demanded to be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate. His demand was refused. Both Kings Beach and Tahoe City are within the geographical boundaries of the Tahoe Judicial District wherein a justice court is established. The Tahoe Justice Court is located within the same building as the jail in which defendant was confined.

In the morning of July 5, defendant appeared with his attorney before the judge of the Tahoe Justice Court sitting as a magistrate. He was admitted to bail in the sum of $1,000. There was no complaint before the magistrate. The magistrate refused defendant's demand for arraignment and advice of the charges and of his rights. In the afternoon of July 5, following his release on bail, defendant learned that a felony complaint had been or was about to be filed in the justice court of the Auburn Judicial District in Placer County, and that he was to appear there on July 11 for arraignment.

On July 9, defendant filed in the Placer County Superior Court the instant petition for relief in the nature of prohibition and/or mandate, naming the justice courts of the Auburn and Tahoe Judicial Districts and the District Attorney of Placer County as respondent. In this proceeding, defendant seeks orders directing the district attorney to dismiss the criminal proceedings pending against him in the Auburn Justice Court and to commence the same in the Tahoe Justice Court. He also seeks an order prohibiting the Auburn Justice Court from proceeding further on the criminal action in which he is defendant and directing the Tahoe Justice Court to assume jurisdiction thereof. The district attorney's demurrer to the petitioner was sustained by the superior court without leave to amend and judgment of dismissal was entered accordingly. Defendant appeals.

Section 849, subdivision (a) provides: 'When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer or private person, the person arrested, if not otherwise released shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the offense is triable, and a complaint stating the charge against the arrested person shall be laid before such magistrate.'

At the outset we emphasize that section 849, subdivision (a), does not state a preference for proceedings in the vicinage in which the crime was committed. It relates rather to the place of arrest, a place not necessarily identical with the locus of the offense. Furthermore, section 849, subdivision (a) does not limit jurisdiction or venue of preliminary felony proceedings to the magistrate described therein. All judges of the appellate and trial courts are magistrates. (§ 808.) Judges 'when sitting as magistrates, have the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law upon magistrates, and not those which pertain to their respective judicial offices.' (People v. Crespi (1896) 115 Cal. 50, 54, 46 P. 863, 864.) Preliminary felony proceedings before a magistrate do not invoke the jurisdiction of the court of which the magistrate is a judge. (Wells v. Justice Court (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 221, 224, 5 Cal.Rptr. 204.) Before an information charging felony may be filed, a preliminary examination must be conducted before a magistrate, commenced by written complaint and culminating in an order holding defendant to answer for trial in superior court. (§ 738.) The complaint required to commence such proceedings may be filed in the court of any magistrate within the county in which the offense was committed without reference to the particular judicial district in which the offense occurred. A magistrate of that court has jurisdiction to hear the preliminary examination. (§ 859; Koski v. James (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 349, 354, 120 Cal.Rptr. 754; People v. Kepford (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 128, 130, 51 P.2d 429; People v. Calkins (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 251, 254, 47 P.2d 544; People v. Van Zandt (1932) 123 Cal.App. 520, 523, 11 P.2d 645.) Thus a magistrate of the Auburn Justice Court has jurisdiction over the proceedings on the complaint charging defendant, and that court is a proper place for the conduct of the preliminary examination.

We must still determine, however, whether the language of section 849, subdivision (a) constitutes an inflexible demand that the written complaint mentioned in section 738 be filed in the court of the magistrate physically nearest the location of defendant's arrest. All other things being equal, that magistrate presumably would be the most accessible of all magistrates within the county. Considered in isolation, the phrase 'nearest or most accessible' would seem to impose a simple mechanical test admitting of no latitude in its application.

In interpreting a statute faithfully to the intent of the Legislature, we are constrained, where possible, to give meaning and effect to every word, phrase, and sentence of the enactment. A construction rendering some words superfluous is to be avoided. All the words of a statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and purpose of the statute in which they appear. The various parts of the enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular phrase to be construed in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224.) Expanding our consideration of section 849, subdivision (a) accordingly to embrace all of its provisions, we note that the 'nearest or most accessible magistrate' before whom the arrestee must be taken is also the magistrate before whom 'a complaint stating the charge against the arrested person shall be laid . . ..' ³ Moreover, both of these commandments must be accomplished without 'unnecessary delay.' Given the purposes of the section, which we shall discuss infra, they must also be accomplished contemporaneously.

At this point we turn to consideration of the mechanics involved in the preparation and filing of the complaint. As we shall see, the arresting officer cannot prepare and file an accusatory pleading charging a defendant with a crime. Insofar as section 849, subdivision (a) is concerned therefore, his obligation is discharged when he physically brings the arrestee before the magistrate without unnecessary delay. The written complaint comtemplated by section 738 must be subscribed under oath by the complainant and filed with the magistrate. Furthermore, where, as here, the magistrate is a justice court judge, the complaint must be 'concurred in by the district attorney of the county in which (the magistrate) sits or the Attorney General of the State of California.' (§ 806.) In practical effect then, the discretion whether or not to prosecute one arrested for felony without a warrant (and not otherwise released by the arresting officer under § 849, subd. (b)) is vested in the district attorney (cf. People v. Barnhart (1939) 37 Cal.App.2d Supp. 748, 750--752, 94 P.2d 411).

The proper exercise of such discretion will obviously entail some delay in the initial appearance of the arrestee before a magistrate to permit the district attorney to evaluate the evidence supporting the charge (People v. King (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 817, 822, 76 Cal.Rptr. 145; People v. Lee (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 514, 522, 83 Cal.Rptr. 715) and to complete the clerical and administrative tasks required to prepare a formal pleading. The permissible length of delay will vary, within the limits prescribed by law, according to the circumstances of each case. Matters bearing upon the permissible length of delay include the factual complexities of the case and the possibility that additional brief investigation might exonerate the arrestee and obviate the need for formal criminal proceedings. (See, e.g., People v. Powell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 32, 60, 59 Cal.Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137.) Delay may not be for the purpose of pursuing illegal investigatory practices (Id. at pp. 60--61, 59 Cal.Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137); and in no case may delay exceed a reasonable time. (See § 825, requiring a defendant arrested on a warrant to be taken before a magistrate 'without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within two days after...