Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 1937
• Docket Number: No. 8537.,8537.
• Citation: 114 S.W.2d 699
• Parties: STANOLIND OIL & GAS CO. et al. v. STATE et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

114 S.W.2d 699

STANOLIND OIL & GAS CO. et al. v. STATE et al.

No. 8537.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

June 30, 1937.

Motions for Rehearing Overruled February 16, 1938.

Appeal from Ninety-Eighth Judicial District Court, Travis County; J. D. Moore, Judge.

Boundary suit by the State of Texas and others against the Stanolind Oil & Gas Company and others. From a judgment upon a directed verdict in favor of the State, the named defendant and others appeal.

Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

Turner, Rodgers & Winn, of Dallas, Clay Tallman and Donald Campbell, both of Tulsa, Okl., for appellant Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.

Cantey, Hanger & McMahon, Gillis A. Johnson, and Warren Scarbrough, all of Fort Worth, for appellees-appellants John H. Tyler and Eulia B. Tyler.

Geo. T. Wilson, of San Angelo, and Henry H. Brooks, of Austin, for appellees Cardinal Oil Co., Dogie Oil Co., Geo. D. Morgan, J. H. Arthur, Bob Reid, and H. W. Compton.

William McCraw, Atty. Gen., and H. Grady Chandler, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees State of Texas.

Collins, Jackson & Snodgrass, of San Angelo, for appellee M. D. Bryant.

McCLENDON, Chief Justice.

This is a boundary suit. It involves a strip of land 122.5 varas wide (east-west) and 1,209 varas long, having for its east line the west line of the Tyler survey (J. H. Tyler survey No. 1); and for its west line the east line of survey 104 (T. C. Ry. Co. survey No. 104) as located by the trial court. The involved land is within the Yates oil field in Pecos county. The suit was by the state, and was predicated upon the theory of a vacancy of at least 122.5 varas in width between the Tyler and 104. The mineral rights in 104 (subject to royalty interests, including that of the state) are owned by the Stanolind (appellant Stanolind Oil & Gas Company). The appeal is by the Stanolind from a judgment upon a directed verdict establishing the vacancy as claimed by the state.

The west line of the Tyler is established on the ground. The existence vel non of the vacancy and its width (if it exists) depend upon the true location of the east line of 104. This line is 7,600 varas east of the west line of 3 (Runnels county school land survey No. 3), which is a due south projection of the west line of 70 (I. & G. N. R. R. Company, block 1, survey No. 70). This latter line is 4,112 varas west of the southeast corner of 70. The true location of that corner is therefore determinative of the boundary issue.

The area in this vicinity has been a fruitful subject of boundary litigation since the discovery of oil in the Yates field. Several of these cases have reached the appellate courts, and the relative location of the surveys in the vicinity, their history, embracing the work of original surveyors and that of subsequent surveyors, have been carried with much particularity into the opinions of the Supreme Court and of the El Paso and Austin Courts of Civil Appeals. While it has been necessary for us to peruse the entire statement of facts (1,000 pages), the issues presented are comparatively simple; and since the evidence introduced has been in large measure stated in some of the other cases, we can see no useful purpose in reiterating it here except in general outline, referring for more detail to opinions in the other cases. At this point we refer to the maps in the following cases: Pandem Oil Corporation v. Goodrich, Tex. Civ.App., 29 S.W.2d 877, at page 879; Turner v. Smith, 122 Tex. 338, at page 355, 61 S.W.2d 792; Stanolind O. & G. Co. v. State, Tex.Sup., 101 S.W.2d 801, at page 803.

The state has granted four oil and gas leases upon the involved land, covering respectively the following area:

1. A strip 19 varas wide immediately to the west of the Tyler, to which we shall refer as the Dogie (Dogie Oil Company) lease.

2. Two strips approximately 52.6 varas wide, one immediately west of the south half of the Dogie, the other immediately west of the north half of the Dogie. To these we shall refer as the Cardinal (Cardinal Oil Company) leases.

3. A strip 50.9 varas wide immediately to the west of the Cardinal leases. To this we shall refer as the Bryant lease.

The west line of the Tyler (the location of which is not in dispute) is 7,600 varas east of the west line of 3 as located from a monument placed by Dod for the southwest corner of 3. For a detailed description of Dod's work, see opinions in Pandem Case, Tex.Civ.App., 29 S.W.2d 877, Stanolind Case, Tex.Sup., 101 S.W.2d 801, and State v. Stanolind O. & G. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 96 S.W.2d 297, 298.

