Stannard v. McCool

Decision Date07 December 1951
Docket NumberNo. 48,48
Citation84 A.2d 862,198 Md. 609
PartiesSTANNARD v. McCOOL.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Edw. A. Smith, Baltimore (G. Elbert Marshall, Easton, on the brief), for appellant.

Jas. Weinroth, Elkton, and Edward T. Miller, Easton, for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

COLLINS, Judge.

This is an appeal from the granting of a demurrer prayer and a motion for a judgment N.O.V. in favor of the appellee, John W. McCool, after a verdict rendered by a jury for the appellant, James R. Stannard.

Of course, in deciding whether this demurrer prayer and motion should have been granted, we will resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the appellant and assume the truth of all evidence and all inferences which may naturally and legitimately be deduced therefrom which tend to support appellant's claim. The evidence will therefore be recited in a light most favorable to the appellant. Eisenhower v. Baltimore Transit Co., 190 Md. 528, 532, 59 A.2d 313.

In 1946, Mrs. Elizabeth A. Holmes, James A. Nowland, Jr., and Eva A. Nowland, residents of the state of Washington and heirs of the Nowland Estate, owned several properties located in Cecilton, Cecil County, Maryland, which were placed in the hands of a real estate firm, the Maryland-Virginia Farm Agency, for sale. On August 23, 1946, a Mr. Nicholson, the manager of the real estate agency, forwarded to Mr. Carroll C. Short of Cecilton, the son-in-law and agent of the appellee, a contract of sale for the purchase by the appellee of certain lots belonging to the Nowland Estate, the purchase price to be the sum of nine thousand dollars. Mr. McCool signed this contract and it was returned to Mr. Nicholson, together with Mr. McCool's check, dated August 26, 1946, in the amount of $1,000.00, as the down payment. Mr. Nicholson deposited this check in the agency account and delivered the contract of sale to Mr. Hector J. Ciotti, who, with Mr. Robert Lee Slingluff, was attorney for the Nowland heirs. Messrs. Ciotti and Slingluff forwarded the contract of sale to their clients in the State of Washington on August 26, 1946. The contract was signed by the Nowland heirs and returned to Mr. Ciotti on October 10, 1946. Before this contract reached Baltimore, Mr. Stannard, the appellant, called Mr. Ciotti on the telephone from Cecilton and asked Mr. Ciotti whether he represented the Nowland Estate and when told he did, asked how much he wanted for the Cecilton properties. Mr. Ciotti told him: 'They have been sold, the contract is on its way to the West Coast now.' Stannard said: 'How much have you been offered?' Ciotti replied: 'I am sorry, I can't tell you. If you want to make an offer, make your offer in writing with a check. I cannot tell you about the offer that's been made. The contract is on its way out.' On September 1, 1946, Mr. Stannard wired Mrs. Holmes. There was an exchange of telegrams, as a result of which Messrs. Ciotti and Slingluff received a wire from the counsel for the Nowland heirs in Seattle. An offer of $12,000.00 had been made by Mr. Stannard and the nine thousand dollar contract with Mr. McCool was cancelled. The signatures of the Nowland heirs were then perforated with holes by Mr. Slingluff and the nine thousand dollar contract was returned to the real estate agent, Mr. Nicholson, who kept it in his files. The one thousand dollars paid by Mr. McCool was later returned to him by Mr. Nicholson.

Messrs. William Pepper Constable and John D. Alexander, attorneys of Baltimore, were employed by Mr. Stannard, the appellee, to represent him in searching the title and in the settlement of the properties here in question. Messrs. Constable and Alexander communicated with Messrs. Ciotti and Slingluff and contracts were prepared by Mr. Ciotti and were delivered with a letter dated September 18, 1946, to the offices of Constable and Alexander. For the purposes of this case, we will assume that a valid and enforceable contract was entered into on September 18, 1946, for the sale of the properties in question by the Nowland heirs to the appellant for twelve thousand dollars.

