Stano v. State
| Decision Date | 25 February 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 70700,70700 |
| Citation | 520 So.2d 278,13 Fla. L. Weekly 167 |
| Parties | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 167 Gerald Eugene STANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Larry Helm Spalding, Capital Collateral Representative, Mark Evan Olive, Chief Asst., and Lissa J. Gardner, Staff Atty., Office of Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Belle B. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
Stano appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the state constitution and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, and we affirm the trial court's order.
After being arrested for aggravated battery in 1980, Stano confessed to having murdered numerous women. He pled guilty to six counts of first-degree murder and, pursuant to a plea agreement, received six consecutive life sentences. He later pled guilty to the two homicides central to the instant case (Volusia County) and went to trial for the murder of yet another woman (Brevard County) and currently has received a total of three death sentences. On appeal this Court affirmed those sentences. Stano v. State, 460 So.2d 890 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2347, 85 L.Ed.2d 863 (1985) (guilty pleas); Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 869, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986) (trial).
In late 1986 the governor signed a death warrant for Stano on his guilty plea death sentences. Stano then filed a rule 3.850 motion, and the trial court granted a stay in order to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Following several preliminary hearings and conferences, the court decided that the record conclusively demonstrated that no evidentiary hearing needed to be held and denied the motion for postconviction relief.
Stano now claims that the trial court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing and reargues the issues raised in his 3.850 motion. Those issues mainly allege ineffective assistance of counsel, i.e., that if counsel had made a proper investigation Stano would not have pled guilty; that counsel did so little as to leave Stano without counsel, thereby rendering his plea and waiver of his rights involuntary; that counsel should not have allowed the introduction of psychiatric reports based on Stano's unwarned statements; that counsel should have had mental health experts appointed to assist in preparing a defense; and that counsel should have precluded any use whatsoever of the presentence investigation (PSI) report. He also argues that the trial judge should have recused himself because he had previously accepted three of Stano's pleas of guilty to first-degree murder.
As the basis for complaining that trial counsel should have investigated more, Stano attacks the six guilty pleas that he made earlier. He claims that a police detective, his psychologist, and the attorney who represented him on those pleas coerced him into confessing for their own personal and professional gain. 1 He argues that his trial counsel in the instant case should have discovered this and, instead of acceding to Stano's wishes to plead guilty, should have done more.
These claims regarding ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance and the involuntariness of Stano's plea are an attempt to go behind the plea. Stano now says that he is innocent of these two murders to which he pled guilty. Faced with a "seemingly unending dilemma," the trial court held: Having previously found that there was a competent basis for the trial court's acceptance of Stano's guilty pleas and because it is clear that Stano's guilty pleas were freely and voluntarily given, without any duress, we agree. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); Robinson v. State, 373 So.2d 898 (Fla.1979); Steinhauser v. State, 228 So.2d 446 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).
An evidentiary hearing is not required when the record demonstrates conclusively that postconviction relief is not warranted. E.g., Agan v. State, 503 So.2d 1254 (Fla.1987); Lightbourne v. State, 471 So.2d 27 (Fla.1985). The trial court included numerous quotations from the original record in the order denying Stano's 3.850 motion. These portions of the record show an evidentiary hearing to be unwarranted.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set out a two-part test for determining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 Under that test, a petitioner must show both that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. Id. Stano's claims, as demonstrated by the record, do not meet this test.
As pointed out by the trial court, Stano's counsel advised the court, at the plea hearing and in Stano's presence, that he had not received full discovery in the case. Counsel went on to state:
I'm just making my position clear in Mr. Stano's presence about the entry of this plea; that is to say, that I am not fully prepared to advise him as to whether the State has sufficient evidence to convict him or not. He is convinced that they do.
I have spoken with Mr. Nixon [assistant state attorney], I have confidence, certainly, in his integrity and honesty, and he assures me that the State can independently establish the corpus delicti in both of these cases. And Mr. Stano tells me that this is so.
Further, I have asked him about the admissions or confessions that he has made to Detective Paul Crow. And he assures me that those statements were made voluntarily, they were made competently, and intelligently after warning of his rights and that, therefore, there does not exist a good possibility that either of his admissions could be suppressed on a hearing.
He feels that he wants to go forward and enter this plea rather than go through a trial or even a delay at this time.
I have agreed that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Madison v. Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Corr.
...not been done. Defendant may not now be heard to go behind his sworn testimony to make the assertions he now claims. See, Stano v. State, 520 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1988); Mikenas v. State, 460 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1984); Bir v. State, 493 So.2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).Resp. Ex. L at 45-46. Upon Petitio......
-
Mincey v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
...is not entitled to relief on this claim. SeeKelley v. State, 109 So. 3d 811, 812-13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (citing Stano v. State, 520 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1988) (holding that "[a] rule 3.850 motion cannot be used to go behind representations the defendant made to the trial court, and the cou......
-
Woods v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
...or defend the charge." Id. at 779. Pleading guilty, in effect, "render[s] any further investigation pointless." Stano v. State, 520 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 1988). As Defendant pleaded guilty and acknowledged his satisfaction with counsel, he is now precluded from alleging counsel was ineffect......
-
Erke v. Sec'y
...Additionally, a defendant may not seek to go behind his sworn testimony at a plea hearing in a post conviction motion. Stano v. State, 520 So.2d 278, 280 (Fla. 1988); Bir v. State, 493 So. 2d 55, 56 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Dean v. State, 580 So.2d 808, 810 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The record refute......