The west line of the Dogie lease is 7,600 varas east of the west line of 3 as located from Dod's monumented southwest corner of 70 and northwest corner of 3.

The west lines of the Cardinal leases are 7,600 varas east of the west line of 3 as located from the so-called car spring corner as southeast corner of 70. See Stanolind opinions, above.

The west line of the Bryant lease is 7,600 varas east of the west line of 3 as located from a point 47 varas north and 50.6 varas west of the car spring corner. This point was fixed as the southeast corner of 70 by George, a licensed land surveyor in the employ of Stanolind. The directed verdict establishing the vacancy is predicated upon the theory that the Stanolind was estopped from controverting the George location. This subject will be treated later.

It is now contended by the Stanolind that the monument of Dod for the southwest corner of 3 was adjudicated as the correct location of that corner in the Supreme Court's decision in the Stanolind Case. In this we do not agree. The location of the west line neither of 3 nor of 70 was necessarily involved in the final decision of the Supreme Court. The proper location of the south line of 70 was directly involved in that decision, and since its location depended upon the location of its east terminus (southeast corner of 70), that corner was involved as to its northing, but not necessarily as to its easting. We think clearly the Stanolind decision rests upon an adjudication that the southeast corner of 70 is not farther north than the car spring corner. This for the following reasons: The Stanolind Case was a suit by the state for a 215-vara strip between the south lines of 101, 102, 103, and 104, and the north line of the Yates survey No. 34½. The location of the latter is established on the ground. Describing the tract sued for by metes and bounds, the state fixed the southwest corner of 101 by beginning at the car spring corner (as southeast corner of 70); thence west 4,112 varas (the called length of the 70 south line); thence south 6,121 varas (the combined lengths of the west lines of 3 and 101, 4,912 varas + 1,209 varas) "to the beginning point of this tract, being the area herein sued for, same being the true S. W. corner of survey 101, Block 194, T. C. Ry. Co., as patented." See Stanolind Case above, 101 S.W.2d 801, at page 803, col. 2, and page 804, col. 1. From this beginning point the area sued for is described: Thence east with south lines of 101, 102, 103, and 104, "7600 varas to the South East corner of Survey 104, for the North East corner of this tract"; thence south 215 varas to point in north line of 34½, "which point is 215 varas south and about 250 varas West of a stone mound on a flat rock marked `SE 104 Dod Oct. 15, 1918'"; thence west to point where 34½ north line is intersected by south projection of 101 west line; thence north to place of beginning. The state filed an alternative pleading predicated upon the George location of the 70 southeast corner. This pleading is copied and its effect adjudicated in a rehearing opinion in the Stanolind Case, Tex.Sup., 104 S.W.2d 1, 2. The state's hypothesis in bringing the suit was that survey 3 (an office survey) must be located by course and distance calls from its beginning (northwest) corner, the southwest corner of 70, discarding the adjoinder calls for western lines and corners of river surveys 69 to 65, inclusive. This method would locate its south line 4,912 varas south of its north line and the south lines of 101-104 (also office surveys) 6,121 varas south of the north line of 3. The south lines of 101-104 thus located would lie 215 varas north of the north line of 34½; thus leaving the vacancy sued for. This theory was adopted by the El Paso court, predicated in the main upon the majority opinion in the Smith-Turner Case. The trial court and the Supreme Court rejected this theory, and gave validity to the adjoinder calls of 3 for the west lines and corners of the river surveys. In so doing the Supreme Court adopted the work of Dod (approved by the land commissioner) in giving each of the river surveys 61-69, inclusive, an excess width of 43 varas. Dod found the southeast corner of 61 and the northeast corner of 69 (southeast 70), but was unable to locate any original corner between these points. He found an excess over calls between these points of 387 varas, which he apportioned among the nine affected surveys. He did not find the original marked southeast corner of 70, but from the description of that corner in the original field note calls of 70 he placed it either at the car spring corner, or on an east-west line with that corner. It is manifest that if this corner is located 47 varas farther north, this additional excess would have to be apportioned among the nine river surveys (61-69). This would throw the south line of 65, 20.9 varas farther north than the Dod location and create a vacancy of that width between 34½ and 101-104. Since the judgment of the trial court was upon a directed verdict, its affirmance by the Supreme Court necessarily, as above stated, adjudicated the location of the south line of 70 as not farther north than the car spring corner. We quote from the rehearing opinion in the Stanolind Case:

"We agree with the contention that an issue of fact was presented as to the exact distance north and south between the south line of survey...