On September 20, 1946, Mr. Stannard, the appellant, came to Mr. Alexander's office and was informed that the $12,000.00 sale 'was off'. Because of the refusal to complete the sale a suit for specific performance was filed in the Circuit Court for Cecil County on September 21, 1946, by Stannard against the Nowland heirs which resulted in the decree of September 2nd, 1947, ordering specific performance of the contract. No appeal was taken and a deed was executed and settlement has been made.

On December 4, 1947, the present suit was filed by the appellant against the appellee by a declaration alleging the ownership by the Nowland heirs of the properties in question, the contract entered into by the Nowland heirs with the appellant for the purchase of the properties for the price of $12,000.00; 'that thereafter, the Defendant, John W. McCool, knowing of the aforesaid contract between the Plaintiff' and the Nowland heirs for the price of $12,000.00 induced them to refuse to carry out the terms of said contract and further induced the Nowland heirs to enter into a contract with the said Defendant for the purchase of said property for the sum of $12,200.00; 'that said action on the part of the Defendant was a malicious and illegal interference with the contractual rights of the Plaintiff and was done with the intention on the part of the Defendant of injuring the Plaintiff and of obtaining a benefit for the Defendant; that it became necessary for the Plaintiff to employ counsel and file suit in this Honorable Court to require the specific performance' of said contract with the Nowland heirs; 'that as a result of the aforesaid unlawful and malicious conduct on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff has been greatly damaged and injured and was required to spend large sums of money for counsel fee and other costs and expenses.' (Italics supplied.) The plaintiff asked for $10,000.00 damages.

On February 16, 1948, Mr. McCool entered a counter suit against Mr. Stannard for malicious and illegal interference with his contractual rights with the Nowland heirs as a result of which his $9,000.00 contract was cancelled. The trial court entered a judgment on the counter claim in favor of Stannard for costs and no appeal is taken from that judgment. The original suit now before us was, after denial of a motion for a directed verdict, submitted to the jury who brought in a verdict in the amount of $650.00 for the appellant, Stannard. From a judgment N.O.V. setting aside that verdict, the appellant appeals.

The agreement between the Nowland heirs and Mr. Stannard, having been entered into on September 18th and rejected by them on September 20th, any action on the part of Mr. McCool in knowingly interfering with that contract must necessarily have occurred between September 18th and September 20, 1946. The trial judge based the granting of the motion on the fact that he was 'unable to find any evidence to establish that the defendant had knowledge prior to September 20th, 1946, that a binding legal contract of sale had been entered into between the owners of the lots in question and the Plaintiff or any evidence from which such interference could be fairly and reasonably deduced.'

Mr. Alexander testified that prior to September 18, 1946, Mr. McCool called him from Elkton. Mr. Alexander said: 'I am not certain whether Mr. McCool asked for Mr. Constable or myself, but Mr. Constable had not returned from vacation at that time, so I talked to Mr. McCool over the telephone and, of course, I don't have the exact words, but the substance of the conversation, the best of my recollection, is this. Mr. McCool said, 'Do you people represent Mr. Stannard?' I answered 'Yes', and he said, 'Well, you know the people down in Cecilton don't want Mr. Stannard to have those properties. They want me to have them', and 'If you and Mr. Constable represent Mr. Stannard in this matter it isn't going to do your firm any good in that part of the County'. I think I recall replying, 'Mr. McCool, are you asking that we represent you?' 'Oh,' he said, 'Oh, no, no, but only that it would be bad for you if you represent Stannard in this matter', and there were probably a few other things said. I think something was said by Mr. McCool, 'Well, you will get a big fee from him. Hit him hard', and I told him that we would charge him a reasonable fee for our services, but we had received nothing from him at that time. I did tell Mr. McCool we would represent Mr. Stannard to the best of our ability. That, as I recall, is the substance of the conversation.'

Mr. Slingluff testified that on September 19th a wire was sent from office which contained the language 'Sentiment of residents against sale to Stannard'. Mr. Slingluff said he received this information from a grocer in Cecilton, who said 'he would offer to meet any price that Mr. Stannard would pay for those properties'. Mr. Slingluff, when asked why the Stannard sale was called off, replied: 'Because we received a wire from our local counsel for...

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