Stansell v. City of Northfield

• Decision Date: 07 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. C3-00-708.,C3-00-708.
• Citation: 618 N.W.2d 814
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
• Parties: Virginia STANSELL, et al., on behalf of themselves and the State of Minnesota, Appellants, v. CITY OF NORTHFIELD, Respondent, Target Stores, a division of Dayton Hudson Corporation, Respondent.

618 N.W.2d 814

Virginia STANSELL, et al., on behalf of themselves and the State of Minnesota, Appellants, v. CITY OF NORTHFIELD, Respondent, Target Stores, a division of Dayton Hudson Corporation, Respondent.

No. C3-00-708.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

November 7, 2000.

Michael B. Chase, St. Paul, for appellants.

George C. Hoff, Paula A. Callies, Hoff, Barry & Kuderer, P.A., Eden Prairie, for respondent City of Northfield.

John B. Gordon, Michael A. Ponto, Paul B. Civello, Faegre & Benson LLP, Minneapolis, for respondent Target Stores.

Considered and decided by SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge, STONEBURNER, Judge, and HUSPENI, Judge.¹

OPINION

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Appellants Virginia Stansell, Gary Stansell, Judy Swanson, Stephen Swanson, Marilyn Haugen, Georgiana Campbell, Arthur Campbell, and Keith Harrison, on behalf of themselves and the State of Minnesota (the Northfield residents), sued respondent City of Northfield, alleging that the Northfield city council lacked authority to adopt two ordinances that allegedly contradicted an ordinance adopted by the initiative of the voters and that the council's actions in doing so violated various statutes, including the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA). Respondent Target Stores, a division of Dayton Hudson Corporation, was granted leave to intervene as a defendant. Northfield and Target moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motions. On appeal, the Northfield residents challenge only the district court's rulings that the city council had the authority to adopt the two ordinances and that the council's actions did not violate MERA. We affirm.

FACTS

In late 1997 or early 1998, Target began to investigate the possibility of building a store in Northfield. At the time, the zoning for the site Target wanted to build on would not allow uses of that nature. In October 1998, a group of Northfield residents presented an initiative petition to adopt an ordinance permitting development of large-scale retail projects such as the Target store. Attached to the initiative petition, as required by the city charter, was a proposed ordinance. The proposed ordinance, however, was in draft form; it included various comments, questions, and explanations in bracketed italics scattered throughout the text of the ordinance. When the city council did not enact the ordinance in a final form acceptable to the sponsoring committee within 60 days, the sponsoring committee requested that it be put to a vote of the electorate.

The proposed draft ordinance was published three times before the election, the first and third times including the bracketed questions, comments, and explanations, the second time without them. When the voters went to the polls, however, they apparently did not have before them the exact text of a proposed ordinance. Instead, the voters voted yes or no to the following initiative question: "Shall the City of Northfield enact an ordinance to permit planned development zones for large-scale retail establishments in highway commercial districts?" A majority of voters voted yes.

After the election, the city council continued working with Target on the final form of an ordinance that would allow Target to proceed with its project. The city council eventually passed Ordinances 718 and 719. The ordinances differed in some areas from the initiative ordinance proposed by the sponsoring committee.

The Northfield residents sued Northfield to prevent the city council from implementing Ordinances 718 and 719, claiming that those ordinances contradicted the initiative passed by the voters, violated several statutes, and were otherwise illegal. The district court granted Target leave to intervene as a defendant. Northfield and Target brought separate motions for summary judgment, both of which the district court granted.

ISSUES

1) Do the Northfield residents have standing to challenge the city council's authority to adopt Ordinances 718 and 719?

2) Did the trial court err in granting Northfield's and Target's motions for summary judgment on the MERA claim?

ANALYSIS

On an appeal from summary judgment, we ask whether there are any genuine issues of material fact in dispute and whether the trial court erred in applying the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990)

. We review de novo the district court's interpretation of the law, including questions of statutory interpretation. Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn.1990); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Carlson, 590 N.W.2d 130, 134 (Minn.App.1999),

aff'd, 610 N.W.2d 293 (Minn.2000). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted and accept as true that party's factual allegations. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993). Summary judgment on a claim is mandatory against a party with the burden of proof who fails to establish an essential element of its claim, because that failure renders all other facts immaterial. Lloyd v. In Home Health, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 2, 3 (Minn.App.1994). We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any ground. Winkler v. Magnuson, 539 N.W.2d 821, 828 (Minn.App.1995),

review denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1996).

1. The first issue we address is whether the city council had the authority to adopt Ordinances 718 and 719. If they had no such authority, we need not consider whether the ordinances violated MERA. The threshold question on this issue is whether the Northfield residents have standing to challenge the city council's authority to adopt the ordinances. Because the district court did not address standing, the Northfield residents question whether this issue is properly before the court, but "[s]tanding may be raised at any time." Cochrane v. Tudor Oaks Condominium Project, 529 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Minn.App. 1995) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. May 31, 1995).

Although the Northfield residents' complaint alleges that they are "individuals * * * who have been injured by and have standing to challenge illegal actions by the Northfield City Council," they do not allege that they have suffered any specific injuries as the result of the city council's actions. Instead, they seem to be litigating a matter of public interest. Indeed, both their complaint and their brief on appeal claim they are prosecuting this action "on behalf of themselves and the State of Minnesota."

Persons who wish to bring suit on a matter of public interest must demonstrate "either (1) damages distinct from the public's injury, or (2) express statutory authority." Conant v. Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P., 603 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Minn. App.1999) (citations omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 2000). The Northfield residents have alleged no distinct damages. As a result, absent statutory authority to sue, they would lack standing.

Minnesota law, however, does include a statute granting the right to sue to challenge a municipality's land-use actions:

Any person aggrieved by an ordinance, rule, regulation, decision or order of a governing body or board of adjustments and appeals acting pursuant to sections 462.351 to 462.364 may have such ordinance, rule, regulation, decision or order, reviewed by an appropriate remedy in the district court, subject to the provisions of this section.

Minn.Stat. § 462.361, subd. 1 (1998). The Northfield residents may therefore maintain their action if they qualify as "person[s] aggrieved" by the city council's action.

Neither the statute nor any published Minnesota case defines the term "person aggrieved" for the purpose of Minn.Stat. § 462.361. The term has, however, been defined in the context of other statutes. In order for an "aggrieved party" to have the right to appeal a decision under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, for example, the person must be "injuriously or adversely affected by the judgment or decree when it operates on his rights of property or bears directly upon his personal interest." In re Getsug, 290 Minn. 110, 114, 186 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1971). This definition has also been applied to other statutes. See, e.g., In re Black, 522 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Minn.App.1994)

(interpreting provision of Minn.Stat. § 46.044 allowing "person aggrieved" to obtain judicial review of Commissioner of Commerce's determination), review denied (Minn. Nov. 29, 1994).

As a matter of statutory construction, we presume that the legislature uses the same words the same way, even in different statutes. Angell v. Hennepin County, 565 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Minn.App. 1997), aff'd, 578 N.W.2d 343 (Minn.1998). We therefore interpret the term "person aggrieved" in Minn.Stat. § 462.361 to grant standing to a person when an action by the municipality adversely "operates on his rights of property or bears directly upon his personal interest." In re Getsug, 290 Minn. at 114, 186 N.W.2d at 689. Because the Northfield residents have not alleged any such particularized injuries, they lack standing to challenge the city council's authority to adopt Ordinances 718 and 719.

2. The Northfield residents also claim that the ordinances violate the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA). MERA protects "air, water, land and other natural resources located within the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction." Minn.Stat. § 116B.01 (1998). Under the statute, the definition of the term "natural resources" includes "historical resources." Minn.Stat. § 116B.02, subd. 4 (1998). The term "historical resources" is not defined.

There is no dispute that Northfield's Central Business District is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. But the Northfield residents do not merely claim that the buildings in the district are protected "historical resources." They also claim that the Central Business District as a functioning economic entity is a protected historical resource.

The Northfield residents cite Chinese Staff & Workers...